University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1983

Realignment and institutional change.
Barry S. Delin
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Delin, Barry S., "Realignment and institutional change." (1983). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February
2014. 1944.
https://doi.org/10.7275/c555-6k71 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1944

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

REALIGNMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

A Dissertation Presented

By

BARRY S. DELIN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September

1983

Political Science

Barry S. Del in
All

1983

Rights Reserved

ii

REALIGNMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

A Dissertation Presented

By

BARRY

S.

DELIN

Approved as to style and content by:

Johri

Brigham

Chciirperson of Committee

Sheldon Goldman, Member

/Glen Gordon, Chairman
Political Science Department

1 i i

my parents, Sydney and Pearl

iv

Del

PREFACE

This dissertation is not the one

I

first intended to write.

My

original plan was to investigate the relationships between patterns of

authority in the workplace and individuals' development of political
efficacy.

Unable to conduct the necessary research

I

turned to

a

second

idea, an examination of the relationships between realignment and insti-

tutional

change.

The two dissertation topics are more closely related than they

might appear to be at first glance.

I

consider individual political

efficacy to rest on certain cognitive skills as well
ings of competence.

viduals act in

a

as

subjective feel-

Still, however political efficacy is defined, indi-

structured world.

Institutional structure and process

have important effects on how and whether individuals, however effica-

cious, can obtain their political ends.
In the United States, elections are said to provide a mechanism

through which

a

mass citizenry can control

This assertion can be viewed as

society.
tion.

I

a

central

the actions of governments.

political myth of American

do not evaluate the validity of this myth in this disserta-

However, even staunch believers in the myth of popular sovereign-

ty accept the fact that there is often a large discrepancy between

majority views and government action, often for substantial time
periods.

Realignments, some argue, provide the most important way to

overcome this discrepancy.

V

students of realignment generally identify the
conformity between

citizen preferences and government action in terms
of political agendas
and public policies.

I

have no objection to this choice of indicators.

However, another indicator should be added, institutional
structure and
process.

My reason is simple.

can and cannot be accomplished.

Structure and process influence what
If realignments constitute

of long term political dominance to
there is

a

a

a

transfer

new partisan coalition, then

prima facie reason for institutional change to take place.

Institutional structure and process that helped

previously dominant

a

coalition to obtain its policy goals would necessarily discourage the
adoption and implementation of substantially different policy goals.
This dissertation is an investigation of the existence and process of post realignment institutional

change.

In

Chapter

I,

I

examine

the realignment literature to see how these questions have already been

treated and for suggestions on how to proceed with my investigation.

Chapter

II

is

an analysis of the meaning of the term governmental

tution and in turn what it means for such institutions to change.

analysis

is

instiThis

built on the concept of social practice as the key element

of institutional life.

Institutional change is understood mainly as

the transformation and subsequent crystallization of institutional
practi ce

Chapters III, IV, and V are case studies of institutional change

following electoral events.
tutional

The first two case studies examine insti-

change in the 1930s, focusing on the development of the EOP

and the evolution of the pre-NLRA labor boards.

vi

The third case study

is

an examination of recent changes

1980 election is not considered

a

in the budget process.

realigning election, the choice of

the third case study requires additional

realignment theory
1930s.
is

is

Because the

the absence of

a

comment.

critical

realignment since the

There is growing skepticism over whether

possible under current conditions.

A current issue in

a

classic realignment

Yet the degree of policy change

following the 1980 election more closely resembles the level of change

associated with realigning elections than with other kinds of elections.

Thus the 1980 election may represent

a

new type of election,

one not easily placed in present classifications of elections but

performing some of the functions associated with realigning elections.
The case studies focus mainly on the process of institutional

change following elections.

In

Chapter VI my goal

is

to explicate the

connections between institutional change and the periods of debate and

politicization that occur before realigning (and comparable) elections.
Finally, Chapter VII examines the inadequacy of the metaphor that underlies realignment theory, the exercise of popular sovereignty,

initial suggestions about

a

I

make

substitute understanding, based on Alain

Touraine's idea of debates.

Whatever is of value in this dissertation
help and support of many people, not all of whom
In

particular

I

the result of the

I

can mention here.

owe much to the members of my dissertation committee,

John Brigham, Sheldon Goldman, and James Wright.
special

is

John Brigham deserves

thanks for his painstaking efforts to help me improve my writing

vi

i

and thereby the clarity of my argument.

Despite the improvement,

I

am

aware of how much more can be done.
This dissertation would not have been completed without
the sup-

port and encouragement of Helen Schneider.

Orchard Hill

Residential

As my supervisor at the

College at the University of Massachusetts/

Amherst, Helen not only insisted that

I

finish my dissertation, but

facilitated that process in many ways.
Finally,

I

must acknowledge the support of my wife, Shirley Ann

Haslip, and of my daughter, Polly Jo Haslip.

Polly's main contribution

was to humor me and when that was impossible to simply tolerate me.

I

also wanted to complete my college education before Polly started hers.
I

have managed it with

a

margin of several days to spare.

I

owe an

enormous debt to Shirley, who completed her dissertation several months
ago.

The fact that she found the time and patience to give me both

emotional support and editorial help implies the praise she so richly

deserves
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ABSTRACT

Realignment and Institutional Change
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Barry S. Delin, B.A., University of Illinois,
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor John Brigham

The United States has been characterized by long periods of rela-

tive stability in electoral coalitions, issue agendas, and public poli-

These periods begin and end in partisan realignments, which are

cies.

major and persistent changes in electoral coalitions.

Realignments are

normally followed by major policy changes that are supposed to be in
close accord with the electoral majority's preferences.

The literature

also suggests that important institutional change follows realignments.
This claim, and the evidence and argument that support it, receive only

passing attention.

This dissertation presents a sustained exploration

of the relationships between realignments and institutional change

through examination of case study material.

Particular attention
change.

is

given to the process of institutional

Institutional structure and process necessarily influence what

can or cannot be done through institutions.
tions embody political purpose.

All

governmental institu-

This dissertation explores what it

means for an institution to embody political purpose and what it means
to say that an institution has changed.

I

argue that institutional

structure and process are rooted in the practices and understandings of

ix

institutional participants.

Realignments are seen as contextual

events that provide incentives for the development of new practices.

Realignment theory, and the research based on it, contain

a

charac-

teristic understanding of how realignments encourage policy and institutional change.

Change results from the electorate's use of its latent

power of popular sovereignty.

This viewpoint provides an insufficient

understanding of the process of change following realignments.
alternative

is

An

suggested based on Alain Touraine's concept of debate.

While realigning elections retain an important role in encouraging governmental response to deep social tensions, an election is only one

moment in the process of articulating, joining, and resolving
debate.

a

social

One implication of this understanding is that some functions of

realignments can be performed by elections and other political events
that do not fit the classic idea of realignment.

X
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CHAPTER

I

REALIGNMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Institutional Stability and Change in the United States

In their broad outlines the

government and political institutions

of the United States of America have changed very little in comparison
to those of most other nation states.

Even in comparison with those na-

tion states with political systems similar to that of the United States,
i.e., those systems termed liberal democratic, the United States has

exhibited an unusual degree of institutional stability over the course
of its history.

Despite the enormous social and economic changes com-

parable to those in other liberal democracies, the United States Constitution has been in continuous operation for nearly two hundred years.

Amendments to that document have had remarkably little effect upon

either the formal structures or powers of the national government.

This

stability even extends to many institutional features of the political

system which are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.
Nevertheless, some observers have perceived significant institutional change in the American political system.

A distinction is some-

times drawn between the Constitution as a written document and the
actual structure, process, and function of

community in the United States.

a

government and political

That is, the form and operation of

institutions is related to but in no sense simply an outgrowth of

1

a

2

literal reading of the constitutional document.

tween

a

formal and real constitution is not

This distinction be-

new one.

a

As early as the

1880s Woodrow Wilson wrote that:

... the Constitution is
only the sap-centre of a system of
government vastly larger than the stock from which it has branched a system, some of whose fomis have only very indistinct and
rudimental beginnings in the simple substance of the Constitution, and
which exercises many functions apparently quite foreign to the
primitive properties contained in the fundamental law
.1
.

.

.

.

.

In a more recent and far stronger statement of this viewpoint,

Theodore

Lowi has claimed that the United States is currently operating under

a

regime that in its essential operation and basis of legitimacy is dif-

ferent than the regime defined by the Constitution of 1787.
terminology, the present government of the United States is
Republic."

In Lowi's
a

"Second

Lowi also contends that in reality the U.S. has gone through

several basic regime alterations since the revolution; he calls the pre-

sent regime the Second Republic only because the other changes had not
been properly noticed and enumerated in the past.

2

Whether Lowi is cor-

rect in his assertions is not as important here as his proposition that

important changes in the structure, process, and function of the U.S.
political system have taken place through its history.

Discussions about how significant political change occurs in the
United States (or elsewhere for that matter) is bound up to underlying
To speak about political

ideas about the nature of political activity.

change is to at least implicitly make claims about the nature and distribution of power.
this dissertation.

Thus,

I

will also be making such claims throughout

For the moment, however,

I

only wish to alert read-

ers to the many sources of political change, such as change initiated by

3

a

cohesive elite outside the government, interest
group initiatives,

acts by government officials, inevitable
adjustments to social or econo-

mic imperatives, or even the unforeseen results of
purportedly incremental

changes.

In a liberal

democracy there is also the possibility of

important change initiated upon the demand of ordinary citizens,
that
is, change initiated on the basis of popular sovereignty.

Given the oft

repeated claim that governments in liberal democracies, particularly
in
regard to important long term policies and commitments, rest on the
consent of the governed; the question of popular sovereignty should be

examined as one source of major political change in such systems.
Furthennore, those policies that shape

a

government's basic structure,

process and function are the most important in the long run.

Indeed,

the question of how a liberal democracy alters its structure and process
is central

cal

to any investigation of the efficacy of a democratic politi-

system, both in terms of

a

system's response to majoritarian needs

and wishes and in terms of the possibility that citizens, individually

and collectively, can act efficaciously within that system.

There is no universally accepted definition of the concept of popular sovereignty.

However,

I

contend that in the United States popular

sovereignty generally means that the preferences of long term majorities
will be translated into governmental policy.

There are many ways in

which citizens either explicitly or implicitly attempt to influence

governmental activity and there is significant disagreement over whether

majority preferences are in fact expressed and if so, when and how.

In

terms of the sheer numbers of participants involved, national elections

4

provide the most fully utilized form of political
participation.
ther, elections are

form of structured decision making."^

a

Fur-

Because

electoral choices are highly structured, virtually the entire citizenry
can participate.

However, individuals can make electoral choices with-

out devoting much in the way of their own time and effort.

provide an extremely "cheap" form of participation.

Elections

Also, the very

aspects of elections that allow low cost participation mean that neither
citizens nor government officials can learn anything directly about public preferences beyond the choices structured into the ballot.

In the

United States all national elections are for the selection of governmental officials, only two of which, the President and the Vice President, are elected on
the ballot.

a

national basis.

There are never any issues on

While candidates and political parties can choose to wage

electoral battle on well defined issues or upon clear presentation of

ideological positions, it is widely recognized that American candidates
and major parties have rarely done so.

claim that national elections provide

Then, on what basis can anyone
a

mechanism for promoting popular

sovereignty in the United States?
Even the most cursory examination of American political history
will demonstrate that elements of the body politic change over time.

Tariff policy was one of the preeminent political issues of the 19th
century.

While not without importance today, the tariff is now

dary concern.

a

secon-

Few people would support a candidate or party simply

because of the position taken on that issue.

Besides changes in the

issue agenda, there have been changes in public policy and in the

5

fortunes of different political organizations and
coalitions.
is

meant to be indicative not exhaustive; the point

is

This list

that persons in-

terested in understanding United States politics need to talk explicitly

about the existence of political change and its possible relationship to
the exercise of popular sovereignty by

a

mass electorate.

Robert Dahl has suggested talking about political change in the
United States in the context of what he calls "historical commitments,"
that is, choices made at times among

a

number of possibilities.

These

choices structure or mold future political and social development in the
society.
as

The commitments made cease to be seen as choices, but simply

expressions of the natural order of things.

Dahl

cautions us not to

see this process as rational and neat, but to identify it by the exis-

tence and cessation of conflict that was

"...

overt, bitter, sometimes

prolonged, and in one way or another came to involve
ber of citizens."

4

a

substantial num-

While Dahl's primary aim is to investigate the im-

plications of historical commitments, one can infer that the involvement
of numerous citizens suggests some role for elections, and thereby

popular sovereignty, in the process of making

a

historical commitment.

Particularly suggestive is Dahl's point that conflict on the relevant
issues generally dies quickly and that the end of most of the periods of

conflict coincides with presidential election years, such as 1800, 1896,
or 1932.

These election years are somehow thought to be especially sig-

m ficant. 5
Of course Dahl, or any other current political scientist with an

interest in American national politics, knows that there

is

a

whole body

6

of work which seeks to explain why certain
elections are more important
than the others over the long haul.

Long periods of relative electoral

stability have been punctuated by occasional periods of
partisan realignment.

In

realigning periods significant numbers of voters form or

reconfinn long standing attachments to

a

political party.

The elections

where major realignment takes place, or at least in retrospect where
realignment can be observed, are termed "realigning" or "critical" elections.

These elections are presumed to have

a

significant impact on the

subsequent character of political life.
Given that most elections or most non-electoral mass political

participation in the United States are not acts of popular sovereignty
in the sense of determining public policy, the concept of realignment,

i.e., that some elections have long term implications, provides

a

basis

from which to claim that popular sovereignty exists and in turn to in-

vestigate its meaning.

For example. Trilling and Campbell, two promi-

nent students of the realignment phenomenon, speak about realignment and

popular sovereignty as follows:
The essential element--ci tizen control of government--exists only in
Realignment translates this cona potential form most of the time.
trol into kinetic form, and it is the fact that control can occur
that makes a system democratic.

Thus, realignment theory provides

citizenry as

a

a

kind of last ditch defense that the

whole, on the basis of majoritarian decision making, con-

trols the general nature and activity of the United States political

system as opposed to merely influencing the decisions of
elite.

However, there is no inherent reason why

a

a

political

different contention.

7

that realignments at best mediate the activities
of

would be untrue.

a

political elite,

Even if this weaker contention (from the
standpoint of

democratic values) is the more accurate description of
political reality, realignment might still

be a phenomenon of some importance in ex-

plaining how and why political change occurs.
Over the years since

V.

Theory of Critical Elections,"

0.
a

Key's path breaking article in 1955,

"A

rudimentary theory of the realignment

process has gained wide acceptance.

Although there are

a

number of

important disagreements about how realignments occur and what their effects are, most observers conceptualize realignment as

a

five step pro-

cess which links the political environment to both mass and elite

behavior and thence to public policy formation.

The process begins with

the existence of severe social or economic tensions that gradually rise
to levels which seem to threaten social

stability.

Eventually there are

rapid and persistent electoral shifts in the makeup of the coalitional
bases of the two major political parties.
tion, or series of elections, itself.

This is the critical elec-

The fourth part of the process is

the turnover, resulting directly or indirectly from the realigning

election, of elected officials, party leaders, and to

a

lesser extent

appointive governmental officials such as judges and career bureaucrats.
Finally, the political system responds to the underlying crisis with new

policies which are in accordance with the interests or perhaps the

expressed preferences of the new majority coalition.
is

most often described as sequential, it

is

While this process

only roughly so.

For

example, shifts in political leadership and government policy may

8

proceed concurrently.

alignment is still in

Most observers concede that any "theory"
of rea

very tentative stage of development.''

Before proceeding, it

is

also important to note the distinction

between the terms "critical" and "secular" realignment.

Critical

re-

alignment refers to an important and sudden shift in the composition
of
electoral coalitions.

Secular realignment refers to important electoral

changes arising from long tenn demographic changes.
analytical, not necessarily empirical.

The distinction is

However, it is important to

remember that unless otherwise qualified, the term realignment will be
used to mean critical realignment for the duration of this dissertation.
The results of critical

realignments may manifest themselves in an

area other than voter identification and party competition, alternation
in political

leadership, or public policy formation.

Despite the ap-

pearance of long term institutional stability in American politics,
realignments also have an impact upon the very structure and operation
of political institutions themselves.

How institutions are organized

influences what can or cannot be done through them.

Any attempt to

enact important changes in public policy will be encouraged or dis-

couraged by existing institutional arrangements.

There is no reason to

assume that institutional forms that proved useful to the dominant interests of

a

particular political era would necessarily prove as useful

to those of the subsequent political era.

opposite.

Indeed one should expect the

New clusters of interests wanting innovations in public poli-

cy would need to make some institutional changes to facilitate their own

9

goals.
cal

One purpose of this dissertation is
to inquire into the empiri-

truth of this contention.

Before proceeding, it is important to give
some content to the
idea of significant institutional change.

about wholesale changes in the nature of
from

a

On one extreme, one can talk
a

regime; for example

system based on separation of powers to

system, or

a

a

shift

a

unified parlimentary

change from hereditary privilege to popular consent
as the

basis of political legitimacy.

If this

is

the standard used,

I

would

certainly agree with those who say that the United States has
experienced little significant institutional change over the past
two centuries.

Alternatively, one can claim that virtually any modification in

institutional organization, recruitment patterns, internal procedure,
etc.

is

eral

indicators of "significant institutional change" that would apply

important.

Rejecting both these extremes,

to the United States.

I

am proposing sev-

Although the full range of important political

institutions may stretch far beyond the confines of government formally
defined, in this dissertation

I

will consider only change among and

within governmental institutions.
Given that institutional change in the United States government

usually involves something less than the creation of new branches of

government, the search for significant institutional change must be carried out within the structure of the government.

Organizations are

created and disbanded occasionally; the functions and jurisdictions of
organizational units also change over time.
important?

What counts as truly

My first suggestion is to look for the appearance of new

10

institutional forms, especially when the government
creates

a

large num-

ber of organizational units constituted on the basis
of the new form.
For example, the independent regulatory commission
was created as

institutional form in the late 19th century.

a

new

These organizations pro-

liferated in the 20th century, particularly after Franklin
Roosevelt's

administration came to office.

It wasn't simply the creation of an

institutional fonn that was important, but its increased use at

a

later

time.

Another indication is when established institutions take on significant functions different in subject matter from those they performed
in the past.

took on

a

For example, after World War II the Department of Defense

major role in foreign policy making and implementation that

DOD's organizational predecessor, the War Department, did not have.
a

third area of significant institutional change

ing changes in the formal and even informal

mental institutions.

I

As

would suggest examin-

relationships among govern-

As a case in point, when Congress created the

Bureau of the Budget, Congress hoped that the agency would provide

information and expertise that would strengthen the legislature itself.
Today, the BOB's successor agency, the Office of Management and Budget,
is often viewed as a

major political competitor of Congress, especially

of many of Congress' committees and subcommittees.

gress, in the 1970s, felt the need to create

a new

Ironically, Con-

budgeting agency of

its own to perform many of the same purposes as the original Bureau of

the Budget.

11

Finally, when governments begin to
perform new kinds of functions,
as opposed to simply adding a new version
of a familiar function, impor-

tant institutional change has occurred.
dized

a

If

a

government that has subsi-

given activity, let us say railroad transportation,
now decides

to subsidize air travel, it may have to
create a new organizational

unit.

Still, that new unit would not need to operate in

different fashion than the agency aiding the railroads.

a

radically

I

would not

classify this example as significant institutional change.

On the other

hand, if the government wanted to design, implement,
and operate an

entirely new transportation technology, previous institutional
forms

would not be as relevant to the task.

Further, new kinds of functions

seem to require new forms of justification to legitimate them.^

Significant institutional change might well occur in other ways.
However, the subject here is whether and in what ways institutional

change arises out of electoral realignment.

The remainder of this chap-

ter is devoted to examining what researchers interested in realignment

have to say on this subject.

Because they have said relatively little,

the primary foci of research have been to establish the empirical vali-

dity of the concept, to develop

a

methodology to accurately identify

realignment periods, and to understand the electoral and coalitional
shifts that occur in realignments.

As Campbell

and Trilling point out,

the concept of realignment was originally seen as an electoral phenomenon.

tions.

Only later did researchers begin to explore its other ramifica9

Nonetheless, the earliest researchers were concerned with the

overall nature of American politics and their interpretations provided

12

hints that institutional change was among
the results of the realignment
process.

This chapter will close with

a

brief examination of several

other writers who do not focus on realignment
per se, but have considered the issue of significant political or
institutional change in the
United States.

The Realignment Literature:
Application to the
Analysis of Institutional Change

I

am dividing my consideration of realignment research
into three

chronological periods.

In the first period,

roughly 1955 through the

early 1960s, researchers aimed at defining the concept and demonstrating
its empirical existence.

Key, E.

E.

Important figures in this period include

V.

Schattschneider, and the Michigan Survey Research group.

0.

In

the second period, centering around 1970, most researchers focused on

describing and explaining the causes and mechanics of realignment.

The

studies by Burnham and Sundquist are probably the definitive ones of
this period.

The third period, that of the past decade, has witnessed

an increasing concern with the implications of realignment on political

leadership and public policy, though not specifically on institutional
adaptati on.

Initial Work:

Developing the Concept

The terms "realignment" and "critical election" were originally

defined by V.

0.

Key.

Key's initial work in this area focused on the

classification of United States national elections; although this interest in classification was certainly linked to broader interests into how
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the political process operates.

tempt to move toward

The author notes that

.

.

the at-

better understanding of elections in the terms

a

here employed could provide a means for better integrating
the study of

political behavior with the analysis of political systems. "^^
Key's definition of the critical or realigning election has
been
the one, which with various modifications, has been used by
subsequent

researchers investigating realignment and electoral cycles.
elements of his definition include:
(2)

(1)

The central

unusually deep voter concern,

high voter turnout, (3) decisive results that show important changes

in pre-existing

electoral alignments and divisions, and (4) persistence

of new electoral alignments for at least several future national elections.

Key stresses this fourth element, persistence of the new align-

ment, as the single most important indicator of

a

critical election.

Implicit in Key's original work on critical elections is the notion of
electoral cycles, although he did not explore either what prompts

a

alignment or what happens between critical elections in any detail.
Key observed that,

".

.

.An understanding of elections

re-

Yet

and, in turn, of

the democratic process must rest partially on broad differentiations of
the complexes of behavior that we call elections."

1

Key's observation

implies that electoral cycles have an important impact on subsequent
political developments.
Key's discovery and interpretation of electoral realignment rests
on aggregate voting data.

However, among the students of voting behav-

ior of the 1950s and 1960s, Key was unusually sensitive to the possibility that voting constituted rational acts by many, perhaps most, voters
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within the limits of the information
and alternatives available to

themJ3

His views on this matter are important
here insofar as any con-

nection between any policy or institutional impact
of realignment and

popular sovereignty requires that voters are rational
actors pursuing
their understanding of their individual and social
interests, at least

during periods of realignment.

Specification of the form and dynamics

of voter rationality would inform ideas of how the
expression of voter

preferences influences, or directs, the actions of government
officials
and other powerholders in the social order.

According to Key, the most useful and accurate explanation of an

individual's vote is his or her perception of past candidate performance.

In the context of presidential

elections, this clearly means the

performance of the administration not just the incumbent.

Key acknow-

ledges that election campaigns, childhood socialization, and other

factors have an impact on the vote, but he says that impact is secondary.

1

As Key points out:

Governments must act or not act and action or inaction may convert
supporters into opponents or opponents into supporters.
Events,
over which government may, or more likely may not, have control,
shape the attitudes of voters to the advantage or disadvantage of
the party in power.
If Key is correct electoral judgements are largely retrospective, one

cannot claim

a

direct relationship between electoral results and insti-

tutional change.
a

However one can conceptualize

a

relationship in which

new administration would undertake institutional change as part of its

policy response to the perceived dissatisfactions of the electorate with
the previous administration.

Further, institutional adaptations might
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then, in a general way, be ratified or rejected
by voters in the next

election.
Key divides voters in any given election into three
categories:

"standpatters," "switchers," and "new voters."

Individuals do not

necessarily stay in these categories in future elections and
members of
of the categories are presumed to act rationally in casting their

all

votes.

Standpatters are individuals who vote for the same (presiden-

tial) party they did in the previous election.

party allegiance.

Switchers change their

However, it is important to note that such changes

may or may not be longstanding.

The category of new voters includes

registered voters who did not vote in the previous presidential election
as well

as those not registered before.

Even in nomal

,

realigning elections, switchers and new voters constitute

nificant part of the electorate.

that is nona

very sig-

Key reported that typically 30 to 40

percent of the electorate did not "standpat" in any given normal election.

1

g

These percentages are probably higher today given the decline

in party identification and organization in the two decades since Key

wrote The Responsible Voter

.

Realignment necessarily means an even

greater degree of either switchers or new voters, and probably both, in
the electorate.

However, the dynamics of the election following realignment, i.e.,
the one in which the new political order presumably receives the elec-

torate's blessing, are not as obvious.
be

a

One possible expectation would

relatively stable electorate as those who had wanted

standpat.

a

change now

Notwithstanding this expectation. Key found evidence of

a
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post-alignment movement of voters based on the
policies and ideological
appeals of the newly dominant political party
and coal itionJ^

second effect

is

This

more consistent with the idea of retrospective
judge-

ment in that persons dissatisfied before realignment
might be equally or
more dissatisfied with the record of the new
administration.
The preceding material
tical

tion.

should not be taken to suggest that

election is little more than an extreme case of

a

typical

a

cri-

elec-

Key notes two differences in the election itself and two
more in

its outcome.

It is

clear that while issues are not necessarily better

defined they are more salient.

More voters are usually involved, not

only in the act of voting, but in the political discourse that surrounds
the election as well.

Similarly, the results are different in kind.

New aggregate structures of voting patterns and other kinds of political

support become apparent and these new structures, while not static, are
persistent.

For instance, the patterns growing out of the realignment

of 1896 were still clearly discernible on the eve of the Great Depression.

Today, even a half century after the New Deal

realignment, enough

of the structure of the great Democratic majority remains that contem-

porary Democrats can still seriously talk about its remobi

1 i

zation.

Key never wrote at length about institutional change arising from

realignment.

Key did pay greater attention to the question of policy

changes after realignment and he did so in
was

a

a

way that suggested there

linkage between realignment and institutional change.

As early as

1955 Key speculated that critical elections might have implications upon

public administration, the legislative process, and the operation and
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regulation of the economyJ^

In later

work, Key, speaking about the New

Deal, emphasized the basic changes in the
relationship between the state

and the citizenry that occurred at that time.

While Key writes mostly

about policy initiatives, he seems aware that new
kinds of institutions

were needed to implement these departures, e.g.,

a

or an NRA to support industrial self-regulation.^^

WPA for direct relief
In truth

the dis-

tinction between policy change and institutional change may sometimes
be
only an analytical one.

If institutions are in the end human creations

meant to serve certain purposes, then

a

prima facie reason for institu-

tional change is to implement new purposes.

A second approach to the study of realignment stemmed from the

work on individual voting behavior conducted by Campbell, Converse,
Miller, and Stokes.

The group's primary concern was to understand indi-

vidual voting decisions in terms of individual perceptions and attitudes.

As such they were less immediately concerned with the social and

political context in which the individual vote occurs.

However, since

one of their key attitudinal variables was voters' psychological identification with
et al

.

a

political party, i.e., "party identification," Campbell

realized that they had to understand why there are both short

term and long term variations in the votes given to party candidates in

different elections, despite the relative stability of party identification among individual voters.
The concept Campbell et al

.

use to capture the meaning of elec-

tions, as opposed to describing individual attitudinal and behavioral

change, is the "normal vote."

The meaning of elections is understood by
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the degree of deviation they exhibit
compared to the ideal, although

empirically unknown, situation of an election
where voters act in perfect accordance with their long standing
identification with

political party.

a

given

2''

All

presidential elections are in some sense differ-

ent from the normal vote, although the party with
the largest percentage
of identifiers is usually expected to win.
this a "maintaining election."

Campbell and associates call

Occasionally there will be enough varia-

tion from the normal vote for the minority party to win.
a

"deviating election."

This is called

Finally, there is the situation where devia-

tions from the normal vote are both massive and permanent.

In this

situation it is also likely that many new voters will come to the
polls
for the first time.

Like Key, Campbell et al. call this

a

"realigning

election.
Campbell et al

.

said little about either the mechanics or the ef-

fects of realigning elections.

This is consistent with their emphasis

on individual attitudinal stability and change as determined through

pre-election surveys.

All

of their data collection was done during

maintaining and deviating elections.

Yet the SRC group has made some

suggestions about the relationships between voters and government officials which provide insights into understanding the relationship between

realignment and policy and institutional change.
Campbell et al.

recognize the limited formal decision that occurs

in United States national

holders.
meani ng:

elections, that is, the selection of office

However, they also argue that all elections hold an implicit
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We have said that popular elections are one
of several means of
decision making in the political system, that this
system coheres
largely because its decision processes are bound
together by relations of mutual influence, and that, as a result,
decisions of the
electorate are of interest for their influence on what
occurs elsewhere in the system.

Reviewing their survey evidence, the authors note that the
electorate as
a

whole does not have detailed information about the past actions
or fu-

ture plans of public officials, political parties, or governmental
in-

stitutions.

They also point out that extremely few voters think in ways

that can be characterized as ideological.

Rather, Campbell et al

.

claim

that the electorate defines the broad universe of political discourse
and action by approving or rejecting presidential candidates and their

parties based on general understandings of the notions of "general
societal goals" that these candidates/parties represent.
sions" are most focused during realignments.

These "deci-

Indeed, the authors

believe that realignments are times of increased ideological focus and
that this focus provides incentives for

group within
.

.

priorities.

a
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major party, or

a

a

minority party, an insurgent

third party to suggest new governmental

Thus, the substance of the so-called Campbell -Key debate

on voter rationality is hardly substance at all when it comes to re-

alignment.

During realignment the ill informed non-rational independent

voter portrayed by the Michigan group acts very much like Key's rational
switcher.
A third major example of early work on the concept of realignment
is that of E.

Schattschneider, particularly as presented in The Semi-

E.

Sovereign People

.

Unlike Key or the SRC group, Schattschneider pays

scant attention to how voters make their choices or to how to classify
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elections.

For the most part Schattschneider doesn't use
the same ter-

minology as most other scholars in the field.

His stated purpose in The

Semi -Sovereign People is

... to work out a theory about the relation between organization
and conflict, the relation between political organization and democracy, and the organizational alternatives open to the American
people.
The assumption made throughout is that the nature of political organization depends on the conflicts exploited in the political system, which ultimately is what politics is about. 26
Schattschneider holds that in

a

liberal democracy elections provide a

simple and regular avenue of public participation in working out political conflicts.

But elections are also by their nature highly struc-

tured, that is, organized events.

Schattschneider offers

a

normative

standard for judging if the organization of popular sovereignty through
elections is

a

viable one.

He points out that the importance of the

decisions made by the public is more significant than the number of
decisions made.

Furthermore, he contends that the nature of available

alternatives, i.e., the "completeness" of the options, is every bit as

important as the nature of the issues.
sense, should be organized in

have incentives to act in

a

a

Elections, in the broadest

way in which political leadership will

manner consistent with these standards.
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Schattschneider was aware that United States national elections
rarely meet these standards.

Still, Schattschneider noted that about

half dozen presidential elections had

a

a

truly important impact on Ameri-

can society; the very elections that Key, the Michigan group, and subse-

quent writers identify as critical or realigning.

28

Schattschneider

clearly identifies the elections of 1896 and 1932 as realigning and discusses the nature and some of the implications of these realignments.

29
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However, Schattschneider

'

s

contribution to understanding realignment

does not come from his ability to identify the phenomenon.

contribution comes from providing

a

His main

language suitable for talking about

the reasons for and the implications of great electoral and
political

shifts
Like most American political scientists, Schattschneider saw politics as
a

a

quasi-market process where individuals and groups competed in

framework of widely accepted rules and institutions.

Within this

framework it is the conflict over differences rather than any shared
sense of community that provides the key to comprehending political
life.

Community or solidarity is seen as mainly the product of con-

flict, that is, as a result of people either pursuing their goals or

opposing others pursuing different goals.

For Schattschneider, it isn't

important that conflict exists, as he sees that as inevitable, but how

particular conflicts get to be defined as important ones.

Major con-

flicts literally define the political system, drawing lines of both

division and unification.

Many new or potential conflicts remain,

either unimportant, suppressed, or unrecognized, because

a

jor conflict has already organized political forces in

distinctive

way.

a

previous ma-

New conflicts which divide and unify people along similar lines as

preexisting political divisions are more likely to penetrate the political

system.

That is, in

a

stable political alignment it will be diffi-

cult to pursue new issues outside the existing structure of conflict.
However, should the original structuring conflict become, to use
Schattschnei der'

s

term, "displaced,"

a

new set of conflicts, and
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inevitably
one.

a

new alignment of political

forces will

replace the previous

This is what happens, or at least becomes
apparent, in a realignOf)

ing election.

Perhaps Schattschneider'

s

most felicitous idea was his concept of

"mobilization of bias," that is, the purposefulness built
into any form
of human organization.

The term was originally used to examine the

kinds of purposes a given fonn of political organization
would carry
out, such as interest groups or political parties.

For example, due

to their particularistic nature interest groups are inherently
biased,

i.e., have strong organizational incentives, to limit the scope of
political conflict.

In contrast,

political parties, because they rely upon

the votes of a mass electorate, have strong incentives to expand the

scope of conflict.

Schattschneider then extended this notion of organi-

zational bias to more abstract forms of organization such as political

alignments, i.e., the structuring of conflict.

He contended that the

very structure of political conflict produces incentives and penalties
for anyone seeking to raise new issues or to obtain new public policies.

Schattschneider showed how the sectional alignment of the 1890s reduced
the incentives for political parties to expand political conflict on

economic or racial issues and how the more national, quasi-class based

alignment of the 1930s had the opposite effect.

That is, the incen-

tives and constraints embedded in the overall structure of political

conflict are more important than the mobilization of bias built into any

particular institution.
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Like Key and Campbell et

al

.

,

Schattschneider often alluded to the

important changes in political agendas and public
policy that follow
realignments.

Unlike Key and the Michigan group, and all too many
later

students of realignment, Schattschnei der

'

s

concept of the mobilization

of bias allowed him to talk about the linkages among
realignment, institutional change, and policy initiatives in an intelligible and
systematic way.
nel

He notes that

"...

The function of institutions is to chan-

conflict; institutions do not treat all forms of conflict impartial-

ly, just as football

rules do not treat all

indiscriminate equality. "^^
and an expression of
bias.

a

forms of violence with

Thus institutional

forms are both

a

part of

political order's characteristic mobilization of

Institutional forms are part of the mobilization of bias in that

they structure conflict in predictable ways, but they are also an ex-

pression of the mobilization of bias in that they reflect
political and social priorities.

were displaced in

a

a

given set of

When social and political conflicts

significant way, newly dominant interests would

necessarily seek to remove prior institutional structures and practices

which worked against them with structures and practices that would favor
the attainment of their goals.

Previously dominant interests may try to

utilize old institutional forms to prevent policy changes or to raise
doubts about the legitimacy of newly dominant political forces.

To

argue to the contrary would mean that either institutional forms have
trivial impacts on political competition and public policy fonnation or

that Schattschneider is wrong about the exclusionary tendencies of im-

portant conflicts.
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While the first argument may be true in
some political systems, it
is unintelligible within any understanding
of American political

life.

Even those observers who stress the power of
economic elites or organi-

zations to limit the range of the decisions made
within formal governmental institutions recognize that governmental
institutions shape

policy and enhance legitimacy.

The second argument fails to recognize

an inherent limit of all human creations, whether language,
or tools, or

institutional forms.

Intent and partiality are two sides of the same

coin; to specialize one must limit and vice versa.

possible to communicate all of one's thoughts with
build

house with

a

design

a

a

As it would be ima

single word or to

single hand tool, so too it would be impossible to

form of social organization and practice that could perform an

infinitude of functions and do them all well.
While Schattschneider did not make

a

detailed examination of the

impact of realigning elections upon institutions, he did make several

suggestions about where to look to find these effects.

Specifically,

the author notes a number of changes in the operation of the United

States Senate and the Presidency related to the extension of the fran-

chise and the creation and extension of national patterns of partisan
conflict.
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In particular,

Schattschneider examines the periods follow-

ing 1932 and 1896 realigning elections for indications of institutional

change.

After discussing the 1932 realignment and the subsequent, if

not necessarily related, increased United States involvement in international relations, Schattschneider says that

".

.

.

the cumulative

effect of these two revolutions has been to produce what is virtually

a
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new government and

a

new political base for American public
"^^
policy.

One implication of his statement is that the 1930s
realignment was

a

contributing factor to important institutional change in
the United
States government.
In contrast,

Schattschneider says that the 1896 realignment did

not bring about major institutional change.

The 1896 realignment was an

affirmation of the status quo; that is of the dominance of
dominated elite associated with the Republican party.

a

corporate

The Republicans

remained the political bulwark of economic privilege, except in the
South where an equally or more conservative elite associated with the

Democratic party gained near total ascendency over its previous rivals.
Thus Schattschneider claims that institutional change was not substantial

at the national level.

Rather previous institutional features were

used more assertively on behalf of dominant elites, for example, judicial

review and the refusal of the executive branch to enforce certain

existing laws.

One might ask if the kinds of institutional change

adopted later in this historical period, i.e., those embodying the principles of nonpartisans hip and the managerial ethos, were related to both
the nature of the dominant elites and the noticeably non-competitive

nature of the regionally based alignment itself.

Schattschneider seems to imply
change and political change.

a

In a

more general way

relationship between broad social

"Every change in the organization, tech-

nology, and scope of the economy has had to be matched by parallel

changes in the organization of political power."
process is the realigning election.
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The linchpin of this
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Later Work:

Dynamics and Impacts of Re ajj^nmpnt^

Still, what is the nature of this linch-pin?

In

what ways is

socioeconomic change connected to electoral phenomena and
then to elite
turnover, policy change, and institutional alteration?

Indeed, is re-

alignment the only way in which major political adjustments can be
made
in the context of the current United States political

order?

It is to

these questions of when, how, and why realignments occur that the re-

searchers of the second period of realignment inquiry addressed themselves.

Once again, most researchers gave secondary consideration to

the impacts of realignment; that is, to impacts other than the composi-

tion of the new party coalitions.

Yet,

if any claim is to be made that

policy and institutional changes following realignments stem from an

exercise of popular sovereignty, one must be able to specify how the
public generates demands or expectations for significant change or at

least mediates the demands of newly dominant elites.

Gerald Pomper's writings on the subject of realignment are indicative of this shift in emphsis.

Like members of the first generation,

Pomper directed much of his attention to recognizing and classifying

different types of elections.

In common with

the members of the second

generation Pomper paid increased attention to the dynamics of realignment.

Pomper's most fruitful insight in regard to institutional change
is

that realignments have structuring effects on subsequent political

conflict and outcomes.

Pomper describes these effects in terms remin-

iscent of Schattschneider with

a

particular focus on the relationship
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between party coalitions and dominant
conflicts.

Pomper contends that

the main long term effect of any election
is seen in terms of its effect
on the majority party coalition in any
electoral era, i.e., between re-

alignments.

In the absence of major changes

in the composition of party

coalitions there is little likelihood of major policy
departures or

alterations in the political agenda.

The actions of government offi-

cials will rarely deviate from established practices.

other words,

In

Pomper suggests there is little chance of important
institutional change

without realignment.
Pomper'

s

strongest example of the impact of elections on policy

does not involve realignment.

Rather, it involves an examination of the

policy responses of both state and national governments to the use and

suppression of suffrage among American blacks.

convincing case that public policy in

a

Pomper makes

a

fairly

number of fields such as civil

rights, public education, and law enforcement reflects to some extent

black voter turnout.
cal

He goes on to claim that the very terms of politi-

discourse, that is of what is politically acceptable, also reflects

the need, or lack of need, of public officials to anticipate the reactions of black voters towards them in future elections.^^

While the

author is not specific on details, changes in these policy areas no
doubt required some changes in institutional practice.
James Sundquist might qualify as the archetypical analyst of this

period of realignment studies because of his concentration on the issue
of how realignments come about.

Not only does Sundquist have almost

nothing to say on the question of institutional change; one can read his
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most important work on realignment, Dynamics
of the Party System

,

with-

out finding any important reference to
policy or leadership changes following

a

critical

election period.

Nonetheless, through his discussion

of the process of realignment Sundquist
considers in detail how insur-

gent groups prompt

realignment and how the nature of that realignment

a

arises from the circumstances of the insurgency.

His work thus provides

insights into the possible connections between
realignment and subse-

quent institutional changes.
Like Schattschneider, Sundquist begins his analysis by
looking at
the basic structure of conflict in

political

a

"organic" to denote this structure.

system.

He uses the term

Giyen that the author

is

interested

mainly in the United States, he assumes that political conflict will
always be mediated by

a

party system with normally two dominant members.

Thus, a realignment requires

a

shift in the organic composition of

a

party system rather than the movement of voters, however large, among
parties within the pre-existing structure of conflict.

However, Sund-

quist recognizes that, empirically,

no

completely erases past structures.

Instead, new realignments overlay

previous ones creating

a

change in

a

structure of conflict

complex situation where dominant conflicts are

somewhat muffled by the remaining echoes of earlier conflicts.
clarity, Sundquist chooses to deduce

a

Seeking

number of hypothetical scenarios

for electoral realignment and then to examine historical cases of both
realignments and unsuccessful attempts to induce realignment to ascertain the utility of his constructs.'^^
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Sundquist sees five variables as central
to understanding the dynamics of realignment.

These are

"...

the breadth and depth of the

underlying grievance, the capacity of the proposed
remedy to provoke
resistance, the motivation and capacity of party leadership,
the division of the polar forces between the parties, and the
strength of the
ties that bind voters to the existing parties. "^^

It is important to

note that these variables interact with each other rather than
having

separate effects.
The first two factors, the nature of the new dominant issue and

the capacity of that issue to provoke resistance is a restatement
of the

adage that important conflicts unify and divide at the same time.

To

begin the realignment process, these factors need to be strong enough to

create serious political uncertainty through the formation of "polar
blocks" whose members feel extremely strongly about the ultimate resolution of the new conflict.

may often take on

a

Sundquist asserts that this strong feeling

moral quality, that members of the respective polar

blocks see their own positions representing good and their opponents'

embodying evil.

This is important in that it suggests that, for at

least the members of the polar groups, realignment is more
than

a

a

prospective

retrospective process.
Also important is the translation of the original grievance into

an explicitly political
dy.

issue with

a

proposed or at least implied reme-

For Sundquist, it is the suggestion of

a

remedy that is critical to

both the mobilization of an opposition and the exact composition of that

opposition.

By implication, the nature of the opposition will in turn
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influence the continued mobilization of the original
aggrieved group,
which will add or lose active sympathizers based on the
nature of the

opposition as well as the issue itself.

character of political leadership plays

It is at this point that the
a

singular role.^"^

Certainly,

one should also expect that any institutional change arising out of

a

particular realignment would be related to attempts to resolve the
issues that were central to the new structure of conflict.
By political

leadership, Sundquist means the leadership of the

dominant political parties before realignment.
have only

a

While leadership may

secondary role in creating the conditions for realignment,

leadership behavior is critical to whether
the form it will

a

realignment will occur and

take.

The power and capacity of the established party leadership are, in a
sense, matched against the strength and momentum of the issue.
If
the leaders have the skill and motivation to handle the issue in a
way that will check the growth of the polar blocs, and if the issue
is the kind that allows such handling, a major realignment will not
take place.
If, on the other hand, they throw in their lot with one
or the other polar group, the realignment becomes inevitable.
The
historic realignments of the American party system occurred because
the leaders either did not try to mediate and compromise the issue
or tried and failed.'^^

Thus one of the main variables that might affect the nature of institutional change following a realignment is the extent to which members of

the previous leadership are able to stay in power during the realign-

ment.

To some extent such leadership will attempt to maintain connec-

tions to their previous (or indeed current) constituencies.

This could

easily influence the extent to which institutional forms are altered to

implement new purposes or remain as before.
Sundquist'

s

Thus, one implication of

work is that the strength of institutional resistance to the
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new political agenda is related to the
remaining strength of previous
electoral/coal itional alignments in the new
structure of political conflict.

Sundquist's last two factors, the division of
polar forces between
the major parties and the strength of existing
partisan attachments, no

doubt serve to mediate the previous three variables,
particularly that
of leadership.

For example,

it is easier to get individuals to reconsi-

der inherited party identifications, than to get them
to put aside iden-

tifications resulting from personal choice in
situation.
political

a

highly politicized

Certainly this influences the readiness of weakly committed

leadership to embrace new constituencies.

Of more importance in Sundquist's schema is the size and relative

growth of polar forces within the existing two major parties.

Sundquist

says that if opposing forces have significant and relatively equal

sup-

port in both parties, party leaders will seek to delay realignment.
However, if and when realignment happens, the scale of the realignment
will

be greater and the degree of disruption to the existing political

system will also be increased.

One implication of this position is

that the scale of subsequent institutional change would be greater in
those situations where there is

a

commensurate level of change in prior

patterns of constituency/leadership relationships.

Sundquist also notes

that the leaders of both parties normally seek to diffuse new issues by

inaction or incremental policy responses.

politicians as

a

He notes that professional

group benefit from and therefore seek to preserve the

existing political alignment; especially those politicians who hold
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leadership positions in institutions where
members tend to form strong

constituency relationships, for instance, legislatures.^^
basis of Sundquist's work, one can postulate that

a

Thus, on the

similar process

operates in the area of post-realignment institutional
change.

For

example, most formal institutional change in the United
States govern-

ment must be approved by Congress.

Yet, the members of this institution

are normally apt to have fewer incentives to puch for such
change, even

after realignment.^^

Thus, major formal institutional change might be

delayed or may not occur at all; although informal change could still
be
quite extensive.
Along with Sundquist, Walter Dean Burnham is one of the most im-

portant figures of the second period of realignment research.

Like

Sundquist, Burnham gives particular attention to the details of how re-

alignments come about.

While there are some significant differences

between the two men on these issues, it is clear that they are describing and explaining the dynamics of the same political

reality.

Unlike

Sundquist, Burnham is explicitly concerned with the impacts of the

realignment process.

Indeed, he is the first prominent researcher

clearly interested in examining the impact of realignment on institutional development.

The critical realignment
constitutes a political decision of
the first magnitude and a turning point in the mainstream of national policy formation.
Characteristically, the relationships among
policy making institutions, their relative power and decision making
capacity, and the policy outputs they produce are profoundly affected by critical real ignments.48
.

.

.

While Burnham is not primarily concerned with documenting institutional change arising out of realignment, he notes several examples of
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such change.

Among these Burnham stresses the
institutionalization and

fragmentation of the United States House of
Representatives, the rise
and decline of the Supreme Court's role in economic
policy making, and
the current (or perhaps now declining) dominance
of "groupism" in United

States politics.

Burnham contends that before the 1896 realignment power
in the
House of Representatives was largely in the hands of partisan
leaders.
Further, these leaders were highly subject to the will of their party

caucuses.

After 1896, the power of the partisan leadership was reduced

and that of the committees, and of their chairs, enhanced.

Seniority

gradually became the near absolute basis of attaining committee power.
Concurrently, party leadership positions became "professionalized," that
is, not so subject to turnover.

The party caucus became an agency of

legitimation rather than of leadership selection and policy making.

Burnham sees these phenomena as closely related to what he terms the

negative public policy purposes of the new party system.

His argument

concerning the role of the Supreme Court after 1896 is similar.

The

Court's extensive use of judicial review to negate both federal and
state legislation on economic matters reflects the often essentially

issueless nature of politics in the 1896-1932 period.

Finally, Burn-

ham's discussion of the rise of subgovernmental politics following the
1930s realignment is based on an understanding of the constraints of

liberalism, that is in its broader sense of liberal individualism, on
institutional adaptation.

While Burnham sees this governmental response
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to the problems of a complex industrial

society as

a

partial outgrowth

of the decline or disaggregation of American political
parties, he
states that even this adaptation could not have occurred outside
the

realignment process.
Burnham, in contrast to Sundquist, does not construct
model of realignment dynamics.

Yet Burnham'

s

a

formal

analysis of electoral

change in one state, Pennsylvania, tends to confirm the importance of
the five elements that Sundquist emphasizes; that is, the nature of the

new conflict, the nature of the opposition it provokes, the role of
political leadership, the distribution of conflicting forces in the

existing major parties, and the residual strength of party attachments
formed in and since the previous alignment.

In concurrence

Burnham

states
Each realignment was in effect a set of constituent decisions by
critical minorities within the electorate and by elites working
within majorities brought into being by critical elections.
These
decisions reallocated the processes and outputs of politics in terms
of the major elements in the new coalition and, in one form or
another, served to manage and contain the political tensions which
contributed to the realignment.^^

Thus, while Burnham in large part validates Sundquist's model, he does
so with a distinctive edge of his own.

Realignments change the process

of government as well as the participants and issues of the political
process.

While Burnham notes that realignment is

a

surrogate for revolution

in the United States, Burnham also contends that realignment serves to

hold political change within certain limits.
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The limiting factor is

the American ideological heritage of Lockian liberalism.

More
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precisely, realignment allows
the redefinition of
political processes
and policies and of the secondary
principles of liberalism without
a
wholesale change in either the
material or subjective
underpinnings of
the political order. 5^
If true, the li.its of as
well as the opportunities for institutional adaptation
through realignment become
apparent.
In contrast to Sundquist,
Burnham implies that the potential
results of
realignment are not completely determined
by the process of the realignment itself.
Burnham is clear in his assertion that
realignment is

a

way in

which the United States political
system adjusts to major socioeconomic
change.

Thus the role of moral combat in
realignment must be

a

secon-

dary factor and voter decisions are
more likely to take on the retro-

spective quality suggested by Key and others.

Burnham emphasizes the

integrative and aggregative functions of
political parties as the American nonn and duly notes the inability of
United States parties to act as
a

policy link between the electorate and political
officials.

Burnham sees normal politics as

Thus,

process that produces an ever widening

a

dis juncture between new political demands arising
out of an evolving

social and economic context and the irrelevant
or counterproductive

public policies produced within the existing mobilization
of bias.

Burnham puts it, there is

"...

a

As

chronic, cumulative tendency toward

underproduction of other than currently 'normal' policy outputs. "^^
Realignment became more likely as tensions grew, or at least did
so in
the past.
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Burnham also sees

a

more prominent role for third
parties in the

realignment process than Sundquist.
last resort,

a

Sundquist sees the third party
as

political option to be used only if
all attempts at in-

surgency within the major parties faiL^^

activity as

a

a

Burnham sees third party

protorealignment phenomenon, that is, as
the first place

in which the growing disjuncture
between the political

status quo and at

least some major elements of society is
clearly articulated.

Burnham

attaches great importance to the democratic
and "leftist" orientation of

most third parties.

However, it is still usually

a

major party that

provokes the realignment by using the third
party issue, rather than the
third party itself.^''

As a result,

there will be

constellation of political elites following
insurgents win, and with it

a

a

a

somewhat different

realignment, even when the

different and often less radical flavor to

any institutional adaptation that takes place.

Yet it would be misleading to say that Burnham claims
that re-

alignments normally result in extensive institutional change.

He agrees

with those observers who hold that United States policy making
institutions have been, to use the author's phrase

.

.

astonishingly little

transformed in its characteristics and methods of operation. "^^
cal

Criti-

elections are explained by the very failure of such stable institu-

tions to make the policy adjustments demanded in

and economic system.

a

very dynamic social

Thus, Burnham is greatly concerned about the cir-

cumstances that promote or impede eventual realignment.
his attention to electoral

This explains

disaggregation, that is the reduced ability

of political parties to mobilize electoral support based upon long
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standing and committed partisan attachments.
electoral disaggregation, which he sees as

a

Burnham's fear is that
long

tem

and possibly

irreversible trend, will make it difficult or
perhaps impossible for
realignments to take place.

While

a

disaggregated electoral system

might not necessarily be an issueless one, Burnham
believes that it
would be virtually impossible to get public officials
to coordinate
their activities in ways supportive of majority preferences,

a

condition

that he thinks has occurred, if incompletely, following
realignment.
Restated, Burnham thinks that future political change will not
be based
in any sense upon popular sovereignty.^^

Concurrent with Burnham's work, and probably influencing it, was
the work of a number of writers focusing on the broad dynamics of
social

and economic change and its impact on political life.

Everett Carll

Ladd and Thomas Jahnige serve as two important and representative ex-

amples of this group.

Like Burnham, they generally agree that realign-

ments arise from the tensions created by underlying and persistent
social and economic forces.

Ladd and Jahnige differ from Burnham and

previous students of realignment in that they do not see each realign-

ment as an equally significant event.
Ladd is particularly insistent on this issue.

He does not cate-

gorize United States political history in terms of periods of party
alignments, but in terms of "socio-political periods" that can extend

over two or more realignments.

In a sociopolitical

period,

a

single

"political class" dominates the majority party coalitions of the entire
period.

That is, coalition members, and some relatively transient
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aspects of the political agenda, can change in the
realignments within

sociopolitical period.
Ladd defines as

a

However, the dominant political class, which

social collectivity which because of its resources

a

and/or functions is particularly important in the economic life of
the
time, remains in control of the political agenda and directs to
itself

a

disproportionate share of governmental benefits throughout the sociopolitical period.

A given era of political history ends when there is

new political alignment in which
nance.
a

a

6

minority party become

life changes is not the same after all realignments.

Further, it would appear to vary in
a

a

Thus Ladd implies that the extent to which the organiza-

tion of political

within

new political class achieves domi-

Ladd claims that only at such times can

majority.

a

a

regular fashion.

Realignments

sociopolitical period would result in less dramatic changes in

political elites and the political agenda than realignments that marked
the beginning of

a

new sociopolitical period.

If the subsequent impact

of the realignment is closely related to the alteration of the structure
of political conflict, then the probability and significance of institutional change should also be greater in the initial post-realignment

period of any sociopolitical era.
Both Ladd and Jahnige use the term "political style" to refer to

differences in the behavior of elites and the expectations of publics in

different political eras.

The term is left undefined, although examples

elucidating its meaning are interspersed through the two men's writings.
For example, both authors claim that pre-Jacksonian politics was based
on

a

deferential style of relations on the part of most citizens toward
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a social

and political elite.^^

similarly, the New Deal period was

a

time in which most citizens substituted
the image of the state for that
of business as the principal agent
of nation building." While
changes
in political

style need not mean that there must be
formal institutional

change, the concept implies at least
informal change in how institutional

elites operate within the existing framework
of institutional rules.

It is this change in the modus operandi

that Jahnige appears to have in

mind when he writes, "Lastly every party
system period has associated
with it

a

particular style of politics

...

and institutional structure

which has often differed radically from those which
characterize the
preceding and succeeding periods. "^^

Current work on the issues of realignment deals increasingly
with
the impacts of realignment.

This work has been focused on changes in

public policy and elite composition and behavior rather than
institutional change per se; but these matters bear upon the question
of

institutional change, especially of the sort that occurs without legal
sanction.

As there has been no grand synthesizer of this research, as

say Burnham or Sundquist were during the earlier period,

discuss several examples of current work that

I

I

will

briefly

think have important

implications for understanding the connections between realignment and
institutional change.

Seligman and King have found that important changes occur in the
occupational and demographic profile of members of Congress during
realignment.

Individuals with lower social/economic status win legisla-

tive office in greater numbers.

Further, the authors found that the
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influx of this kind of member had an effect
on coalitional patterns in

Congress and on legislation.
During realignments, however, background factors
successfully predicted congressional voting behavior, indicating that
new legislators, elected in the midst of realignment, acted as
a cohort
seizing opportunities presented by the realignment crisis
to'represent the interests of the disaffected. ^5

They also found that the old demographic profile of Congress was
gradually restored in the years following realignment.^^

Studies of this

sort provide useful material for conceptualizing the dynamics of both
formal and informal

institutional change.

and King's research it is possible to make

On the basis of Seligman's
a

counterargument to Sund-

quist's claim that Congress, because of strong constituency based relationships, tends to restrain the extent of post-realignment change.
The research conducted by Benjamin Ginsberg and David Brady also

serves to confirm the impact of realignment upon public policy.

Both

authors look at the passage of legislation in selected issue areas and
seek correlations with variables such as national party platform content, changes in congressional membership, and changes in congressional

committee membership.

Both authors found that the number and scope of

policy changes in the issue areas they examined are greater than average
in the years immediately following realignments.

They also indicate

that the degree of policy change is greatest in those issue areas related to the kinds of conflict that prompted the realignments.

However,

their data also shows that significant policy changes have occurred

without realignment, although this appears to be an occurrence less
C

common than realignment itself.

-I

Brady's work is noteworthy in that it
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goes beyond demonstrating the strong
association between realignment and
policy change to suggest causal
relationships.
Brady posits and then

examines several models of how the
realignment process might influence
congressional committee actions.

He concludes that no single model

fits

the data well, that different models
seem to be valid for different
issue areas. 68 Brady's results imply
that realigning elections have

variable impacts in different policy areas.

Thus the degree to which

post realignment policy or institutional change
can be tenned

a

result

of popular sovereignty also appears to be
variable.
David Adamany comes to

a

similar conclusion in his examination of

the role of the Supreme Court in the realignment
process.

He claims

that the Court's role is complex, that perhaps the
Court's most impor-

tant role is in helping to restructure majority coalitions
within what
Ladd called

a

sociopolitical period.

Key judicial

decisions may have

a

vital role in attracting and rebuffing coalitional partners
for the

dominant political class.
1890s as

a

Adamany sees Supreme Court decisions in the

good example of this phenomenon.

The author also suggests

that the Supreme Court plays an important through lesser role in

a

pro-

cess of restraining and to some extent delegitimating the policy and, by

implication, institutional innovations of the new majority coalition.
This would be particularly true after a realignment that begins

sociopolitical period.

a

new

An example of this would be the Court's hostil-

ity to some aspects of the New Deal.^^
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Other Pertinent

L1

teratur

p~~^

While the main thrust of this dissertation
is to look at realign-

ment as

a

precondition of subsequent institutional
change, available

research on the impact of electoral alignment
does not yet document any
such relationship.
I

It only implies it.

Apart from realignment research

find at least two other kinds of political
science literature perti-

nent to the issues

I

want to examine.

The first group of works focuses

on the interactions between national
government institutions and organ-

ized segments of the private sector.

Writers such as Theodore Lowi and

Grant McConnell are prominent representatives of this
perspective.
These authors are primarily concerned with
institutional arrangements

since industrialization.

Therefore, their material and insights are

most applicable to understanding the impact of the 1930s
realignment.
The second kind of literature

I

will

review examines political and gov-

ernmental adaptations to changes in the nature of an underlying
capitalist economy.

Most of this work is radical or Marxist in orientation and

tends to be skeptical of the impact of elections on political life
in

any capitalist society.

This work is relevant because these writers

still need to explain how and when economic elites promote or shape

political change to deal with problems or crises arising out of the

operation of the economic system.

Once again, these writers are chiefly

concerned with the period after industrialization.
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Lowi and McConnell
Lowi

explicitly claims that

a

new form of government, a "Second

Republic," has evolved in the United States
since the realignment of the
1930s.

Lowi

uses the term Second Republic only because
previous "re-

gimes" went largely unrecognized as such.

However, Lowi fails to link

the origin of these other republics, or the
Second Republic for that

matter, directly to electoral realignment.
regime develops

a

He does note that "Every

politics characteristic of itself, consonant with its

own claims of legitimacy and congruent with its own
particular uses of

government.

"'^^

This might be restated as follows:

its own pattern of institutional

Every regime creates

structure and process within the

general fornis of the United States Constitution.
Lowi speaks about the process of institutional adaptation in
more

detail

than the authors

I

previously discussed.

tent with all the forms of institutional change
this chapter:
(2)

(1)

His analysis is consisI

presented earlier in

the widespread use of new institutional forms,

the performance of new functions or those captured from previously

existing institutions, (3) major changes in the interrelationships among
political institutions, and (4) the performance of new kinds of governmental functions.

In principle, all

four kinds of change may occur

informally, without specific legal sanction.

Lowi

stresses the fourth

type of change in his evaluation of the institutional adaptations of
Roosevelt'

New Deal

s

The transition to the Second Republic began in earnest during the
The best known but least significant characteristic of
1930s.
the New Deal period was the increasing size of the national government, measured in budgetary terms ... of far greater significance
.

.

.
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^''^

^'^

^""^^^'^"^
the federal
qovernmenr^'
government
"^"'Jh^
the federal government was
...
adopting two entirelv
''''''' governm^nf ^n
tne
e united
:? :d°StI^ef
States "^h^se^^
These functions were regulation
and redistribution.
These two new functions involved the
federal
government
in direct and coercive use of
power over citizens.71

Lewi then notes that these new functions
brought fundamental changes in

institutional relationships.

Among these changes were the shift
toward

executive oriented government, the rise of
delegated power to the
bureaucracy (particularly in the extremely wide
discretion given to
agencies to enact "administrative legislation'^)

,

and in the gradual

adjustment in the function of the federal courts to
these other new
institutional fonns and functions.
Lowi's work gives substantial content to Ladd's and
Jahnige's con-

cept of political style.

Lowi would say that the style of the Second

Republic is administrative, that the most characteristic
kind of political

relationship is one in which the likelihood of governmental
coercion

is immediate but the incentives and likelihood for
peaceful

are high.

In this situation,

adjustment

participants have largely internalized the

probable sanctions so that the sanctions rarely need to be applied.
Lowi

states that the administrative style develops

macy precisely because the coercion
mundane.
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is

a

degree of legiti-

internalized, unnoticed, and thus

Within the context of the fragmentation of formal government

authority and of the dominance of liberalism in the United States, the

characteristic institutional expression of the administrative political
style is what Lowi calls the process of tripartite bargaining.

Others

have referred to tripartite bargaining and its institutional forms by
terms such as groupism,

cl

ienteleism, subgovernments, and iron
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triangles.

Lowi

notes that the characteristic policy
making process in
i

the post-1932 period has become
this process of privatized negotiati
on

among relevant bureaucratic agencies,
congressional committees, and

organized interest groups.
In

fairness to Lowi

'

s

views,

I

must note that he does not think

that the Second Republic is the direct
result of the New Deal or of the
1930s realignment.

While Lowi acknowledges that the preconditions
for

the new regime were established in the
1930s, the Second Republic came
to fruition in the Democratic administrations
of the 1960s and was fi-

nally legitimated upon the continuance and extension
of the new style of

governance by the Republican administrations of the
1970s.^^

This

raises the question of the time scale in which one must
look for the

impacts of

a

realignment.

Should one limit inquiry to the years imme-

diately following realignment or look at the entire period
between two
critical election periods?
is

Lowi

'

s

position seems to be the former, and

supported by research such as Seligman's and King's on Congress.

an effective counterargument can be based on

a

Yet

number of factors includ-

ing the gradualness of elite turnover in other institutions such as the

federal courts and bureaucracy and of the tendency of some elected offi-

cials in the dominant party coalition to maintain strong ties to old

constituencies and/or to remain committed to various aspects of the old
political agenda.
Lowi

says nothing about the impact of elections upon the process

of institutional
the fundamental

change.

Indeed, he does not present

a

model

political change he documents and interprets.

to explain

Yet one
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may infer the outlines of

a

model

from his concept of "the public
philo-

Sophy.
Lowi appears to use the concept
of the public philosophy to mean

something similar to what others might
call an ideology or
political beliefs.

a

system of

A public philosophy provides an
understanding of the

realities of social life, suggests

a

set of values or goods for public

life, and implies the boundaries of acceptable
political action.

How-

ever, for Lowi, the public philosophy is
different from an ideology in

that it shapes institutional practice and policy
fomation.

Above all

else the public philosophy is the set of legitimizing
ideas behind

a

regime and the preeminent source of justification
or rationalization for
that regime's actions.

Therefore, it is more than an ideology; although

an ideology may become the public philosophy or

a

discarded public

philosophy may remain an important ideological force.

Lowi

also appears

to think that the public philosophy constrains the range
of serious

ideological discourse.
Lowi contends that the public philosophy primarily t^epresents the

interests of

a

social and political elite and only secondarily those of

the general citizenry.

He argues that a public policy exists only when

there is widespread agreement among the elite over the nature and purposes of public life.

When agreement is not general, there are only

competing ideologies.

This is

philosophy .^^

Lowi

a

sure sign of the decline of any public

characterizes the public philosophy of the Second

Republic as interest group liberalism,

a

synthesis reflecting the need

of elites to accommodate capitalist ideology, the previous public
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philosophy, with the increasing need
to build and justify
state emphasizing administrative rule.^^

a

positive

While the decline of capital-

ism as the public philosophy began about
1900, the rise of interest

group liberalism to the status of the new public
philosophy takes place
in the 1930s.

Thus the rise of the public philosophy of
the Second

Republic is concurrent with the New Deal realignment
and

a

major crisis

of the social-economic order, the Great Depression.

Realignment can therefore be conceptualized as

mation of elites and/or elite ideas.
that Lowi never claims that there is

elite in the United States.

a

time of transfor-

Nonetheless, it must be cautioned
a

unified economic or political

Indeed, Lowi emphasizes the multiplicity of

constituencies and therefore elites that arise out of the complexity
and

specialization of

a

modern industrial society.

For Lowi,

importance of subgovernments documents this point.

'^^

the observed

So how does a

public philosophy coalesce and become acceptable or at least accepted as
a

given to the citizenry in general?

point, but

I

Lowi

has nothing to say on this

think his concept of the public philosophy fits well with

Ladd's idea of

a

political class.

That is, one might investigate

whether the dominant political class of each sociopolitical period
accepted an ideological perspective which it was later able to enshrine
as that era's public philosophy.

Toward the end of an alignment or of

the longer sociopolitical period, a decline in the reality value of a

public philosophy might signal the weakening of

a

dominant political

class and foreshadow the emergence of new social forces and of

alignment or sociopolitical era.

a

new

Further, the persistence or decline of
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public philosophies might serve as
one way to tell the difference
between realignments that mark the
boundaires of sociopolitical periods
from realignments that are within one
political era.

Grant McConnell views American poltical
institutions much like
Lowi, particularly with regard to the
domination of areas of public

policy by particularlistic coalitions.

Like Lowi, McConnell sees this

phenomenon as mainly occurring since the New Deal
and as defended by

widely accepted orthodoxy or public philosophy
McConnell does not see as sharp
nance.

a

In

a

contrast to Lowi,

transition in the patterns of gover-

McConnell believes that many of the ideas of the New
Deal are

implicit in its supposed antithesis, the Hoover
administration.

The

differences involve in part the sheer size of Rooseveltian
initiatives;
but the central difference is in the national government's
willingness,

beginning in the New Deal, to make use of coercion to create
and enforce
the policies of clientele centered policy making coalitions.

This is

exactly the departure from past federal practice that Lowi says constitutes the main change in institutional practice.

admits that F.D.R.'s administrations have had

a

Elsewhere McConnell

major impact on the

institutional practices of the United States government.

For instance,

McConnell notes that all presidents since the 1930s were Rooseveltian in
the sense that all of them, when compared to pre- New Deal presidents,

are activist or strong presidents, irrespective of policy preferences or
personal temperament.
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Radical Analyses
In general,

radical observers of the United States
political pro-

cess pay little attention to the institution
and phenomenon of elections.

The political system is seen as largely
reflecting the needs and

aspirations of

a

relatively unified elite who get their power
mainly

from the control of productive wealth.

hardly of

a

Of course, these observers are

piece in their interpretations of how the political
process

mediates elite control; but institutional decision makers,
interest
group leadership, party leadership, etc., tend to be seen
as having more

effective impact upon policy than does the mass electorate.

provide infomation about popular dissatisfactions and

a

Elections

safety valve to

discourage more disruptive forms of political action based on these
grievances.

More importantly, radicals tend to see elections as

a

mech-

anism through which the elite can greatly control the granting of concessions to public demands, even to the extent that concessions can be

shaped to the actual advantage of all or at least part of the politicalgo

economic elite.

Other observers stated that the main functions of

elections in the United States are to create

solidarity and
cratic ethos.

a

a

sense of (false) social

legitimation of elite decisions in terms of the demo-
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Nevertheless, radical observers need to explain why an elite needs
to utilize electoral mechanisms to accomplish significant change in gov-

ernment policy and institutions.
including politics, in

a

Given that all aspects of social life,

capitalist society are already expected to be

shaped to the advantage of the elite, why would elite members seek
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change?

The answer is twofold.

likely to be fully unified.

First, no pol itical -economic
elite is

Few radical observers would deny
that dif-

ferences of interest arise within an
elite because of competing economic

interests, social attachments, or even the
vagaries of individual development.

They would only say that in most
circumstances these divisions

within an elite are much less important than
most pluralist observers
claim.

Secondly, individuals and organized groups can
sometimes be mis-

taken about the efficacy of existing policies
and institutional arrangements.

For example, some members of an economic
elite may explain

a

drop in corporate profits as the result of
government regulations or the

wage inflation promoted by organized labor.

Yet

a

more objective analy-

sis of the problem might find that capital's
failure to reinvest past

earnings in new technological processes was the root of
the problem.

Similarly, an elite, or part of one, may remain committed to old
govern-

ment policies or forms of organization long after they cease

to

further

elite interests.

Within the context of elite differences and the expression of

popular grievance, it becomes possible to talk about
tation of electoral

realignment.

For example,

with the general proposition that elections are

a

radical

Piven and Cloward agree
a

way to express grie-

vances that is essentially non-disruptive to the operation of
ist,

industrial system.

interpre-

a

capital-

Yet given the fragmented and constituent nature

of United States political

parties, Piven and Cloward understand that

majorities are necessarily transitory being composed of diverse elements.

Individual officeholders can easily lose their offices because
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of electorally channeled dissatisfaction.

Thus elections are anything

but non-disruptive events to elected
officials.
go on to explain, "Political

As

Piven and Cloward

incumbents try to use the powers and re-

sources of governments to intervene in the
institutional arrangements
that bred dissension or to develop public
programs intended to recapture
the allegiance of disaffected voting blocks. "^^

However, major concessions to subordinate groups are
not the rule
in political

life, but occur only under rather atypical
circumstances.

For the most part, following Burnham's argument, Piven
and Cloward see

realignments and crises in the larger social-economic systan
as closely
related.

However, Piven and Cloward do have

actual process of realignment.

In part,

a

distinctive view of the

the impact of electoral

insta-

bility arises from the concurrent build up of disruptive protest
outside
the bounds of sanctioned political activity.^^

Serious disruptive pro-

test is likely to occur only when the normal constraints of work and

other aspects of everyday routine are no longer present.

This is most

likely to occur during periods of economic depression and other severe
forms of social dislocation.
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Interestingly, the very success of gov-

ernmental responses initiated by "new" members of the political elite to
the crisis, provides the basis for reimposing social control and even

some degree of retrenchment of government policy.

As a case in point,

Piven and Cloward observe that the most innovative stage of the New
Deal, especially in regard to policies improving the status and condi-

tion of non-elites, ended once electoral stability returned with the

massive Democratic electoral victory in 1936.
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Although it was not recognized at
the time, the election of IQ^fi h.H
'
those who believed
i
in America ... the extremist
parties polled only 2 9 oerrent of
the vote
the underlying popular unrest
upon whi-ch^insurqencv
The little the poor had gotten
" quelled.
was
89
Pnnunh
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.

The dynamic of dissatisfaction among
the populace, particularly of

those parts of it in economic distress, is
one side of
of realignment.

radical

theory

The second side is the political
conflict among members

of the elite within the same context of
crisis.

a

a

serious social or economic

For example, Edward Greenberg says that
the New Deal was

a

period when one segment of the corporate elite
was able to extend the
size and function of the slowly emerging positive
state.
this segment had long wanted

a

The members of

greater role for the state in the regula-

tion and support of the capitalist economy but had
not been able to

overcome the opposition of those members of the elite who
were still
committed to "laissez-faire" or strictly volunteerist
policies.

The

disintegration of the economy, and the electoral and social disruptions
of the era, produced

a

context in which the more "advanced" wing of the

corporate sector was finally able to prevail.

The role of the elec-

torate in this process was to select public officials more amenable to
new approaches for responding to social and economic difficulties
and

then to legitimize the new policies by returning these officials to
office.

Innovative members of the corporate elite would have ample

opportunities to convince elected officials to try their plans,^^
Thus realignment might be seen as part of the process of the

readjustment of state forms to the needs or tensions produced by the
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historical evolution of

capitalist system.

a

In the case of the United

States, this readjustment is greatly slowed by
the built in fragmentation of both the governmental process and
of the nature of American

electoral arrangements.

One can conceive of government policies,
taking

loosely James O'Connor's categories of "accumulation"
and "legitimation," as actions aimed at maintaining both the
profitability of economic units and of the social

depends.

quiescence on which industrial production

The particular form, level, and mix of policies aimed
at ful-

filling the functions of accumulation and legitimation, may
not neces-

sarily fill either the technical or political demand for them in
society.
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a

given

Thus in the American political system, realignment may be

viewed as furnishing one way in which appropriate adjustments can be

made in such policy outputs, and by implication, in the institutions
that create and implement these policies.
In this chapter,

I

have examined current political science litera-

ture pertinent to the examination of the impact of electoral realign-

ments upon institutional change in the United States national government.

While none of these sources provide substantial documentation of

such change, examples of institutional change are given, sometimes

explicitly, sometimes implicitly.

While none of these sources fully

explicates the fashion in which realignment causes or mediates institutional change, the literature does put forward

a

general framework in

the form of a chain involving social /economic crisis, electoral insta-

bility, elite turnover and policy innovation, and electoral restabilization.

Particular authors provide suggestions about the relationships
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among the various elements of this
chain.
tation will focus on two major issues:

(1)

The remainder of this disserthe further documentation of

institutional change following and integrally
related to realignments,
and (2) the further explication of
both the process by which such
change

comes about and of important variations
in that process.

CHAPTER

II

INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Governmental Institutions as an Ambiguous
PhPnnmpnnn

Because government institutions are sites
of political conflict,
loci of public decision making, and
seem, at least in liberal-democratic

societies, to bestow legitimacy upon public
policies, institutions are
an essential

subject for political inquiry.

chapter, institutions are purposeful.

preferences of human beings.

"I

As

I

noted in the last

They embody the intentions and

These may be the purposes of persons
long

dead, the living poorly served, or the most
powerful segment of

order; but in any case institutional forms are
never neutral.
a

meaning to what they do and how they do it.

Thus, as

I

er, changes in the structure and processes
of governmental

imply modifications in the purposes they serve.

a

social

There is

argued earli-

institutions

Conversely, changes in

the interests of those who hold power or in the social
or economic bases

of holding political power imply that powerholders will
seek to modify

institutional structures and procedures.
The "purposeful ness" of governmental institutions provides an
im-

portant justification for their study, which is reinforced in putatively
democratic political orders where it is expected that government policies rest on the consent of subject citizens, that is, upon the exercise

of popular sovereignty.

In the United States, and in liberal

democra-

cies in general, at least some government officials are selected by an

55

56

electorate which is nearly
coextensive with the adult
population.
Other
major officeholders are then
selected by elected officials
or by procedures set up by elected officials.

It is useful

to study governmental

institutions both in the ways they are
organized to embody "popular

sovereignty and the ways

in which their policies
reflect and in turn

structure citizens' needs and desires.

The results of such study can

infonn judgements about the degree to
which the American electorate

actually exercises sovereignty.

The results can also inform
proposals

for institutional reform.
As noted in the United States an
electoral

realignment seems to be

the situation in which significant changes
in government officials and

public policy are most closely related to the
expression of the public
will through electoral mechanisms.

I

have also discussed why it makes

sense to look for changes in the structure and
process of governmental

institutions following realignments.

Ultimately, my reasons for this

contention are based on the proposition that institutions
embody purpose.

However self evident this assertion may be, it says
nothing about

exactly how governmental institutions embody purpose nor
how those purposes are altered.

The main function of this chapter will be to analyze

more precisely what it means for

a

governmental institution to embody

a

purpose; that is, what defines the concept of "governmental institution."

My explication will be aimed at making sense of this concept

within the United States.

Ideas which prove to be useful there will

doubt apply to institutions in many other political orders.

no
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The previous material

Almost everyone knows

a

is

not an attempt to obscure
the obvious.

governmental institution when they
see one.

Everyone knows that the Congress
and the Presidency are
institutions.
Individuals more familiar with the
United States government know
that it
is

differentiated into numerous institutions
and subinstitutions, including diverse elements like the House
Agriculture Committee, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the
Court of Appeals of the 9th
Circuit.

Each of these subinstitutions is
identifiable as an entity

with relatively stable functions and
processes.
ously part of
ment.

a

They are also unambigu-

larger entity called the United States
national govern-

Then, why is there any need for further
analysis of the identity

of governmental institutions?
For the most part political scientists interested
in United States

national politics have chosen to ignore definitional
questions in regard
to institutions.

One might think that at least newcomers to the
formal

study of politics would need to be given an explicit
definition of the

term "governmental institution" or the more general
term "political

institution."

Yet a brief examination of introductory texts will show

that their authors rarely discuss the subject.
seems to be that students will recognize

a

governmental

institution when they encounter one; that is, as

within or continually associated with
this is hardly

a

a

The working presumption

a

(or political)

persistent entity

government.^

Although true,

complete description of the standard, though usually

implicit, view of institutions.

In most textbooks chapters on institu-

tions follow chapters on the Constitution.

Governmental institutions
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are seen as entities within
the government which are
set up through the
Constitution either directly or
indirectly. ^ This implicit
definition
includes the criteria of 'organization"
and "legality" along with "persistence." Yet many non-governmental
institutions can meet all three of
these criteria.
A few textbook authors do adopt
a more explicit definition
of in-

stitution.

Several authors define governmental
institutions on the

basis of certain organizational
characteristics derived from Max Weber's

discussion of the ideal type bureaucracy.^

Alternatively, at least one

"radical" text speaks of government institutions
as mediations between
social structure, especially the means
of production, and individual

citizens.^

Still

these views add little to the idea that
governmental

institutions are identifiable entities within

government.

a

While both

of these viewpoints say something potentially
useful about the relationship of government institutions to the rest
of

a

society, these concep-

tions do not respond to the question of what it
means for institutions
to embody purposes.

Research intended for the professional community suffers
from the
same sort of problem.

Nonetheless many of these studies provide useful

ideas and examples for explicating the nature of institutions.

While

little attention has been given to the problem of explicating the
con-

cept of governmental institution, substantial attention has been given
to the question of why a certain class of institutions, for
example

legislatures, is different from another class, for example executives.
Similarly, there is

a

good deal of work concerning how and why specific
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institutions within

a

particular class, e.g., legislatures,
are alike or

different from each other.

Nevertheless, even authors dealing
openly

with questions of defining particular
kinds of governmental institutions
do not deal with the more general
question of what a governmental Institution is.

But to make claims that certain
events or processes (for

example, realignments) result in
institutional change, researchers must
be able to identify objects or
processes central

governmental institution.

subset of

a

to something called a

Further, as governmental

larger universe of institutions, it

find criteria for identifying that subset.

is

institutions are

a

also necessary to

However difficult it may be

to articulate the distinctions that underlie
our ability to know a gov-

ernmental institution when we see one, the explication
of those distinctions is crucial to any systematic investigation
of institutional
change.

Conceding it is relatively simple to identify governmental
institutions in the United States, there are still ambiguous
situtions where
one can identify

a

governmental institution but the usual definitional

characteristics of organization, legality, and persistence do not
completely fit the phenomenon.

At first glance, "governmental institution"

appears to be an example of what has been called an essentially con-

tested concept.

If so, the decision to call

a

phenomenon

a

governmental

institution would be based on the observer's political or moral purpose.'^

Yet, the fact that governmental

institutions are intuitively

recognizable in stable political systems suggests that the idea of
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institution as

a

contested concept

is

most useful only where

a

govern-

ment or social order is under severe
attack.
Following Frohock,

I

will define governmental institutions
in

terms of their core properties.

Core properties are those aspects of

a

phenomenon necessary to maintain the basic
intelligibility of its definition.

8

That is,

I

am looking for

a

formulation of the concept of

governmental institution that is more flexible than

taxonomic defini-

a

tion, and yet will still be relatively free
from differences in meaning

based upon political perspective.

I

will

now discuss some political

phenomena which do not fit neatly into the usual ideas
about governmental

institutions and yet are things most political scientists
agree are

governmental institutions.
range of conditions that

a

These ambiguous cases will alert us to the
truly useful concept would include.

The Presidential Cabinet is called

a

governmental institution.

Richard Fenno, the author of perhaps the most widely cited study
on the
Cabinet, said that

".

.

.

The President's Cabinet is

crete, and describable political institution."^

a

distinct, dis-

While Fenno uses the

term political institution, he makes it clear that in the context of his

writing he means government.

That is, the core personnel of the insti-

tution are in fact part of the government.

Then, in seeming contra-

diction, Fenno goes on to note that the Cabinet has no legal existence
as part of the government.

Its legitimacy as an institution comes from

its persistence and from the needs it serves.

required to form

a

While no President is

Cabinet (as opposed to appointing heads of executive

departments) or meet with one, not to do so is thought to have enormous

political cost.
to act^as a

Nonetheless, the Cabinet has
no legal basis fro. which
Cabinet; that is, it does not
have a manifest legal func

tion.ll
be a

Given the prevailing implicit
definition, how can the Cabinet
governmental institution without a
legal status or function?
Further, it is clear that the
Cabinet neither acts nor
deliberates

as a Cabinet.

As Fenno points out, the
institution is not capable of

effectively promoting interdepartmental
coordination despite the fact
that its members include the President
and the chief executive officers
of the departments of the executive
branch.
^deed, some presidents
have difficulty in even recognizing
some members of their own cabinets.

1

This reflects the tendency of
presidents to restrict their

interactions with most cabinet members
to symbolic occasions or to those

policy matters involving the members'
departments.

Presidents usually

engage in general discussion and planning
with only some Cabinet members.

Is

this inner circle an institution?

After all there is

a

ten-

dency to include certain Cabinet posts in this
so-called inner circle
(e.g.. Defense, Justice), as well as certain
non-Cabinet members (e.g.,
the National Security Advisor, the White
House Chief of Staff).

At

least this pattern has been typical of recent
administrations.
The Cabinet presents definitional problems because
it is an organizational entity without

a

clear legal mandate.

The "institution" of

United States Federalism presents problems for different
reasons.
legal

The

functions of the federal system are identifiable and relatively

persistent in their broad outline.

However, there is no organized en-

tity that performs and situates the federal function in the
sense that
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the Congress performs and is the location of the
legislative function.

Rather, federalism is

a

set of relatively stable relationships among

governments and their constituent institutions.

Therefore it

is

not

surprising that the treatment of United States Federalism as
an institution in political science literature is in turn uncertain.

Typically, in introductory material,

a

"structure and process" of

Federalism is described in much the same way as the structure and process of national government institutions, although the material on

Federalism is placed in

a

separate section of the text.^^

The same un-

certainty over the institutional status of United States Federalism is
also found in professionally oriented material.

For example, the Hand-

book of Political Science includes its review article on federalism in

the volume on governmental institutions.

Riker, treats the term federalism as

a

Yet, the author, William

concept describing certain kinds

of governments and their constituent institutions rather than conceiving
it as an institution per se.

Still, to call

a

political order

system, the concept must be expressed in concrete institutions.

ample, Riker says the key indicator of

a

a

federal
For ex-

federal system is the location

of final decision making power for at least one area of policy in the

institutions of at least two separate governments.

1

These two examples demonstrate there are governmental institutions

without either legally defined status and functions or
fiable organizational center.

a

clearly identi-

There are even governmental institutions

that have neither of these two characteristics.
ships called

a

The web of relation-

subgovernment can serve as an example of this kind of

63

phenomenon.

Basically,

a

subgovernment is

a

longstanding pattern of

bargaining and accommodation among
interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and congressional committees
dealing with

immediate mutual concern.

a

narrow policy area of

The subgovernment normally makes
policy in

the interests of its members.

The unit persists because its members
are

better able to provide each other with desired
resources and supports
than non-members.

Subgovernments operate in

a

context that is

a

result

of the high degree of formal fragmentation
embodied in United States

bureaucratic and congressional structure.
(e.g., many dealing with agricultural

most subgovernments are not formally
ment.

While some subgovernments

issues) have some legal status,
a

part of the United States govern-

Yet these units make or implement public policy in

of areas.

a

wide variety

1

Furthermore, these units are hardly sub rosa.

Subgovern-

ments can be clearly identified and studied, so much so that
political
scientists can develop generalizations about the conditions and
policy
areas where these entities are apt to form or to be most effective.^''

Therefore, two of the three standard identifying criteria of governmental institutions must be questioned, if not rejected.

Some insti-

tutions are neither legal in function (e.g., the Cabinet, most subgov-

ernments) nor origin (e.g., most subgovernments).

Some institutions

have no organizational center (e.g.. United States Federalism, subgov-

ernments); although these still consist of organized relationships among

organizational centers.

government to be

a

Indeed, an institution need not be part of the

governmental institution.

considering subgovernments as

a

This is one implication of

type of governmental institution.

While
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it is true that subgovernments
contain members who are government
offi-

cials belonging to identifiable
government agencies, at least one member

of the coalition is usually

a

representative of

a

private interest.

In

fact, all sorts of supposedly non-governmental
organizations make public

policy in the sense that their actions have
important effects upon the
general public.

Must

I

now concede that any line separating
government

from the rest of the social order is an arbitrary
one?
think not.

I

will

Ultimately

I

construct an argument for the distinctiveness of

governmental institutions which will include the
understanding that such

institutions are political and even social as well as
governmental.
will start by examining what, in

a

general sense, constitutes

a

I

social

institution.

Toward

a

Concept of Governmental Institutions

The implicit understandings about institutions that political sci-

entists use have been borrowed from other disciplines, most notably

sociology.

One kind of understanding begins from the proposition that

institutions are organizations.

According to the proponents of this

approach, those who want to understand institutions need to look at the

division of labor, the location of power centers and the content of

organizationally defined roles.

1

A second approach focuses on the

norms and values of an institution's participants or subjects.

Institu-

tions are defined mainly by internalized roles acquired and maintained

largely through socialization rather than through the conscious decisions of individuals. 19
•

•

Finally,

a

third general approach focuses on
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individual behavior and the motivations
of institutional participants.
From this point of view, institutions
are relatively permanent con-

straints in the marketplace of individually
derived tastes.

All

three

of these approaches have informed some
substantive research about the

operation of governmental institutions.

However, none of these ap-

proaches to institutional understanding
sufficiently captures the

relationship between human purpose and institutional
form.
While

I

reject the view that one can create

a

perspective toward

institutional inquiry that straightforwardly incorporates
the insights
of disparate approaches, analysts must deal with
the strengths of other

approaches within the boundaries of their own perspectives.
Apter, in his series of essays entitled Political Change
this very point.

,

David

focuses on

His main concern is not institutions per se, but
his-

torical change on a societal, though particularly political,
level.

Apter contends that human societies, in

choice— the choice
sees choice as

a

a

collective sense, involve

to maintain the status quo or to change.

The author

process occurring within certain boundaries rather than

as an unstructured process.

These boundaries coincide with the three

general approaches to institutional study that

I

noted above.

Apter

calls these constraints (1) the normative boundary, (2) the structural

boundary, and (3) the behavioural boundary.

The normative boundary is

manifested socially in culture and ideology, individually as norms and
values.

The structural

relationships.
human action.

boundary refers to the organization of human

Finally, the behavioural boundary refers to conscious
This includes the perceptions and motivations that
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activate behavior which Apter
sees as distinguishable from
norms or
.^^
values
In principle, one should
be able to predict the
general

nature of

any one of the boundaries if one
understands the status of the other
two. 22 Apter concedes that in
most historical situations the
relations

among the three variables are not
easily predictable.

variable alters dialectical ly with the
others.
boundaries interacting in an asymmetric
fashion.
and structures as constraints upon choice.

Instead, each

In fact, Apter sees

the

He understands norms

The behavioural

boundary

represents the active process of choicemaking
working within and against
the constraints.

On this basis he defines political

orders as the sys-

tems of choice created by the normative,
structural, and behavioural

boundaries
While my immediate concerns center on institutions
rather than entire political

systems, Apter's suggestions about open and closed
bound-

aries to social systems are useful because

I

must confront the simulta-

neously open and yet closed appearance of social life.

However,

I

am

changing Apter's notion of choice to the more restricted
terms of purpose and function.

This is defensible because the term "choice" im-

plies intentionality, although the congruence between the intentions
of

individuals and the choices embodied in collective action is far from
automatic.

Restated then, an institution embodies purpose through the

reciprocal effect of current human action within and upon the normative

and structural constraints created through previous human action.
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Since

I

am claiming that institutions
arise and are maintained

through human action

I

must explain the concept of human
action and then

show how it becomes crystallized into
institutional forms.
quires making
action.

a

This re-

distinction between human behavior
and activity or

Behavior refers to all observable
responses of

to its environment.

human organism

a

The terms action and activity refer
to all

sponses, observable or not, that arise
from the intentions of
being.

I

a

re-

human

am explicitly considering thought as
well as observable phe-

nomena such as movement and speech as forms
of action.

This means that

any valid analysis of institutions must
begin from the position that the

participants or subjects of any institution must
be understood as self-

conscious agents.

certain norms.

Persons are not simply acculturated into holding

They must in some sense recreate the norms
out of their

own experience.

Thus persons are not usually "forced" into
subservience

to institutional

structure and process.

al

forms through their actions.

They must recreate institution-

Yet these implications seem unaccept-

able; persons are confronted with alien norms and institutions
and

usually face heavy sanctions if they fail to take the normative
and
institutional structure of

a

social order as given.

In effect,

this

reality raises Rousseau's dilemma, "Man is born free, and everywhere
he
IS

in chains."

23

The response to this quandary is, to paraphrase Marx,

that human beings create their own social existence, but not in the

circumstances of their own choosing.
While human beings have self-consciousness only as individuals and
thus directly act only as individuals, they do so only in

a

social
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environment.

Indeed, self-consciousness
can only develop through
social

interaction with other human beings.

If the preceding assertions
are

correct, then any interpretation
of institutions, or of social
order
more broadly, as a contract between
or the congealed tastes of
previously asocial individuals is
illogical on its face.
Yet, if what Apter
calls the behavioral boundary is
socially produced, would not a
direct
focus on either the constraint of
values or of structure provide
the

proper beginning for the study of
social institutions?
the cost of reducing personhood to
the causal

social environment.

It could,

but at

product of the external

To retain the position that persons
genuinely pro-

duce social life through the process of
self-conscious thought and
action, one must establish the nature of
the connection between human

action and the creation of norms and organization.

The perspective of

social analysis called symbolic interaction
provides one plausible un-

derstanding of that connection.

I

will

use several

elements of the

interactionist approach to describe how institutions embody
human
purpose.

The Interactionist Approach
The key concept of the symbolic interactionist approach
ing."

"mean-

Its importance is that it serves as a bridge between
what others

might call the normative and behavioral realms.
are no separate realms.
action.

is

More accurately, there

The meaning of human action is embedded in the

Neither the actor nor the observer need refer to

domain of principles in order to understand the action.

a

separate

Symbolic
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interactionism is constructed upon
three basic premises.
^^^'"9^

on the basis of the meaninqs
thar;h!;"th^^'H^'
that
the th ngs
have for them.
Secondly, these meaninqs are a oro
duct of social interaction in human
society.
Thirdly these mean
ings are modified and handled
through an i nterprelive' process ?hai
'''' ^"^^^^^"^1 in dealing with the^igns^h^/ThfLou^-

llfn

The third premise is of crucial
importance in that it stresses the ability of individuals to self-consciously
alter what they have learned

socially and that communication, especially
through the mechanism of
language, is the basic glue of the social
process.
A detailed review of the relation of
language to reflective

though and ultimately to the process of
institutionalization would go

beyond my needs in this chapter.

briefly sketched to provide
rules and practices.
vidual

a

However, these themes need to be

basis for understanding institutional

Communication in some sense occurs when one indi-

by his or her action can call

second individual.

out

a

predictable response from

However, human thought that

is

a

self-conscious occurs

only when the action of an individual calls out the response
in himself
as well as in another individual.

That is, the action or, in the case

of language, the symbol calls out the same response in both
individuals.
This is the least complex situation.

The action need only call out the

response in the individual's own mind, not in the external world.

Fur-

ther, since the response is no longer automatic, an element of choice

is

now present, if only in the sense of either choosing to or choosing not
to complete the act.

said divided into

a

26

Thus the individual

"me" and an "I."

is

as

George Herbert Mead

Rather than being two separate

personalities, the terms refer to different orientations of the self
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with respect to thought and
action.

The 'me"

is

both the internaliza-

tion of significant symbols learned
through social

interaction and the

modifications of those symbols through
self-consciousness.

The "I" is

the self in action, with the possibility
of uncertainty in both the

execution and result of either thought
or action.
mental

The human or environ-

responses that result provide the basis
for the recognition of

novelty by the "me."

In a

certain sense the dialogue between the
"I"

and "me" parallels the dialogue between two
individuals or between

individuals and society.
Societies, in turn, are constituted by individuals
who have inter-

nalized similar significant symbols.

There is no presumption that all

such symbols or meanings are either fully shared
or similarly inter-

preted by all members of

a

social order.

Indeed variation should be ex-

pected because of differentiation in the social order
and the potential
of most individuals for creative thought.

However, when Mead defined

the term "institution" he did so on the basis of shared
significant

meanings
The institution represents a common response on the part of all
members of the community to a particular situation.
When we
arouse such attitudes, we are taking the attitude of what I have
termed a "generalized other." Such organized sets of response are
related to each other; if one calls out one such set of responses,
he is implicitly calling out the others as well. 28
.

.

.

By implication the institution, as part of the social environment, in-

fluences the development of individuals, although Mead did not present
fully developed theory of the impact of social organization.

Later advocates of an interactionist approach have dealt somewhat

more explicitly with this issue.

In an

attempt to apply the framework

a
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explicitly to politics, Peter
Hall wrote, "Order or
structure is not
something that automatically occurs
but rather must be worked
at and
must occur, to the extent that it
does, out of the repeated,
reaffirmed,

reconstituted acts of participants "29
.

of "negotiated order,"

a

^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^

variant of the social contract based
on either

shared agreements or tacit understandings
within

a

social

context.

Hall

also notes that negotiated orders
leave room for significant conflict

based upon the perspectives of different
participants ^0
.

takes

a

similar position.

Erving Goffman

Although, in the context of what the
author

calls total institutions--for example the
mental hospital Goffman

studied, the impact of formal structure is
much more apparent.

case the negotiated order

is

the underlife of the institution.

In this

It takes

place in the areas of social life left unorganized
by the more formal

aspects of institutional structure.

A reasonable inference is that

the realm of negotiated order must be far greater
in the larger society

outside the total institution.
Yet however much institutions are constituted by
shared meanings,

institutions are seldom experienced as the products of
cooperative
action.

Rather, institutions are usually experienced as givens
to which

persons adjust their behavior and sometimes as sites of
human oppression.

Critics of the symbolic interactionist approach have subjected
it

to intense disapproval

because of this issue.

They charge the approach

with being ahistorical and blind to the implications of organization
and
power.

32

These charges are in my view substantially true.

How then can
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one address these issues and still
retain the insight that in the
end
human beings create the social world
through their activity?
One approach to this problem is to
compare the ideas of social

process and social structure.

Social

process refers to the interactions

of individuals and groups based upon
their intentions (in the case of

group "aggregated" intentions).

voluntary in nature.

In

a

Thus social process is in principle

contrast, the concept of social structure
rests

upon the idea of constraint.

The relations among individuals and

groups are structured or organized externally
to their intentions.
Human activity takes place within those constraints;
that is, structure
finds expression through the behavior of individuals
and groups.
as supporters of the social

Just

process perspective find it difficult to

explain why persons often see their actions as highly
constrained, supporters of

a

social structural viewpoint find it difficult to account

for deviant behavior or, more importantly, efforts aimed
at social

transformation.
Tom Bottomore, following Georges Gurvitch, suggests

a

way of exam-

ining these two faces of human society, and by impliciation, institutions.

Bottomore defines social structure as

a

permanent process of

destructuration and restructuration, that is, of the transformation and

maintenance of social structure.
structure is

a

Bottomore makes no claim that social

negotiated order, although he would probably agree that

one could imagine social orders that approximated that condition.

advantage of Bottomore's definition

is

The

that it focuses on the role of

human activity in the creation and maintenance of structure and thereby
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the creation and maintenance
of institutions.

One must now look a lit-

tle deeper into Botto.ore's
idea and ask what it means
for human action
to create, support, or
overturn structure. What do
human beings do when
they engage in the process
of destructuration and
restructuration?
To begin this analysis

I

am returning to Mead and his
ideas of the

significant symbol and the generalized
other.

The significant symbol

is

gesture, whether through language
or physical action, that
calls out
the same response in both the
observer and the actor. According
to
a

Mead, both human thought and social
activity rest upon the sharing and
the use of significant symbols.
Although Mead's ideas about social

structure and organization were not fully
developed, he implied that
organized social life

is

grounded in more than the possession
of common

significant symbols.
Mead develops this point by examining
the differences between what
he calls

"play" and "games."

Pure play requires only the existence
of

common significant symbols to coordinate and
give meaning to the activities of the individuals involved.

There is no coordinating purpose

built into the participants' actions.

called

a

game this changes.

In any situation that can be

As Mead points out,

The fundamental difference between the game
and play is that in the
latter the child must have the attitude of all the
others involved
in the game.
The attitudes of the other players which the
participant assumes organize into some sort of a unit,
and it is that
organization which controls the response of the individual 35
.

It is

this unity in thought and action, structured by the
common

activity, that Mead calls the generalized other.

Note that the general-

ized other rests on more than internalized norms and
values.

It can be
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no more than a mere shadow
outside of a context of social
action.

It is

this generalized other that provides
the basis of both the process
of

institutionalization and institutional control.

As Mead continues.

The complex co-operative processes and
activities and institutional
functiomngs of organized human society are
also possible ^sofar as
every individual involved in them or
belonging to^t at oc ety ?an
take the general attitudes of all other
such individuals wUh reference to these processes and activities and
institutional functionings, and to the organized social whole
of experiential relations
and interactions thereby consti tuted-and
can direct his own behavior accordingly .3d
Thus the individual encounters structure through
the taking of the role

of the generalized other.

Yet how then can persons experience institu-

tions as alien or oppressive?

At this point in my discussion institutions
appear as clusters of

significant symbols relating to structured activity, that
is to the

arrangement or coordination of diverse individual activities on
some
relatively persistent basis.

Yet this is only part of the reality of

institutions, or at least of institutions as normally understood.

All

institutions certainly rest upon patterns of common understandings and
actions, but institutions also organize the material world outside human
interaction.
and so on.

That is, institutions organize space, material resources,
Further, institutions also direct human actions in ways out-

side of or in opposition to the intentions and understandings of individuals.

While grounded in human understandings and practices, institu-

tions are themselves environments which persons must interact with or

respond to.

Just as the game, through the embodiment of the generalized

other in constitutive rules and actual practices, appears as

a

given

reality in most circumstances to new participants; so too, in principle,
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do almost all phenomena that can
be called social

institutions.

The

most salient difference is the character
of the sanctions and rewards

available to many institutions relative
to those built into games.
Thus, an institution embodies purpose
through the crystallization of
social

understandings into rules and rule governed
social practices,

normally understood as institutional structure
or organization and institutional process.

These rules, in turn, guide the manifestation
of

the institution in the material world and
thereby the creation of the

environment that people experience as the institution.
Rules, Practices and Understandings
Thus, institutions are structured through two kinds
of rules.

The

most explicit rules publicly codify the organization and
process of the
institution.
as

These rules need not be entirely formal or legal as long

they are in principle public; that is, easily intelligible
to

a

community significantly wider than active participants in the institution.

For example, one can talk about the rules that codify the organi-

zation and operation of

a

standing committee in the Congress.

These

rules may in fact be formal, as in the jurisdictions granted standing

committees in the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act; or they may be
informal, as in the rules that govern the party composition of different

committees.

My understanding of these codifying rules

valent to Rawls' view that institutions are

"...

a

is

roughly equi-

public system of

rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties,

powers and immunities, and the like."
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However, there is often also

a

set of rules, in addition to
the

public rules, which guides and supports
participants' understandings of
an institution.

These rules consist of social

practices within the in-

stitution and the understandings that make
these practices intelligible
to institutional

participants.

These rules are never as explicit as

those that codify the institution and should
not be assumed to be shared
or indeed sharable in the same sense that the
codifying rules can be and

often are.

Rawls expresses this notion when he describes
institutions

as being simultaneously an abstract form of
human conduct (i.e., codify-

ing rules) and the concrete activity of human
beings in reference to
38
rules.
I
will refer to this second kind of rules, or more
properly

activity structured or governed by such non-public understandings
as
institutional practices.
is led by a

The situation where

a

congressional committee

person other than the chair serves as

a

good example of this

difference between codifying rules and institutional practices.

Active

participants in the committee's environment would understand this reality and modify their actions in that environment accordingly.

Few

members of the general public would be aware of the impact of this
situation on the committee's operation.

Peter Winch gives

a

particularly useful analysis of rules as prac-

tices based upon participant understandings.

It is worth noting the

many places at which Winch's ideas are congruent with Mead's and those
of most other symbolic interactioni sts

.

This congruence is strongly

reflected in their respective views of the relationship between human
thought and action and social process.

77

Winch is interested in explicating
the conditions in which individuals may be said to be following

rule in their action or thought.

a

contends there are three necessary
conditions, the first of which
that rules can only occur in social
settings.
vidual

is following a rule,

is

One can say that an indi-

in language or any other context,
only if

other persons can, in principle, discover
the rule in question.
implications follow from this criterion.

engage in

a

He

First, all

sort of internal social relationship.

Two

individuals must

To understand one's

own use of a rule is equivalent to the way in
which others understand

that use from an external perspective.

Stated differently, human beings

experience themselves indirectly as an "other" or an
"object."

Second,

rules can be followed without fully conscious
knowledge of their nature.
A person need not recognize his use of rules except
"in principle."

That is, the individual would recognize the rule if it was
explicitly

brought to his attention.
rule.

Hence, one can speak of tacitly following

Certainly this provides

a

a

partial explanation for why individuals

do not perceive their actions as part of the process of restructuring

social institutions.
A second condition of using a rule is that a rule establishes and

embodies connections between previous experience and action and that of
an individual
all

in the future.

"The rule can only seem to me to produce

its consequences in advance if

Therefore one could say that

a

I

person

draw them as a matter of course. "^^
is

following

a

rule only if, in

principle, other persons can deduce from it expectations about the first

person's future actions.

Further, if these other persons were to follow

78

the same rule, all of them would
have

a

common understanding of what to

expect from each other in the specific
context of that rule.
Given

a

certain sort of training, everybody does,
as

a

.

matter of course,

continue to use these words in the same way
as would everybody else."^^
It follows that commonly understood
rules provide the basis for roles

and institutions.
Finally, rule following is identified by its
logical inseparability from the notion of "making a mistake."

Winch contends that it is

nonsensical to talk about rules except when it is
possible to judge if

someone is following the rule correctly.

For example, in the case of

language. Winch says that if one claims that he is using
ly, he must also, at least tacitly,

usage.

a

word correct-

know what constitutes incorrect

Indeed, others must be able to determine if mistakes in
usage

are being made in order to understand the first individual.

As evalua-

tion of language usage is ultimately social, it follows that the
evaluation of the usage of or appropriateness of any rule

Additionally, if the idea of contravention

is

a

is

also social.

necessary part of the

idea of a rule, then one can consider the possibility of deliberately

making

a

mistake; that is, of choosing to reinterpret or abolish exist-

ing rules.

Thus, consciousness or understanding of

a

rule involves,

above all else, understanding what it means not to follow that rule.
one can choose to contravene

a

As

rule, in principle the range of alterna-

tives to the rules is vast, perhaps infinite.

Thus, the rules that

human beings possess are potentially open textured and the actions

related to them are likewise alterable.

To the extent that

79

institutions are experienced as
constraints, it

is

because institutions

through their very existence as
systems of rules impact upon
individuals
to construct boundaries to the
open field of human activity,
much as the

organization of Mead's games produces
the similar appearance (and
experienced reality) of constraint.
This tension between constraint and
the potential
an important feature of institutions.

for choice is

That is, as John Brigham notes,

institutions are the possible forms of
conduct realized in the social
world.

44
In

this view,

.

.

understanding an institution implies

awareness of the dynamics between possibilities
and action. "^^

Brigham

then gives examples of this tension in
the context of the Supreme Court,

describing situations showing the variable
constraint of practices
(i.e., rules in Winch's use of the term).

For example, the practices

governing interpretive latitude in the meanings
given to terms like
commerce, contract, full faith and credit, and due
process are quite
broad.

This allows Justices to have commensurate flexibility
in the

range of intelligible decisions possible in cases
involving these terms.
In

contrast, the use of the term equal protection in anything
but

a

very

specific way would not be intelligible to those persons who
understand
the institutional environment of the Court.

Brigham says the applica-

tion of equal protection to cases of search and seizure would not
make

sense to other judges, lawyers, the relevant press, etc., even if that

application might make sense to many members of the general public.^^
That is, such understandings or practices are not on their face sharable
with those persons who are not active participants in the institution.
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such cases it may be difficult
to convince outsiders of
the intelligibility of such practices for
insiders.
The outsider might perceive
In

institutional action based on privatized
practice as fixed or corrupt.
For the insider the action would
likely be viewed as arising
through

correct procedure.
In

contrast, what

I

called codifiable rules, such as the
formal

process of voting in the Supreme Court
to decide cases or to decide
what
cases to hear, carry

gibility.

a

much wider and more immediate sense
of intelli-

One should not assume that rules are
inherently intelligible.

Rather, the probability that

a

rule will make sense may be largely

function of the audience addressed.

Rules, in terms of social

standings and practices, usually require

a

a

under-

greater degree of active par-

ticipation in the business of the institution to
make sense.

Codifiable

rules, that is the rules governing the most publicly
available aspects
of organization and process, may require only

of the preconceptions of

a

a

person's internalization

given culture to be intelligible.

be particularly true in liberal

This may

societies like the United States where

it is generally believed that institutions either are
or should be rule

governed.

This cultural preconception is particularly strong in the

case of governmental institutions.

Such institutions are expected to

operate according to fair procedures, not simply by procedures.

codifiable rules may be
in liberal

a

Indeed,

precondition for institutional effectiveness

democratic societies.

One way of looking at the respective roles of codifiable rules and

of practices in constituting institutions is to imagine an institution
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without structure and process,
without common understandings
of the
range of required, expected,
possible, or impermissible
activity.
Plainly such institutions would
violate common understandings of
the nature of institutions, perhaps even
of the nature of social interaction
generally.

However, occasionally people have
tried to design institu-

tions to minimize rule generated
constraints on participants' actions.

Examples of institutions of this type
are rmny of the women's groups

established in the United States during the
1960s and 1970s.

In a

study

of such groups, Jo Freeman discovered
that a set of rules governing

group practice arose despite the intentions
of group members.

Indeed,

Freeman found that such unrecognized rules
were usually more pernicious
both to the interests of most group members
and to the expressed pur-

poses of the organizations than formal rules
concerning structure,

decision making, etc. would have been.

Freeman contends, to adopt

Brigham's terminology, that when the practices of
unstructured groups
are unavailable to all of its members, those members
who know the practices are far less likely to act responsibly, i.e., in
the interests of
the entire membership.

Private rules often result in the creation of an

elite, whether by intent or coincidence.^'^

In a

more theoretical con-

text, John Commons agrees with this point; although he qualifies
the

argument by stating that public access to rules embodied in practices
are only

a

precondition for institutional responsibility.^^

Commons' work also is helpful

from

a

in

differentiating an institution

persistent system of social interaction.

to explain why,

for example,

a

That is, his work helps

legislature is an institution and

a
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cross-generational friendship between
two families is not.

Both kinds

of social relationship are in
some sense rule governed,
dependent on
common understandings and practices.
Nonetheless, for Commons, only

institutions are "going concerns," that is,
chains of what Commons calls
transactions.

He defines

a

transaction as

a

pattern of human interac-

tion in which there are rules which
specify what individuals must do,

may do without interference from the
institution, can do without expecting the institution to use its power
and resources to aid, and can do

with the aid of the institution."^^
tions must exist for some public.

Thus, Commons holds that institu-

Institutions cannot be totally

private arrangements.
Still, institutional publics are seldom identical
to the entire

community or cultural unit, nor may those institutional
publics share
fully in the knowledge of all significant rules and
practices.

ments and governmental

Govern-

institutions in liberal democracies do provide

a

case in which the institutional public is nearly equivalent
to the

entire (adult) community.

This is a result of the inclusive notion of

citizenship found in most liberal democratic societies.
is no

However, there

reason to expect that different parts of that public know the

rules and practices of governmental

same ways.

As

I

institutions either fully or in the

noted before, there are good reasons to think that

rules in the sense of practice are relatively private in comparison to
the more abstract, and often formal, rules that constitute the most

public face of an institution.
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Some Applications
I

will explicate this idea of
social differences in the
knowledge

and understanding of institutional

analyze

a

rules and practices by using
it to

common description of United States
political parties.

Sorauf

and others have described American
political parties as having

a loose
but identifiable three part structure
consisting of "the party in government," "party organization," and
"the party in the electorate. "^^

These structures through their interactions
form the institution called
a

major poliitcal party in the United
States.

must not be mistaken as organizational
units.
tures is an abstraction rather than

enced by participants.

There

there is

a

a

President of

is

a

However, these structures
Each of the three struc-

structure that

is

directly experi-

no party in government per se.

Instead

given party who may seek support from or give

support to members of Congress belonging to the
same political party.
This pattern of interaction may occur between
the President and individual members of the House and Senate, the
partisan leadership of these

bodies, or through

a

number of other mechanisms.

Further, party in

government can involve other interactions involving neither
or members of Congress.

a

President

Cooperative activity between two appointed

bureaucrats representing different agencies also qualifies as an
example
of party in government.
A similar analysis can be done for both party organization and
the

party in the electorate.

Major United States parties are often de-

scribed as loose coalitions of state parties.
may not always have coherent organizations.

Yet, the state parties

Some local components may
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be strongly organized, but
other local party units
.ay exist in na.e
only.
Similarly, there is nothing in
the American political
environment

that can be simply isolated and
called the party in the
electorate.
Different parties in the electorate
may be found or constructed
for differing purposes.
For example, most Southerners
call themselves Democrats in regard to state and local
politics and they usually vote in
ways consistent with those self
perceptions.
Since about 1970, Southern
whites have increasingly called
themselves Independents in regard
to

national politics.

Some have theorized that nonaffi
liation provides a

socially acceptable way to vote Republican
in presidential elections.

Rather than viewing political parties
as three distinct if overlapping
elements, it makes greater sense to think
of political parties as dif-

ferentiated patterns of understandings and
practices within

a

system of

potentially public rules.
This idea that different persons can
share common understandings

about the existence of an institutional form
and yet in some ways per-

ceive that institution in radically different
ways need not be restricted to political or governmental institutions.
social

institutions in general.

nents of the Equal

It applies to

For example, both supporters and oppo-

Rights Amendment seem to share a similar conception

of the family on the most general level.

I

suspect that if

a

number of

concrete groupings of individuals were described, most proponents
and
opponents would label most of the same groups as either "families"
or
"not families."

Should supporters and opponents then be asked to give

reasons for their answers,

I

still doubt that members of the two camps
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would differ greatly in their
replies.

They would be basing
their

answers on the widely available
public rules about how to
recognize a
family in United States society.
However, if these same people
were

asked to estimate the effects
that implementing the ERA
would have on
the quality of family life, I
believe that supporters and
opponents
would now tend to give extremely
different replies. While part
of this
expected divergence might reflect
different perceptions about the
content of the ERA,

I

also expect that differences in
the less public

understandings of what

a

family

are now coming into play.

is

That is,

they are basing their judgements in
part on implicit understandings

based on actual social practice.

It is

important to remember that the

meaning of practices lies in action as
well as thought.

Despite simi-

larity in the public rules that define
families, the actual practice of
real

families may give rise to different
understandings of the institu-

tion of family.

Differences among individuals, groups, and broader
publics over
the nature of institutional

practices, within broad agreement over the

nature of institutional rules, may be the most common
source of tensions
that generate institutional change in the United
States.

The court

packing incident in Franklin Roosevelt's second
administration provides
an example of this dynamic.

After 1933, the Supreme Court declared

several major laws unconstitutional.

These laws had strong support in

the rest of the national government and, apparently, among
the general

public.

At least the second claim seems reasonable on the basis
of the

1936 landslide for Roosevelt and congressional

Democrats.

Yet the
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Supreme Court appeared ready to
use judicial review against
additional
New Deal legislation.
Roosevelt sought to gain a working
majority on
the Court by proposing legislation
aimed at giving him the power to

appoint new justices should Court members
refuse
age.

In

to retire at a certain

brief, the Supreme Court and its allies
were able to mobilize

the public against Roosevelt's proposal
by using the publicly held ex-

pectation that the Judiciary
political

body.

is

predominantly

a

legal

rather than

Although Roosevelt correctly understood the
intrinsic-

ally political function of the Supreme Court,
he was unable to convey
this to the public.

That is, he was unable to convey the differences

between the public rules that define an institution
in

a

general way and

his understanding of the practices that defined
the institution's actual

operation.

51

The court packing example provides

how the interplay of different persons'
rules and practices can serve as

a

a

useful

beginning for showing

understandings of institutional

window into both the nature of insti-

tutions and of institutional change.

through

a

I

will

extend this analysis

second example based upon Fenno's analysis of the Interior and

Insular Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives.
I

want to show how Fenno's examination of changes

in the composition,

operation, and policy decisions of this committee in the early 1970s can
be further elucidated by looking at the interplay of committee rules and

practices.

Despite the fact all House standing committees operate under the
same general

formal and informal

rules established by the House, Fenno
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found important differences
in the character and
operation of the six
committees he examined.
In the 1955-66 period,
Fenno observed the

Interior Committee to have the
following characteristics:

members
usually came from western states
and sought conrnittee membership
to aid
their reelection,52 (2) members
had extensive interaction with
special(1)

ized but diverse clienteles,"
(3) members attempted to secure passage

of all member sponsored and
clientele supported bills and thereby
to

give priority to the interests of
commercial

users of natural

resources,

and (4) members engaged in logrolling,
both in the committee and in the

House, on the basis of non-partisan
expertise, to move bills through the

legislative process.

In reality,

these practices were far more speci-

fic and yet more flexible in application
than my summary indicates.

For

example, Fenno observed that despite the
pro-business orientation of the

committee's western majority, members made real
efforts to mollify the
concerns of
It

is

a

senior eastern member with strong conservationist
views.

doubtful

that any member of the House Interior Committee

during the 1955-66 period believed that the committee
operated in an

illegitimate fashion.

While members might concede that the immediate

goal of the committee was to act in the interest of
specific functional

and electoral constituencies, rather than some broader
concept of national

interest, there is no reason to believe that most members would

understand their constituents'

ordinarily opposed.

There

is

interests and those of the nation as
no

way to document how the general

public

felt about how the Interior Committee operated during this
same period.

Given the low level of information and interest that the public
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generally has in the day to day
operation of the United States
government, it would be surprising
if any substantial element
of the citizenry
knew of the committee's existence.
Nonetheless,
the public has some

awareness of Congress and that its
function

entire nation.

is

to make law for the

Thus, one might expect that
there would be a general

public expectation that Congress
should make law in primarily the

nation's interest rather than primarily
in the interest of any
particular constituency.
I
would expect the same standard to
be applied to the

judgement of committee activity, except

to the

extent that self or group

interest is directly affected by that
committee's actions.
Therefore, to the extent that the general
public became aware that
the first priority of the House Interior
Committee was to serve the tan-

gible interests of western commercial
resource users, the question of

legitimacy would be raised.

I

am not claiming that the public would
be

surprised to learn that members of
in ways supportive of special

goals or reelections.

a

congressional committee would act

interests that could aid those members'

Certainly, there

is

a

public folk lore concerning

how politicians "sell out the people" to further
their own personal interests.

Rather, practices and decisions that were perfectly
acceptable

on the basis of members' understandings of the Interior
Committee become

potentially suspect from the perspective of the general public.
Traditionally, the Interior Committee's work was relatively noncontroversial.
change.

Beginning in the late 1960s, this situation began to

Greater societal concern with what can be broadly called envi-

ronmental issues gradually changed the political environment in which
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the committee operated and
generated greater awareness
and concern among
at least some elements of the
public over the subject matter
included in
the Committee's jurisdiction.
By 1972 Fenno discovered
the beginnings

of change in the committee's
operation.

New members interested in

environmental policy making rather than
constituency service began to
join the committee.
There were also some changes in
committee rules

which reduced the formal powers of
the Chairman and strengthened
those
of the subcommittees.
Fenno, as of 1972, did not think
these changes
had made an important difference in
the committee's decisions on legis-

lative matters, but he noted that the
preconditions for major changes in

committee outputs had been set in

movement represented

a

pi ace.

Thus, the environmental

situation in which tensions resulting
from dif-

ferences in members' understandings of acceptable
practice and those
latently held by the public became important
enough to require some form
of resolution.

Whether these changes were mainly symbolic or
have made

an impact upon the substantive actions of
the committee or of Congress

are of course matters subject to empirical
is

investigation.

However, it

clear that Interior in the early 1970s was gradually changing
from

what Fenno calls
tee.

a

corporate type committee to

a

permeable type commit-

Corporate type committees are more likely to get bills they
report

to the House passed,

but these committees are usually responsive to

rather narrowly defined interests or constituencies.

meable type committees operate in

a

In

contrast, per-

more pluralistic environment.

ever, such committees are less able to effectively pass legislation

through unified committee action.

How-
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While the apparent transformation
of the House Interior Committee

from

a

corporate to

changes in what

I

permeable type committee resulted
in

a

call

at the level of what

I

a

number of

codifiable rules, most of the changes
took place
call

rule governed practices and
understandings.

For example, neither the House nor
particular committees have formal
rules governing how seriously

a

committee should take its subcommittees'

recommendations about pending legislative
business.

In

the case of the

Appropriations Committee, acceptance of
subcommittees' views was almost
pro forma.

Fenno describes this committee as

corporate type.

a

near perfect case of the

During the 1955-66 period the Interior
Committee fol-

lowed, if somewhat less fully. Appropriations
with respect to having

a

high degree of subcommittee autonomy in
making policy decisions.

Over the same time period, the House Education
and Labor Committee, the
very model of

a

permeable type committee, paid little attention

subcommittees' reports.

to

its

If the House Interior Committee was in fact

becoming more permable during the 1970s because it was
operating in an
intensely partisan and pluralistic environment similar to
Education and
Labor, then Interior's previous tendency to ratify subcommittee
decisions should be declining.

While the changes in Interior's codifiable

rules appear to support more power for subcommittees, the committee

members should be learning to act and to understand their actions in
quite an opposite manner.
While institutions may change through alterations in either codi-

fiable rules or in practices, in the long run there should be

measure of coincidence between explicit and implicit rules.

a

large

Yet,
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particularly in societies subject
to rapid change, one
should expect
that full coincidence between rules
and practices would be rare.
When

Brigham says that,

"...

understanding an institution implies
awareness

of the dynamics between possibilities
and action" he seems to be focusing on this very point.^^

In very stable institutions,
a great deal

of

change may take place through alteration
in institutional practices

without any immediate change in the formal
or formalizable rules.
deed,

a

In-

change may be fully institutionalized when
observers or partici-

pants can realize that the new rule can be
consciously stated by parti-

cipants.

The changes described in the operation
of the House Interior

Committee fit this pattern.

On the other hand,

rapid disjunctive insti-

tutional change seems to be related to major changes
in the formal

governing and defining the institution.

Institutional changes coming

from the victory of revolutionary movements serve as
example.

rules

a

useful

if extreme

Yet even in this case underlying social practices
may affect

the way institutions operate.

For instance, despite the official abol-

ishment of the untouchable status in India after independence,
members
of that caste are still effectively barred from most positions
of institutional authority in that nation.
As

I

noted earlier, the governmental and political

the United States are highly stable as such things go.

institutions of
Thus,

I

expect

that institutional change occurs as much or more by the gradual alteration of institutional practice and its eventual
rules than vice versa.

impact on codifiable

To the extent that electoral

realignments pre-

sent situations when there are relatively large shifts in political
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relationships,

expect that an unusual degree of
change in formal

I

institutional rules would occur.

revolutions only if one

is

Still, realignments can be called

given to rhetorical excess.

There

is

no

reason to reject the expectation that
post realignment institutional

change will be reflected mainly through
changes in understandings and
practices.

In

any case, the total amount of institutional
change

occurring in the wake of realignments should be
greater than that
occurring at other times provided that the
electoral process

is

either

a

significant expression of the public's power or
provides opportunities
for elites to initiate political and social
change.
My analysis to now has focused on institutions
and institutional

change in general.

To apply this material

to

understanding how govern-

mental institutions change requires the ability to
differentiate governmental institutions from other kinds.

institution

is

sometimes used as

a

Further, the term political

synonym for governmental institution.

Yet, the terms are not used interchangeably in either political

or ordinary discourse.

A discussion of this issue will

science

also help to ex-

plicate the meaning of the term governmental institution and what it
means for

a

governmental institution to change.

Governmental

Previously

I

Institutions:

Selectivity and Legitimacy

discussed some of the problems resulting from the use

of conventional definitions of governmental institutions.

As noted, the

Cabinet, Federalism, and subgovernments do not fully meet conventional

defining criteria such as having

a

legal

existence or

a

definite
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organizational structure.

Yet the Cabinet, Federalism,
and subgovern-

ments are still called governmental

institutions.

Further, almost all

political scientists call all three
of these examples political
tions as well as governmental
institutions.

institution is regularly applied to
ena than the term governmental

would call interest groups

a

Yet, the term political

much more diverse group of phenom-

institution.

Most political scientists

type of political

a

am not aware that the National

institu-

institution.

However,

I

Rifle Association or the AFL-CIO's

Committee on Political Education have ever
been called governmental
institutions.

Nevertheless, political scientists, or people
generally, may disagree over what constitutes

a

political

institution.

For example,

I

say that the Chase Manhattan Bank is

a

political

claim that the bank's management has

a

great deal of power to shape

institution.

economic development in the United States and elsewhere
and has

nificant ability to influence government policymakers.
ual, even one who agrees that

I

institution.

is an economic

might

I

a

sig-

Another individ-

have accurately portrayed the bank's

operations, may still reject my characterization of the bank
as
tical

may

a

poli-

He or she might answer that the Chase Manhattan
Bank

organization which may at times act in the political

environment.
Clearly, ideas about which entities or sets of social

relations

should be called political are closely related to ideas about the nature

of politics.

Furthermore, ideas about politics inevitably serve some-

one's political purposes.

Yet the concept of politics involves more
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than a debate over the
objects the concept describes.

Any Intelligible
Idea of politics Involves
questions of preference; that
Is, the condi-

tions to be preferred, the
means chosen to obtain these
conditions, and
the persons and processes
that will decide the first
two items.
While
politics is more than just a moral
or normative concept, both
ideas

about politics and the practice
of politics refer to conditions
that
have moral or normative implications.^^
While politics can be an unbounded
or contested idea, most persons
are uncomfortable calling all aspects
of the human condition solely
political.
I
doubt that anyone would go beyond
saying that all aspects of
social life can be politicized, that
is made political under
some cir-

cumstances.

Individuals may differ in their use of
the concept of poli-

tics, but in any culture some situations
are regularly seen as politi-

cal, others as non-political.

In the United States

passage of tax bills through Congress
the birth of

a

child is not.

is

normally considered political,

Sometimes usage is ambiguous.

an individual might talk about the politics
of
tion.

for example, the

a

For example

charitable organiza-

While some persons may conceive of such
organizational struggles

over power and policy as fully and unambiguously
political, most people

would agree that this situation

is

not political

the legislative process in Congress is political.
will be termed political

in the same sense that

Rather, the situation

insofar as the actions of the participants in

the charitable organization resemble the actions of
participants in what

would normally be called

a

political process in ordinary language.
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To the extent that one can
identify those aspects of the
concept

of politics that are more
central than others or indeed
constitutive of
the concept, one has a firmer
basis to differentiate political
from nonpolitical institutions.
Along these lines, Fred Frohock
suggests three
standards to identify central or what
he calls core properties.
These
include (1) that core properties
remain "constant" despite changes
in

other properties, (2) that if core
properties change, all other properties must also change, and
(3) that
in a radical

a

change in

a

change in the meaning of the concept.

core property results
The implication is

that core properties are those that
allow individuals to understand

a

concept differently and still know they are
expressing the "same" idea.
Frohock goes on to claim that the core
properties of politics are "directing" and "aggregations."

Politics involves "directing" in that

politics always involves actions to influence
human behavior.

Politics

also involves "aggregations" in the sense that
political actions are

only intelligible as such when they involve the
fortunes of social collectivities.

Frohock holds that both core terms are central to the
idea

of politics.^^
The absence of either core term renders any situation
incompletely

political.

For example, the internal

dynamics of the charitable organi-

zation appear to meet the condition involving "directing" but
does not

meet the condition involving "aggregations."

Thus, the internal strug-

gles of the charitable organization can be meaningfully described in

political terms but without other justification should not be called political.

However, if

I

were convinced that the organization in question
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had through its actions

a

large impact on the benefits
and burdens

placed upon some identifiable
collectivity (e.g., "the poor"),
probably reconsider my position.

charity was

a

political

That is,

I

I

would

might now say that the

institution and/or was engaging in
politics.

To
the extent that Frohock's two core
terms actually capture the basic
na-

ture of politics, distinctly political

institutions would need to embody

purposes involving these dimensions of
power and large scale social
relations
Still, Frohock's specification of the
core terms of politics seems
to be missing at least one crucial

enced.

dimension of how politics is experi-

Any useful concept of politics must reflect
the potential open-

ness of all social life.

It must involve a

ity of human choice in thought and action.

recognition of the possibilPolitics

interactions of human beings pursuing their choices in
ment.

For want of a better term,

"reciprocity."

However,

I

I

based on the

is

a

social

environ-

claim that politics always involves

am not claiming that politics is restricted

to relations among relative equals.

Thus, an institution that made

policies without something that can be called discussion or
negotiation
in the broadest sense of those terms would not be intelligible
as a

political institution.
If the core terms of politics could be fully specified, then the

basic dimensions on which political

institutions embody purpose would be

those consistent with the core terms.

Still, such terms are highly ab-

stract and give little information about how political or governmental
institutions operate or change.

To understand an institution and what
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happens when an institution
changes one needs to know
the concrete for.s
in which the core
properties of politics are embodied
in institutional
structure and process.
Among the universe of ways
in which such properties can be expressed, an actual
institution can embody only a
very limited part of this universe in
rules and rule governed
practices.

Otherwise the institution cannot
embody purpose.
stituted on the basis of selectivity.

Institutions are con-

More specifically, political

institutions involve selectivity on the
specific understanding and practice of forms of direction, definitions
of aggregates, and so forth.
E.

E.

Schattschneider stresses this idea of
selectivity when he says,

"The functions of institutions are
to channel conflict; institutions
do

not treat all forms of conflict
impartially

.

.

.

"^^

Recent work on the theory of the state
also focuses on the issue
of selectivity, despite the fact that
this work proceeds from assumptions quite different from Schattschneider's.

Benda and Claus Offe see political

Authors such as Charles

institutions as entities exhibiting

policy selectivity through the operation of their
rules.

institutional rules

".

.

.

act as

That is,

'selection mechanisms,' actively

sorting or filtering the demands placed on the state
and actively formulating certain policies without external demands
or participation being

necessary."

64

Observers of political institutions should give
attention

to how rules structure the likelihood that certain
issues will

and certain policies will be adopted.

be raised

This approach is especially

appropriate to the study of realignment insofar as realignments are
expected to result in significant changes

in

public policy.
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Political

institutions, then, appear to
be organizations with

selective rules that effect
outcomes that require the
direction of human
behavior, involve significant
collectivities, and result from
a process
based on reciprocal human action.
Earlier in this chapter I
rejected
the view that institutions are
equivalent to organizations. As
cases in
point

referred to patterns of relationships
such as subgovernments and
American Federalism.
These are patterns that many
call institutions,
but patterns not centered in
organizational entities.
Yet neither subI

governments nor Federalism exist or act
apart from organization.
I

have not fully divorced institutions
from organization.

Alain Touraine, makes this departure.

wrong on this point,

I

While

I

Thus,

One writer,

believe that Touraine

is

also believe Touraine's approach to
institutional

questions offers valuable insights into the
nature of political and
governmental institutions.

Touraine understands institutions as decision
processes, not as
organizations.

He views institutions as being in principle
distinct

from organizations or administrative entities.

Touraine defines insti-

tutions as follows:
We shall therefore use the term "institutions" here
for that set of
mechanisms by which the doubly open field of historicity
is transformed into a set of rules for social life which, in
their turn
predetermine the functioning of organizations. 65

That is, political institutions are involved in

a

mediating process,

adjusting organizational structure and process to the demands
and constraints arising out of

a

particular sort of social order.

In point of

fact, Touraine makes no distinction between the terms
institutional and

political.

It would be more accurate to say that Touraine is

talking
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about

system of decision making rather
than identifiable institutional
66
entities.
While this approach may appear to
be similar to Marxist
ideas about the state, Touraine
denies that the institutional
system and
the state are identical.
He contends that the state,
while rooted in
a

the political/institutional

organization.

In

system, acts mainly on the level of
social

Touraine's terms, the state

is

more an instrument of

power than the producer of decisions
and rules that structure social
life.^^

Therefore, political

institutions, or more properly the politi-

cal/institutional system, decide the basic rules
for social life and the

structure and functions of its constituent
units.

In

contrast, social

organizations are involved in the management and
repression of that
social

life.

Yet where and how are the rules determined?

It is one

thing to say that institutions operate in an
environment structured by
class relations, technology, forms of knowledge,
etc.; however it is

unwarranted to abstract

a

decision making process outside any identifi-

able set of human relationships and concrete human actors.

Touraine would agree, society

is

If, as

ultimately the product of human action,

just where do human beings act when they make basic decisions?

The

separation of institution and organization on the concrete level must be
rejected.
Still

Touraine's ideas are valuable precisely because organization

can now be treated as

a

dependent rather than independent variable.

Organization becomes the result rather than the source of institutional
purposes.

In the

context of this study,

I

expect that changes in the

nature or priority of political purposes held by members of dominant
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coalitions following

a

realignment will result In
institutional modifi-

cations aimed at fulfilling
those new or reprioritized
purposes.
Yet
What is the dynamic relationship
between changes in purpose
and changes
in organization to embody
purpose? After all if previously
existing
institutional forms are selection
devices, then the relation between
purpose and form cannot be unidirectional.
Previous organization, unless totally uprooted, will certainly
have an impact on how new
purposes
will become embodied in
organizational form.
Touraine suggests this

process can be examined by looking at
what he calls societal debates,
".

.

.

the public expression of the tensions
between the elements of

a

system, particularly between the elements
of the system of historical

action."
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Because political institutions are
selective, that

to some interests and purposes and
closed to others, not all

will occur in the setting of political
institutions.

is

open

debates

Further, those

debates which are carried on in or through
political institutions will
be distorted to some degree by the nature
of the institutional

forms.

Touraine expresses this idea as follows:
Institutions, because they are mechanisms of discussion,
negotiation, and translation, at the same time as being
the political
expression of a social domination, are always
simultaneously instruments of constraint and legitimation.
They do not codify the totality of the field of historicity; they distort
it, exclude certain
components from it, limit the action of the social classes,
above
all that of the dominated classes. 69
The study of institutional change following realignment
can provide some

insight into this process.
formal institutional

An examination of the interaction between

rules, the understandings and practices of insti-

tutional participants, and the understandings of outside groups or
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publics during and following
realignments can provide a
useful way to
grasp the channeling and
ultimate institutionalization
of what Touraine
calls societal debates.
Some writers use the terms
political, government, and
governmental
institution as essentially synonyms.
This view has merit only
so far as
the realm of politics is
restricted to the government
proper, its

actions, and to

a

select group of institutions which
are almost totally

concerned with the operation of
government (e.g., nBjor political
parties).

Those people who hold

political

a

more extensive view of the domain
of the

usually claim that some institutions
can be political without

being governmental.

Using an earlier example,

that major banks are political

institutions.

I

might want to claim

Yet

I

cannot intelligibly

claim that American banks are governmental
entities, no matter how
powerful

they may in fact be.

What

is

the basis for this distinction?

To begin with, the idea of government
is sometimes seen as identical

to that of the state, sometimes not.

Initially, it will be easier

to proceed working within the first
approach.

Most American political

scientists work from Max Weber's assertion that
governments are those
social entities that have or can intelligibly
claim to have
on the legitimate use of violence in

a

given terri tory.

a

monopoly

''^

In this

tra-

diton, institutions are organizational sites which make
decisions ulti-

mately enforceable by legitimate force.

Other observers hold that the

state and the government are not the same.
of the state, though usually

a

Government

very important part.

is

merely

a

part

The basic reason

for this distinction is that such analysts think
that real decision
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making and enforcement powers
are often held by groups
or institutions
outside the government.
Still, the ideas of
government and governmental
institutions are important ones
in this tradition.

The reason is again

the question of legitimacy,
particularly over the use of
violence.

Touraine notes that government
he calls the institutional

is

the most important part of
what

system because governments can
appear, in

principle if not actual practice,
to be autonomous from
dominant social

fomations.^l

Nico Poulantzas elaborates on
this view by saying that

governments act to legitimate the
actions of the state by taking
action
in the name of a "people-nation"
which is inclusive of almost all
social
groupings.

This is important because process
and discourse are often

structured to give preference to the
interests of

a

dominant class.

However, to be legitimate, such process
and discourse cannot be reduced
to simply a mystification of class
power.

Perhaps this idea and its implications
for institutional operation

and change are best grasped through

C.

governments as dual systems of power.

B.

Macpherson's description of

Macpherson contends that govern-

ments act upon society both directly
through their own policies and in-

directly by giving sanction for non-govenmental
institutions to exercise

legitimate authority over some area of human activity.

That is, non-

governmental institutions borrow legitimacy from the
government and if
need be these institutions can call upon the
government to use legiti-

mate violence to enforce their authority.

concentrated elsewhere, in most contexts it

Though real power may be
is

proper to restrict the

term governmental institution to those rule governed patterns
of social
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interaction that are for^lly
part of

constant interaction with

a

government or are 1n priory
and

a

government.

Thus, the essential difference
between governmental and
other
kinds Of political institutions
is that the characteristic
of legitimacy
is central to the former.
Should governments or governmental
institutions lose legitimacy completely,
they are simply another
sort of political institution.
That is, there is no substantive
function or form of

organization which

is

inherently governmental.

The paradigm case of the

loss of legitimacy is the
revolutionary overthrow of

a

government.

Be-

fore the overthrow, the pre-existing
government was legitimate to the
extent that the way it operated assured
that its decisions would be

either obeyed or disobedience would be
hidden or disguised.

The govern-

ment's legitimacy rested upon its
ongoing social relations with its

citizens rather than on merely how the
citizens felt about the government.

Similarly, the destruction of the regime
automatically destroys

its legitimacy.

The new government becomes legitimate
because it acts

like a government, i.e., in Macpherson's
terminology

a

dual

system of

power, and becomes imbedded in the ongoing
activity of the total social
order.

While in more stable political orders the
disjunction of social

and political life is far less, changes in
institutions imply changes in
the operative character of legitimacy.
In the

purest sense,

a

As Robert Grafstein points out.

legitimate institution secures obedience to

Its decisions by the very fact of having made
them through appropriate institutional procedures.
Its outcomes are accepted, in the
behavioral sense, when they are generated through the
decisionmaking process of the institution
.74
.

.
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Concl usion

In this

chapter

I

have attempted to explicate
the idea of what it

means for an institution to
embody

a

purpose.

By doing so

I

hoped to

lay a basis for penetrating into
the nature of institutions
and institutional change at a somewhat deeper
level than mere description
of structure and process over time.
I
also sought to understand
institutions

from

perspective consistent with my understanding
of persons as

a

active participants and makers of their
social life.
I

have taken the position that
institutions are best understood as

human created but crystallized patterns
of social interaction based upon
both explicit rules and implicit but
ultimately rule governed practices

and understandings.

I

have sought to understand institutional
change

through the interplay of rules, practices,
and efforts to redefine or

modify them.

I

have also tried to distinguish governmental
institu-

tions, the actual subject of my inquiry, from
social
general and political

able to find

a

institutions in particular.

simple standard of differentiation,

institutions in

While
I

I

have not been

contend that gov-

ernmental institutions must be identified by the activity
of bestowing

legitimacy upon their own policies and those of
non-governmental institutions

.

Through the rest of this dissertation

I

intend to use the concepts

developed in this chapter to explicate the process of institutional
change arising out of major electoral realignments in the United
States.
The demonstration and explanation of such change is important.

First,
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changes in institutional
structure and processes imply
changes in public
policy and it is public policy
that in the end affects the
lives of

ordinary people.

Secondly, in

a

society that claims that legitimate

government action must in the end arise
through some process involving
popular sovereignty, it is important
to evaluate the ways, if any,
in
which elections are related to policy.

As

I

have pointed out, in the

United States the relationship between
elections and policy formation
a

is

murky one, but any such relationship
should be strongest and most

clearly seen following realignments.
In the previous chapter,

I

suggested several places to look for

significant institutional change following
realignments.
(1)

the appearance of new institutional

institutional

forms,

(2)

I

the creation of new

functions, (3) changes in the relationships among
institu-

tions, and (4) the initiation of new governmental
four,

These included

want to add

a

fifth.

functions.

To these

Changes in institutional process, particu-

larly those related to new constituencies or policy
goals should be

added to the list.
in alterations

While these changes can be most obviously identified

in formal

or codifiable rules, in many cases these

changes might occur, at least initially, primarily on the level
of practices and understandings.

Therefore, attempts to document and explain

institutional change following realignments could focus on rules, practices, or both.

CHAPTER
A CASE STUDY:

III

REALIGNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
Real ignment Debates and
Institutional

In my review of the

scholars found

realignment literature,

Chan rp

I

noted that most

definite relationship between
realignments and altera-

a

tions of government policies.

claimed there was

a

To a lesser degree, researchers
also

connection between realignment and
institutional

change.

This connection was noted by
Burnham, Schattschnei der. Key, and

others.

However, these authors did not make

ment this point.

a

serious effort to docu-

Rather, they supported their arguments
through brief

historical examples and vignettes.

In

this and the following chapter

I

examine the relationship between realignment
and institutional change in

more detail.

I

show that the forces and conditions that
produce signif-

icant institutional change following realignments
are integrally related
to the forces and conditions that prompt
major electoral and coalitional

change.
In

the realignment literature great stress is
placed on the re-

aligning election itself as

a

cause of subsequent political change.

brief, realignments are seen as exercises in popular
sovereignty.

characterization

is

In

This

unfortunate because the realigning election is

a

response to deep political tensions that arise from major
social and
economic problems.

The realigning election
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is

but one moment in

a
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longer period of political
debate and conflict.

Thus, any understanding

of policy or institutional
change following realignment
must be linked
to the history of the debate
that led to the realignment.
A full discussion of the debate
and transformation of discourse

that would accompany any realignment
would be
Yet any institutional change following

a

massive undertaking.

realignment would be more com-

a

prehensible in light of understanding
the realignment debate.
all,

I

After

claim that institutions embody purpose
through the crystalliza-

tion of social understandings into
rules and practices.

New institu-

tional structure and process would
correspond to the crystallization of
the discourse of the newly dominant
political coalition.

At least one

tradition of work focuses, if coincidental
ly, on these very issues.
During the 1960s

a

number of American political scientists became

interested in the formation and consequences of
the peculiarly American
form of the positive state, usually called
interest group liberalism.

Members of this school, including Kariel

,

McConnell, and Lowi

explicitly concerned with electoral realignment.

,

were not

However, each to some

extent perceived that the current procedures of United
States national

governance had either their origin or their first complete
articulation
in the New Deal,

i.e., following the 1932 realigning election.

As a

group, these authors saw this new style of governance as

a

politically

viable response to the need for

a

society where

a

more activist state in

most politically active members had deep misgivings about the exercise
of state power.

These authors viewed interest group liberalism as an

ultimately self-defeating form of governance.^

Of these authors.
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Theodce

L0W1 .ost

fuUy

t.aces the connections
between Ideological discourse before the realignment,
the Institutionalization
of the new discourse following realignment,
and the Implications
of that discourse for
subsequent policy and institutional
adaptation.
As

I

noted In Chapter

I,

one of Lowl's .ost
important concepts Is

the "public Philosophy."
that Is. an ideology that
dominates political
action and discourse over
a relatively long
period of time.
The dominance of the public philosophy
that Lowl calls capitalism
was reconfirmed by the 1895 election,
but soon came under
questioning given the
various tensions and irrationalities
still produced by Industrial
capitalism.
Thereafter, according to Lowl.
a debate was joined
by proponents of what most 20th century
tericans call conservatism and liberalIsm over the proper use of state
power.
Lowl says this debate ended
in
FDR's second term with the
retreat of the Supreme Court from
conservative principles.
The conservative-liberal debate
was replaced by the

hegemony of interest group liberalism.

After 1937, the Constitution did not
die from the Roosevelt
Revolution, as many had predicted, but
the basis

for the , beral
liberal ism-conserva«sm as
e''
source
ource^o
of 'oub
publ Jr'Z?
c philosophy no longer made
sense.
Once
the
principle of positive government in an
indeterminable but expandinq
political sphere was established, criteria
arising out of ?he verv
issue of expansion became Irrelevant. 2

"'V'

^

The author then continues by exploring
the consequences of the public

philosophy of Interest group liberalism
that began to emerge in the
1930s upon the policies and forms of state
action adopted In

of policy areas.

a

sampling
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Lowi-s work, by its very
scale, is strong on the
elucidation of
cause and effect but is less
convincing in te.s of process.
That is, he
does not provide the reader
with a detailed view of the
concrete actions
and events that resulted in the
conversion of ideas into practice
and
policy.
Reading Lowi, one may be able
to see why there is a
particular
form of positive state in the
United States, but it is hard
to grasp the
actual process of its creation.
A large scale "history" of
a realignment, or better, a series of
realignments, including the full sweep
of
the process from its origin to its
uttermost consequences, would be a

most useful addition to the literature.

But that project is far beyond

the capacities and resources of this
writer.

Instead, it

is

more man-

ageable to look for case studies of
institutional change following
realignments and then to relate those cases
to the general debate that

constituted that realignment.
While

I

am not aware of any case studies of that
sort, there are

case studies upon which

a

reader can interpose that kind of framework.

One example of this material

Machine.

Crenson's intention

is
is

Matthew

A.

Crenson's, The Federal

to understand why bureaucratic forms of

governmental organization began to replace forms based
on other principles during Andrew Jackson's administration.

Specifically, Crenson

looks at the rapid pace of bureaucratization in two
agencies, the Post

Office Department, and the General Land Office.

These agencies employed

about 75 percent of the civilian federal employees and were the
most
important points of direct citizen contact with the national
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government.
1828

Most realignment theorists
consider Jackson's election in
realigning election.

a

Ladd and Jahnige have each
characterized United States national

politics in the half century prior to
1828 as having

ence to

a

so-called natural aristocracy

a

style of defer-

Jacksonian politics were

built on the decline of this political
style,

a

decline resulting as

much from the rise of entrepreneurial
capitalism on
the rapid extension of the egalitarian
frontier.

vast scale as from

a

Guardianship of the

previous concepts of public morality and the
possession of economic

power no longer coincided as in the past.

This created new problems of

governance for the incoming Jackson administration.

As Crenson states,

the social conditions of the era would
present these executives with a special set of administrative
problems.
In the absence
of the old institutions' regulating power, it
would be necessary for
civil servants to find new mechanisms for
securing peaceful
reliable compliance with laws and administrative
directives. 5
.

.

.

'

Given that government officials came from the same
social order whose

members no longer obeyed social or political authority
on the basis of
deference, Crenson

's

argument applies to these officials as well.

The Federal Machine presents the story of how the Jacksonians

gradually established bureaucratic forms in the government's largest
agencies to deal with the crisis caused by the decline of the political

style of deference.
ians'

Bureaucratic reorganization was not the Jackson-

first attempt to deal with the crisis of non-compliance.

The tra-

ditional, almost familial, structures of agency operation were first

replaced by the extensive use of party based patronage.

This, by

itself, proved insufficient to maintain administrative and political

Ill

control

in the growing and
more geographically
dispersed agencies

the Postal and Land Offices.

like

While positions were still
filled through

the spoils system, the
principles of office operation
changed radically.
For the first time the government
instituted a clear separation
between
official and private acts in office,
genuine internal specialization
of
functions in agencies, and the
specification of duties by formal
rules.
Of key interest is the relation
of these administration actions
to the
public debate of the realigning
election itself.

Crenson believes that the Jacksonians
came to Washington without
any major policy changes in mind.

Rather, they came to reestablish
the

old moral order of civic virtue in
government.^

Ironically, they were

both the products and the beneficiaries
of that breakdown.

Many of

their actions, including government
reorganization on bureaucratic principles, the direct support of local
constituencies, and even patronage
itself, can be understood as attempts to
recapture civic virtue through

institutional mechanisms instead of by direct
appeal to individual conscience.

Crenson proceeds to claim that the net result
of these activi-

ties was the creation of

a

new standard of political

legitimacy based

upon the affections of the citizenry for the
government (and governors)

rather than the standard of Washingtonian virtue
the Jacksonians had
o

hoped to preserve.
A second kind of case study is represented by Kenneth
Finegold's

article on the origins of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933.
relation of this work to realignment research is fairly obvious;
the

passage of the AAA,

a

radical

departure from the government's

The
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agricultural policies of the
1920s, occurred soon after
the 1932 realigning election.
Unlike Crenson, Finegold
does not see the election
as a

direct factor leading to policy
change.

sulted in

a

Instead the election re-

new political context in which
the power and opportunities

of various political actors were
substantially altered.

The author

focuses on the interaction among
four groups of actors:

corporate busi-

ness, political

parties, farmers' organizations,
and the academic-

government complex of agricultural
economists.

Until about 1930,

reflecting the alignment of 1896, large
business interests and their
governmental allies were simply not
interested in responding to the
agricultural depression of the 1920s.

The business community generally

sought to keep agricultural prices down
to subsidize their own interests.

Reflecting their dominant position in the
post 1896 majority

coalition, big business had an effective veto
over most public policy.
From 1933 onward, the business community's
interests counted for
less in the emerging structure of political
power.
veto power.

Business lost its

Concurrently, FDR's massive electoral victory reduced
the

ability of organized agriculture to initially
control the specifics of
New Deal agricultural policy.
to turn to the agricultural

The Democratic administration was freer

economists for programmatic ideas.

As a

result, organized agriculture accepted elements in the AAA
that it

normally would have opposed (e.g., production controls).^
Both the Crenson and Finegold case studies provide examples of

what should be included in
a

a

case study that explicitly attempts to link

policy or institutional change to

a

realignment.

Both studies focus
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on appropriate topics.

In each case the

policy or institutional
change

selected for examination has
an organic relationship
to at least a part
of the overall political
debate arising prior to
realignment.
Once
again I am using the term debate
in a broad sense, to
encompass the
whole range of the public expression
of tensions arising out of
the
operation of the social order.
These debates are often carried
on
through many means outside the
usual confines of political
action, i.e.,
electoral competition, interest
group activity, and formal
government

institutions.

Crenson's examination of changes in
the operation of the

executive branch is appropriate in
that those changes are organically

connected to the tensions arising from
the decline of traditional
patterns of social power and the rise
of new ones based on the expansion
of

entrepreneurial capitalism in early 19th
century America.
Finegold's examination of New Deal
agricultural policy is also
good subject for

a

case study for much the same reason.

a

The agrarian

insurgents were among the biggest losers of the
1896 realignment.

The

boom-bust cycle that in large part prompted the
insurgency did not abate
over the following three decades, nor did all
demands for structural
change to respond to agriculture's plight.

However, the use of govern-

ment for these purposes was effectively blocked by
the structure of
political conflict and power of the 1896-1932 period.

question was but

a

The agricultural

part, though an important one, of the ongoing debate

over the need for positive government in the United
States.
The differences between the two case studies are equally
instructive.

Crenson is directly concerned with tying the discourse of
the
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election and of politics
generally to subsequent
institutional change.
Finegold is more interested in
the interaction of various
social actors

directly concerned with

a

policy area.

He is not overtly concerned
wi th

the more publicly available
discourse of party and electoral
competition.
For Crenson, the election of
1828 provided the Jacksonians
with a
fairly explicit message, if no
instructions on how to proceed.
For
Feingold, the 1932 election was a
context altering event.
It changed,
in often uncertain ways, the
relations of political

operate in

a

fairly privatized context.

actors who normally

As politics in the United

States proceeds in both public and
private modes, whether in realignments or normal times, case studies
of change after realignments
should
focus on both types of political
action.

Still,

I

think there is

a

necessary third element to appropriate

case studies, especially ones looking at
institutional change.
Postal

The

Department, the General Land Office and the
Agricultural Adjust-

ment Administration all were or became identifiable
entities of social
action where participants behaved in cognizance
of explicit or implicit
rules and understandings.

institutions.

That is, all were identifiable as social

Thus, in each of these institutions,
participants had an

identifiable way of life or way of doing things.

While the creation or

alteration of such institutions may be traceable to the
realignment
debate, much of the actual

process of change occurs within the institu-

tion itself or in its interaction with its immediate
environment.
This approach should be especially fruitful

in the American con-

text given the incremental tendencies of the United States political
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process, tendencies that have
been noted within all political
eras.
Earlier I noted that institutional
change could be conceptualized
as

either

process where changes in explicit
rules force an ultimate reconciliation of institutional practices
with these rules or as a process
where changes in institutional practices
and understandings eventually
a

result in alterations of codified
institutional rules.
that the second process

is

To the extent

more typical of institutional change
in the

United States, as should be expected
in an incrementally oriented
political

order, then researchers should emphasize
investigations of how

the realignment debate influences the
internal life of governmental
i

nsti tutions
In

the rest of this chapter and in the next

I

will look at two

examples of institutional change stemming from the
1930s realignment.

Since the use of cases from more than one realignment
would seem an
obvious strategy because it would allow comparative
analysis, some jus-

tification for limiting the cases to the New Deal must be
given.
all

the 1930s realignment was atypical

in some important respects,

After
for

example its rapidity and that no third party threatened
to replace one
of the major parti es.^^
I

made this choice for two reasons.

I

wanted to look at realign-

ments where the discourse was truly national in scope.
national communications media are

a

Since the

product of the late 19th and 20th

centuries, only the 1896 and 1932 critical elections are appropriate
choices.

I

eliminated 1896 because the proponents of change failed.

Certainly the Republican coalition after 1896 was somewhat different
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than before, but the
elements who already managed
to i.ple.ent policies
favoring the development and
consolidation of large scale
capital were
even .ore powerful in the
new political era.
While many of FDR's supporters (and opponents) may
not have imagined the
nature and extent of
change that the new administration
would enact, few observers
expected a
reprise of the business oriented
government and public policies
of the
1920s.
I
will limit my analysis to
the 1930s because unlike
the 1890s
the purposes of government
and therefore its institutions
were changing.

The 1930s Realignment and the
Formation nf fho^pnp
An important element of the
executive branch of the United
States

government

is

the Executive Office of the
President (EOP).

The EOP is

the most important element of
the executive branch under
direct presi-

dential control.

presidents to make

The EOP is the institutional
apparatus that allows
a

credible attempt to control and
coordinate the ac-

tivities of the national government.

constituent elements.
two thousand employees.

The EOP has varied in its size
and

In 1980 the EOP contained ten
units with about

Important and familiar units include the
White

House Office, the National Security Council,
the Council of Economic

Advisors, and most notably the Office of
Management and Budget.

important institutional cluster

is

This

surprisingly new, being legally

established late in the New Deal on September
8, 1939 by Executive Order
8248.
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On the surface, government
reorganization does not seem
to be the

kind Of issue involved in
realignment.

Instead, one thinks of
economic

depression, federal supremacy,
slavery, or the relative
political power
of industry and agriculture
as the sort of issue
involved in transformations Of the United States
political order.
Nonetheless issues relating
to government organization
seem to often follow realignments;
for

example the Jacksonian innovations
directed at enforcing government
authority in a changing social order^^
and the institutionalization
of
congressional seniority and the
disenfranchisement of blacks and the
poor that followed 1896.^^
While one can find hints of most of
the programmatic innovations
of the New Deal

in the discourse of the 1932
campaign,

the Roosevelt ad-

ministration entered office largely uncommitted
to any set of programs.
However, it was clear that the new
administration would be an activist
one that would use public power in new
forms for new objectives.

Yet

the structure and process of a business
oriented government were clearly

not adequate for supporting programmatic
innovation.

Thus, FDR stressed

the need for reorganization in the campaign
and in the first days of his

administration.
In

retrospect it seems amazing that Roosevelt waited until
January

1937 to submit his first formal

Nevertheless,

a

reorganization proposal to Congress.

kind of reorganization, especially of the Presidency,

took place from the start of the administration.

occurred in part through changes in the

fornial

This reorganization

rules and structure of

118

admittedly ad hoc Institutions.

However, the

™re

important elements of
this process of reorganization,
the ones that led to the
formation of
the EOP, initially took place
as alterations in institutional
practices
and understandings.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. tells

a

story of FDR's first day in office

that sounds nearly unbelievable to
those familiar with the current in-

stitutionalization of the Presidency, and the
current process of presidential transition.
Schlesinger writes that FDR literally
found nothing
in his office save a desk and a
chair.

There was nothing to write with,

nothing to write on, and no way to even
summon his secretary except

Roosevelt's own voice.

Schlesinger reports that Rexford Tugwell

recalled that Roosevelt saw the situation as

a

metaphor for both the

nation's helplessness before the forces of
Depression and of the weakness of the presidential office to take
appropriate action.

Roosevelt,

believing in the tradition of Wilson and the first
Roosevelt that the
Presidency had to be the activist center of the United
States government, found this an intolerable situation.^^
The Presidency of 1933 was not without institutional

resources

that could be applied to the task of coordinating the growth and
activity of the positive state.

There was the Cabinet, an institutional form

dating back to Washington's administration.
some ways as much

a

Still

the Cabinet is

creature of Congress as the President.

in

While

Woodrow Wilson's judgment that Cabinet members, because of their departmental responsibilities, are virtual servants of Congress no longer

applied by 1933; Cabinet members were not completely free to be the
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President's servants eitherj^

Besides ties to Congress, Cabinet
offi-

cers must also cultivate their
departments and key constituencies.

Direct help for the conduct of presidential
business had always
been meager compared to the need.

Until

1857 Congress would not provide

funds for hiring even one presidential
clerk.

Presidents always had

made use of informal advisors and troubl eshooters
of one sort or another.

These included department heads, officials borrowed
from other

agencies, and persons with no formal government
position.

Yet these ex-

pedients presented certain problems in assuring legitimacy
and accountability, and, most crucially, resulted in the lack of any
institutional

memory.

When Roosevelt entered office one element of the future
Execu-

tive Office of the President was already in place, the Bureau
of the
Budget.

The Bureau of the Budget had been operating since 1921, but
its

manner of operation was significantly different from what it was to
become.

Today, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the

successor agency to the Budget Bureau,
attention than most Cabinet members.

is

the subject of greater public

0MB itself is perhaps the most

powerful instrument of presidential leverage over the rest of the execu-

tive branch.
The need for positive government and the parallel need for means
to direct it is mainly a consequence of industrialization.

The United

States government was established in circumstances where the need of
national coordination was largely restricted to the contingencies of war

and internal revolt.

The framers intended the President to provide

emergency coordination, mainly in the capacity of Commander-in-Chief.
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Even 1„ this .ole.
the President's

aM,1ty

to coordinate

was ,u1te limited.

fede., action

Lincoln needed to assume
ext.a-constltutlona, powers
to carry on the Civil
War
war.
tho n^r^
c
^
As the
pace of
industrial and urban
develop-nt increased, the United States
government did not have
adequate Institutional capacity to
respond to the new kinds
of problems that
arose.
That is, the government
had neither the type
of personnel nor
the organizational
experience to cope with the
problems of industrialization even if the political
leadership before 1932. and
especially
before 1900, had cnosen
1^
chosen tn
art
i
j
j
to act.
Indeed, the institutionalization
of
the constitutional doctrines
of separation of powers
and of checks and
balances in the national
government resulted in a strong
bias against
governmental coordination.
To a lesser extent, this
remains true today.
To most Americans living
in the final quarter
of the 20th century,
the Presidency seems the
most obvious location for
coordinating govern-'
ment activity. This was not
always the case.
The center of national
government in the period of rapid
industrial development following
the
Civil War was Congress.
As an Indication of its
power. Congress both

originated and passed the budget.
the process.

The President had no official
role in

The Secretary of the Treasury
had responsibility for

gathering agency estimates, preparing
an aggregate budget estimate,
and
simply sending the materials on to
Congress.
woodrow Wilson reported
that contests for the selection of
the Speaker of the House received
nearly as much press coverage as did
presidential elections.'^
This system of congressional dominance
showed

nesses, theoretical and actual.

a

number of weak-

Wilson, anticipating the problem that
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would .esult in the creation
of the Budget Bureau,
noted that the budget
process only worked because
there was usually a
surplus.

He goes on to

State,

absolutely
necessaXTvrfinanctal' .^l^^^r^'
highly-ti^aineS and
metact na to^a^v
'^'^''"^ responsibility, and this is just
what our frnno^pcc?
iT^committee
(congressional)
^^'"^ ""^^
system does
not allow. 20
Of more immediate seriousness
was Congress'

inability to respond legis-

latively to the needs of urban
labor and of farmers in the
pre-1896
period.
In the years from 1877
to 1901 only twenty-one
major pieces of
legislation, excluding appropriations
and pork barrel, passed Congress.
It was clear that Congress
could not initiate its own
policy response to
the problems faced by an
industralizing nation.^!
The electoral insur-

gency of the 1890s failed, and the
period of economic prosperity that
coincidental ly followed muted the
political expression of deep social
and economic tensions.
However, the tensions did not vanish.
In retrospect,

the Progressive movement can be
seen as an attempt

by some elements of the victorious
Republican coalition to address the

problems of industrialization without
challenging the basic features of
industrial capitalism or initially the
Republican party.

As a group,

progressives realized that only government
could address the problems of
the new era.

Therefore, there needed to be some mechanism
to mobilize

and coordinate the use of government.
anism.

Congress could not be that mech-

The institution was too decentralized internally
and in its

relationships to external constituencies.
initially rejected the political party as

Similarly, the progressives
a

coordinating agency.

122

A.en-can political parties
shared ™a„y of the sa.e
shortcomings as
Congress.
In any case the
reformers did not find
parties an attractive
-de Of political action. They
were repelled by the
corruption that
seemed intimately linked
to partisan activity.
,t was also true
that

many progressives felt
strong loyalties or
antipathies to a major party
following the polarization
of the 1896 realignment.
As such, the

executive provided the one
institutional basis for reformist
action to improve the managerial capacity
of the national government.

The developing tradition
of progressive sponsored
institutional
reform at the state and local
levels would have a ^rked
influence on

reorganization in the New Deal.

This tradition was firmly
centered on

the use Of executive and
administrative power.

also

a

At this time there was

noticeable increase of executive
power and initiative at the fed-

eral level.

Following McKinley's election,
Wilson observes in

a

revised

°^ Congressional Government that McKinley's
more assertive presidential style might presage the
future.
Wilson stressed the growing

integrative role of the Presidency in
the overall operation of govern-

ment to the degree that he speculates
on the possible obsolescence of
his book's title.

It can be argued that the modern
Presidency,

at

least in its personal elements, was
complete when Wilson left office two
decades later.
However, it was Congress, perhaps because
executive agencies were
products of legislative action, that conducted
the first modern inquiries into the need for reorganization
of the federal executive.

Con-

gress authorized several studies in the decades
following the Civil War,

123

culminating in the Dockery-Cockrel

1

Commission of 1893.

taken on the basis of any of
these studies.

are important.

They demonstrate

a

No action was

Yet these early studies

congressional perspective toward

reorganization that has lasted to the
present.

From the start, Congress

was more interested in the
potential of reorganization to
save money

than in the goal of increasing
executive capacities to plan and imple-

ment policy.

Congress valued "economy" over
"^^
"efficiency
.

During this same period, Congress slowly
began to respond to certain problems of an industrial society
through establishing specialized
and decentralized administrative entities
now known as independent agencies.

Beginning with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, Congress ac-

tually reduced the potential for central
coordination, whether by itself
or by the Presidency.

government in

a

Indeed, the Congress'

decision to reorganize the

fashion oriented to special treatment of narrow
consti-

tuencies resonates with the later growth of the
system of subgovernments

after the 1930s realignment.
presses it, is
really is

-

".

is by

.

.

The result, as Harold Seidman aptly ex-

An Alliance

definition

gether in some common goal.

a

-

which is what the executive branch

confederation of sovereigns joined to-

Some members may be more powerful than

others, but they are nonetheless mutually independent."^^

under this circumstance

is

The problem

to make sure that those with a putative

responsibility to define and implement the putative common goal have
some real capacity to undertake those functions.

Congress took the first step toward creating

a

presidential ly

centered institutional mechanism that could help integrate federal
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activities With the passage
of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921
It is not likely that
Congress understood the
potential effects of forcing the Bureau of the
Budget beyond the i^ediate
goal of bringing the
federal deficit under
control.
The action was prompted
by the disappearance of the almost
traditional budget surplus
of the late 19th century.
The period of 1904-1910
was marked by an unheard
of six consecutive deficits. These deficits
were followed by a series
caused by World
War I spending. Congress'
establishment of the Budget Bureau
was entirely understandable within
the tradition of seeing
econo^ as the main
purpose of reorganization.
As such, many members of
Congress believed
the agency would be as
responsive to Congress as to the
President.
Nonetheless, while Congress responded
to the pressure of mounting
deficits, the response itself was
designed by the executive.
The proposal for

a

central budgeting agency under
presidential

direction, originally came from

dent Taft.

agency.
term.

28

27

special commission appointed by
Presi-

Clearly Taft was in agreement with
the commission's report.

Taft even prepared
Congress.

a

a

budget of his own, which was promptly
ignored by

Wilson also strongly supported the
formation of

a

budgeting

The legislation he submitted almost
passed during his second

Among the advocates of central budgeting
was Franklin Roose-

velt, who as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy had pushed for more cen-

tralized control of programs as well as
funds.
The 1921 legislation attached the Budget
Bureau to the Treasury

Department rather than directly to the President.
Bureau was to be in but not of the Treasury.

However the Budget

Congress also decreed that
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Of the Budget Bu.eau.

The President was
to appoint the
bureau's Director and Assistant
Director.
In addition there
was no conflr^tlon

requirement for the
appointments,

™Hng

the Budget Bureau's
leadership

directly responsible to
the President.
The Bureau of the Budget
was directed to evaluate
and revise the
funding requests of other
agencies as well as to
collect and aggregate
the.,
other agencies were
specifically denied the right
to ™ke appro-

priations requests directly
to Congress.

The Implication here,
given

the President's control
of Budget Bureau personnel.
Is that the budget
proposal presented to Congress
has the President's
approval, not just
the bureau's.
In fact the 1921 Act
required the President to
submit an
annual message to go with the
budget proposal.
Finally, the Budget

Bureau was empowered to make
studies of other federal
agencies for the
purpose of recommending changes
in the Interest of economy
and administrative efficiency. This second
mandate was not implemented
until after
the creation of the EOP.^^
The role of the Budget Bureau
in its early years was
very different from what it would become
after the 1932 realigning election.
However, the agency's practices
and understandings of its functions
that

evolved in the 1920s had independent
consequences for the ways the
agency changed in the 1930s.

President Harding appointed Charles

Dawes the first Director of the
Bureau of the Budget.

G.

The new director

had extensive experience in
accounting and procurement in the Army,
and

doubtless that experience informed
Dawes' implementation of the
Budget
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and Accounting Act
ot ,.2, and the
or,an1z1n, ot the Budget
Bureau's
Structure and routines.
Dawes

,u1cMy established

principles of agency
operation.

The

first Of these was that
the Budget Bureau
was an instrument
of the
President, that its
placement In Treasury was
no .ore than accident
of
history. Harding was
highly supportive of
Dawes on this issue.
Harding
let Dawes use the Cabinet
room for his meetings
with department heads
and put Dawes in charge
of the governmental
retrenchment following demobilization.
Dawes' second principle
was that the Budget
Bureau would
act according to the tenets
of good public administration
as then understood.
The agency would always
be impartial. Impersonal,
and above all
else non-political. 31
Dawes denied that the
agency had any role In
policymaking. On one occasion
he noted.

Much as we love the PreslHont if r
appropriations ^Z%l fccTA^n^^^^

political way

Dawes'

"'^^

ZJotlt^tZ^ll VZTsi Ihe^^xS^wIInd"""

initial efforts bore fruit.

Until

the Nixon administration and

the reorganization of the
Budget Bureau Into the 0MB, nx,st
Washington

observers saw the agency's staff
as the closest American
approximation
to the spirit of neutral
competence identified with the British
civil
service.
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Nonetheless, any agency involved in
evaluating and revising
get has to make policy decisions.

a

bud-

One reason that Director Dawes was

able to quickly establish his agency
was the biases he embedded in
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agency routines were compatible with the objectives of President
Harding
and his Republican successors.

Dawes favored governmental

retrenchment

and economy, and he and his agency developed their routines to achieve

those goals.

The Budget Bureau even cut its own expenses.

The agency

spent only $120,000 of its $225,000 initial appropriation.

Dawes'

imme-

diate successors at the bureau continued this policy, thereby depriving
the agency of the resources to carry out some of its mandated functions,

e.g., administrative studies.
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More important in the long run was the

agency's initiation of the process of central clearance.

Central clear-

ance refers to the power of the Budget Bureau or other presidential surrogate to approve or reject an agency request for funding and/or pro-

grammatic authorization in the name of the President.

It is

this prac-

tice, whether for appropriations or legislative proposals generally,

that became the consolidating focus of presi dertiel efforts to control
the national government.

The practice of central clearance laid the

institutional basis for the creation of the EOP.
In 1954,

...

Richard

E.

Neustadt observed that legislative clearance

by far the oldest, best intrenched, most thoroughly institutionalized of the President's coordinative instruments - always
excepting the budget itself - receiving new stability and new significance by virtue of its demonstrated power to adapt and survive. 35
is

Today Neustadt'

s

judgement remains accurate, although the locus of

clearance has shifted from the stylistically neutral Budget Bureau to
the highly politicized White House Office.
ly thought of as a presidential

the mutual

Though clearance is usual-

function, the practice had its origin in

interests of the newly formed Budget Bureau and the

Appropn-atlons Co™lttees In
Congress to stave off
interference 1n the
budget process by executive
agencies and other
congressional co^ittees
The initial proposal
for a clearance process
ca„« fro. the House
Appropriations Co^ittee in November
1921.
Dawes promptly adopted
the substance of this proposal in
Budget Circular 49 of 12/19/21.37
jy,,
the clearance process as
then adopted was
expenditure control, not
central program planning
or implementation.
This decision, once insti-

tutionalized in agency practice,
came to influence the
applications of
clearance that would make sense
to officials in the
Roosevelt admini

Strati on.

Clearance of appropriations was
not fully institutionalized
immediately.
Cabinet officers strongly
protested to President Harding
and
Dawes.
The bureau then backed off.
For important matters
and often in
practice routine ones, agency heads
went directly to the White House.
,

Thus, while Dawes did not succeed
in fully establishing
clearance, he
did not have to recall Budget
Circular 49.^8 jhe Budget Bureau
could

wait until there was

a

President with the political will
to fully

enforce central clearance.
Calvin Coolidge was just that President,
being interested in ex-

penditure control both as

a

general principle and to offset the
revenue

losses that were expected from the
business oriented tax cuts drafted by

Treasury Secretary Mellon.

Over the period of 1924-1926, the Presi-

dent's use of the Budget Bureau as his
clearance agent became nearly
universal on funding requests.

Indeed the Budget Bureau became rather

heavy handed in the exercise of its
authority.

Neustadt reports that
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Budget Director Herbert
law
Law

"

...

peppered key departments
with warn-

ings, abjuration,
and complaint, backed
by

^"^

a
d

considerahip
considerable amount of
Bud-

-^'-^-'"^

central clearance
continued in
this .orm at tbe
beginning of the Hoover
administration.
Subsequently
as the Hoover
administration

gradually became immobilized
by the Depre^
s-n crisis, the use of
clearance declined and
then virtually disappeared.

As Should be Clear
from the previous
material, the Republican
administrations Of the 1920S
did not reject the
notion of the coordinating
role Of the executive
out of hand.
Rather, the role of the
President
and the proper scope
of activity for the
national government was
delimUed by the final extension of
the political logic
of the 1896 realignment.
As Coolidge was reported
to have said, the
business of terica
was business.
While it was now clear
that the satisfactory
operation of
the economy required some
government activity, that
activity had to be
in forms favorable
to business, especially
large business, and not

Interfere with the performance
of legitimate business
functions.
Specifically, the purpose of
government was to exhort the
private sector
to take appropriate action
for Its own and thereby
the country's welfa re.

cy."

One facet of this style of
state action has been labeled
"adhocraThis term refers to the use
of government personnel and
services,

-alnly by business, without actual
state control.

The federal govern-

ment, especially the Commerce
Department, supported the creation
of
trade associations, coordinated
the spread of technical
information.
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aided promotional efforts
eTTorts, ptr
etc.

a
A
secondj element of the
adhocracy was
-,

the use Of executive,
including presidential,
persuasion to convince
business and financial leaders
to take necessary actions,
certain

m

emergency situations, the President
could even initiate governmental
provision of crucial services like
relief or loans to prevent
bankruptcies.
Congress, potentially responsive
to special interests
(which at
this point in time did not
include big business by the
political definition of 1896) was not in a
position to properly exhort the
business com-

munity.

Congress, according to the Republican
Presidents of the 1920s,
was likely to take actions that
would undermine business confidence,
such as farm relief or public
power development.
This "Hooverite" theory of activist
government bears some resem-

blance to the preconceptions that
informed congressional action in the

creation of independent agencies, except
that at least in the latter
case the agencies have substantial
statutory authority to make and/or

enforce policy.
on New Deal

Both the idea and practice of adhocracy
had an impact

programs such as the National

Industrial

Recovery Act and on

the development of the phenomenon of
subgovernments which is such an

important form of state action today.
toward

a

Yet,

FDR's election pointed

change in the role of the federal government
in general, and of

the Presidency in particular, from exhorter
to the agency of policy

initiative.

The executive branch would need the aid of Congress
to

perform this new role.

Franklin Roosevelt, aware of this new context,

stated in his first inaugural address:

These measures or such
^"
""^ '"^''"^'-eother measures a?
ns experience and wisdom,
^^''^^ ™^
0"t of
I sha n
seek w?.h
authority to bring to
constitutional
speedy adoption

Trl

«

The election of 1932
did not mandate the
eventual creation of an
Executive Office of the
President, but the event
does see. to have unleashed the forces that
would require an integrative
agency of some sort
attached to the Presidency.
Given three years of economic
disaster it
was hardly surprising that
the nation elected
Roosevelt and a massive
Democratic congressional majority.
However, the size and
distribution
of the Democratic landslide
was somewhat unexpected,
especially to observers familiar with post-1895
voting patterns.
Roosevelt ran up a

Plurality of over seven million
votes, an eight to one margin
in the
electoral college, and carried
282 counties that had never
gone to a
Democratic presidential candidate
before.
While some of these gains reflected the continuation of the
party's growing popularity in
the 1920s
among urban dwellers and farmers,^*
the Democrats' gains were only
weakly correlated with those of
1928 and 1930.''^

Congressional results were equally
impressive with the Democrats
acquiring a healthy majority in the
Senate and massively adding to their
thin House majority.
Congressional and presidential voting
patterns

were closely matched, implying

a

strong coat tail effect."^

Further,

there was substantial turnover in the
membership of the Democratic, as
well as the Republican, congressional
delegation.

Over 55 percent of

the persons who served in the House
during the 72nd Congress did not

return for the 73.d/'

One f1na, sign of the
electorate's restlveness

and their apparent choice
of FDR and the Democratic
party as an agency
Of refer., was that the
1932 election was a bad
year for progressive
Republican incumbents.
The progressives had done
very well in 1930,

despite the general turndown in
the Republican vote/S
country had made

a

i„

massive almost unidirectional
shift to the Democratic

Standard.
In addition, many historians
have inferred a deeper meaning
to the

1932 election than the change in voting
patterns.

proaching

a

There was nothing ap-

unified Democratic viewpoint on
the problems of the Depres-

sion, nor on their underlying
causes.

Many congressional

Democrats had

economic views indistinguishable from
those of the Hoover administration.

Though FDR was widely believed to
be progressive and activist
in

outlook, his advisors and appointees
held many different viewpoints.
Some appointees were quite conservative,
including the first budget

director, Lewis Douglas.
The most important aspect of the
political environment following
the 1932 election was the sharp decline
in the position of large scale

capital as the preeminent source of action
and legitimacy in the Ameri-

can polity; that is, the decline of big business
as what Everett Carll

Ladd calls the main political class.

William Leuchtenburg, the his-

torian, summarizes this phenomenon as follows:
As the depression deepened, amorphous resentment
finally took form
in one overwhelming question:
Who was to blame? The answer came
readily enough.
Throughout the 1920s, publicists had trumpeted one
never-ending refrain: that the prosperity of the decade had
been
produced by the genius of businessmen.
If businessmen had caused
prosperity, who but they must be responsible for the depression?51
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The fact that it
was possible for the
government to ™.e significant policy departures
during the New Deal
can only he understood
in the
context ot the decline ot
business legitimacy.
,n the Republican
ad.in-trations following the
1896 realignment, typically
more tnan 80 percent Of the top executive
appointments were given to
persons who were
-.bers of the United States
financial/industrial elite.
I„ the Roosevelt administrations of
the 1930s elite
representation in these posts
declined to 47 percent.
Phillip h. Burch Jr.. on
the basis of these
figures, claims that the
Roosevelt administration was
the most pluralistic in all of United
States history.
The sequence of events
leading from the 1932
election to the

establishment of the ECP

is

neither short nor straightforward.

In part

this is a reflection of
Roosevelt's administrative style.

FDR was known
to favor overlapping
sources of information and
structures of authority.
He felt this would enable
him to retain firmer control
over final policy

decisions.

To accomplish his goals
Roosevelt often relied on the
per-

sonal support of a series of
key aides such as Howe. Holey,
and Tugwell.

This was more than

a

matter of personal style; it
reflected the failings

of more institutionalized forms
of support."

However, the main reason

for the delay in setting up the
EOP was that while the incoming
administration understood the need for
integrative mechanisms, the administration lacked, save the World War
I mobilization, much
experience with

coordinative mechanisms at the federal
level.

This problem did not

arise from the idiosyncratic character
of the Roosevelt administration.

It would have been
a ™ajo. p^oblen,
fo. any Incoming
administration that
desired to use governmental

power for new purposes.

Leuchtenburg reports that
the Roosevelt
adminsitration faced a
snuation in 1933 that was in
many respects similar
to that faced by
newly independent nations
after the colonial
administration leaves
There were few skilled
Democratic administrators
except for some veterans Of the Wilson years.^^
The new administration
could have tried to
retain many of the top officials
from the Hoover administration.
This
option was rejected given
the probable hostility of
most of these individuals to the new administration's
aims.

Many

of the appointments made
to the rapidly constituted
emergency agencies were chosen
from outside
the ranks of the Civil
Service for much the same reason.
The adminis-

tration preferred to rely on
new talent.

Another option was to proceed
with fonnal reorganization to
create
a fully integrated administrative
structure.
Despite FDR's support in
the 1932 campaign for this
course of action, and

a

certain amount of

political pressure in its favor,
the President was understandably
more

concerned with programs aimed at
increasing public confidence and ameliorating the economic emergency. ^6

approach was to try

a

i„stead, the administration's main

number of experimental devices.

Through the

decade the use of these expediencies
provided the administration with

a

learning process on organizational
issues.
The Roosevelt administration made
relatively little use of the one

integrative agency available from the start,
the Bureau of the Budget.
This was not odd, given that the agency's
principal goal of budget

reduction was at variance
with the administration's
goal of expanding
the realm of government
activity.
Neustadt reports that financial

clearance came to

a

near standstill.

The turnover in the
federal

administration left many agencies
in the hands of officials
who knew or cared
little about the clearance
procedures
FDR seems to have tolerated
agency efforts to circumvent the
process.
Further, as policy differences Sharpened between the
President and his conservative
Budget Director, Roosevelt increasingly
used personnel borrowed from
other departments to do budget work.
Apparently, Roosevelt did not see
any poten.

tial

time.

in the Budget Bureau for any
function beyond gatekeeping at this

58

Nonetheless, Roosevelt did not force
the bureau to rescind or

amend Budget Circular 49.

Thus the basic regulations governing
clear-

ance remained formally in effect.

At the very point the Budget
Bureau's

clearance authority appeared fatally weakened,
the agency began to
reassert its authority.

This was done slowly and cautiously.

Low level

staff began to remind equivalent officials
in other agencies of their

clearance obligations in early 1934.

This was done on the Budget

Bureau's own initiative and prepared the way
for the agency's quick

return to
In

a

position of significant power in the executive
branch.

the initial

ly on fiscal

days of the administration, coordination, especial-

and economic matters, was attempted through ad
hoc groups

of advisors and officials including the famed "brain
trust.

second half of 1933, Roosevelt set up

integrate the executive branch.

a

By the

more definite structure to help

This new entity was named the Executive
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council.

The Executive Council
was composed of

department and agency heads.

a

fairly large nu.ber of

The body had no agenda,
little staff sup-

port, and promoted little
serious work or discussion
on its memberspart except when Roosevelt
himself was in attendance.
In

November 1933, Roosevelt by
executive order initiated

body, the National Emergency
Council

a

smaller

(NEC), composed of only ten
offi-

cials heading departments or
agencies that were central

to the recovery

effort.

While no formal power was
initially granted to the NEC,
the
agency received staff to prepare
agendas, do research, and maintain
liaison with a wide variety of
federal and state agencies.
Ultimately the
NEC became enlarged and thus
subject to many of the failings of
the

Executive Council (which was absorbed
by the NEC in 10/34).

While the

National Emergency Council at times
showed signs of developing into

a

genuine mechanism of policy and
administrative coordination, the NEC
mainly served as a forum where agency
heads could learn about their
counterparts' concerns and activities and
as

interagency tensions.

a

mechanism to reduce

Most NEC members had more interest

agencies and constituencies than in the
government as

a

in their own

whole.

In

ret-

rospect the NEC can be viewed as an opportunity
for political learning.

Schlesinger expresses this interpretation of the
NEC when he states,

... the NEC enabled the President to begin to gain control of the
administration's legislative program by providing for
the central
clearance of all legislative proposals coming out of
the executive
branch.
Roosevelt authorized the National Emergency Council to
engage in

clearance of substantive legislative proposals in December
1934;
although the NEC itself had discussed the matter as early as
February.
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Roosevelt has been quoted
as being
beinn
^

half

a

dozen times

.

"

^
.

.

.

quue horrified
l.

.

-

not once but

by finding out about
some agency's plan for

.

submitting major legislation
from the press or some
other indirect
64
source.
By December 13th, NEC
Director Donald Richberg
announced an
initial set of procedures.
While "substantive" matters
would go to the
NEC Director or one of several
NEC committees for clearance,
the Budget
Bureau would officially resume
clearance of requests for
appropriations.
The Budget Bureau protested
that the procedures were
unclear given that
most legislative authorizations
are meaningless without funding.
In
April of 1935, Roosevelt directed
that the situation be clarified.

Budget Bureau drafted

a

The

new set of clearance regulations
and managed to

get presidential support for them.

Indeed Roosevelt personally informed

the NEC that the Budget Bureau now
had his support.

These proposals

were issued as Budget Circular 336
on 12/21/35.^^
Under Circular 336 the bifurcation
of policy and appropriations
continued, except that there was
tion that involved both elements.

worked.

a

joint clearance process for legislaWhile awkward on paper, the process

This in large part reflected the Budget
Bureau's long opera-

tional experience with clearance in some
form.

It also

reflected the

rapid decline of the NEC as an effective and
influential agency.

Neustadt points out that the basic procedures set
forth
lar 336 have remained in effect ever since.

in

Budget Circu-

More importantly, he notes

that legislative clearance was no mere extension
of the budget process,

but

a

significant departure

in

executive coordination.
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^

''''
tfTZ'.
^is budget, but

creaiion I en
r
c
nTt
tives, his freedom of action
and\
of determined presiSen??al

.

Ldersh^pJ^^^"

Roosevelt's
his preroga-

-

°' '''''''''

Before the end of 1936, the
Budget Bureau was in practice
the only
agency engaged in legislative
clearance.
This fact was recognized
with
the issuance of Budget
Circular 344 in December 1937.
While the decline
and ultimate death of the
National Emergency Council can
be attributed
to the routinization of
the relief and recovery
efforts and to an in-

creasingly conservative political
climate in Roosevelt's second
term,
the Budget Bureau took advantage
of this situation to establish
its pre-

eminent position in the area of
central clearance.

The bureau and ulti-

mately most other agencies simply
ignored the NEC's rights under
Circular 336.
This happened, actually, as a matter
of course, a detail of admini^;
trative tidying, a minor item among
all the majo? cnanges
changes in ?he
the
Bureau's status, role, and outlook
^
.67
.

That is, the exercise of

a

.

new practice, closely related in
form and

function to the Budget Bureau's traditional
practices and understandings

gradually became codified into formal rules.

While some major agencies

were at first willing to end run the Budget
Bureau in 1935-36

(a

prac-

tice clearly tolerated by FDR), by 1939 the
Budget Bureau cleared vir-

tually all legislative proposals.

One political scientist of the era

characterized the agency's performance as having
such great influence
that it was "frequently commanding. "^^

During the early 1930s there were
policy coordination.

a

number of other experiments in

One of these was the National Resources Planning

Board, which was later placed in the original EOP.

The board had its
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beginning 1n July 1933, when
Harold Ickes, then the
Administrator for
Pubbc Works, appointed a three
.ember National Planning
Board
This
board was directed to
coordinate and develop plans
for public works construction that would take
account of the impact of
these projects on a
Wide variety of social,
economic, and environmental
factors, as well
as

the more traditional tasks
of avoiding waste and
preventing interagency

duplication and conflict.

The board received
additional status when FDR

reorganized it into the National
Resources Planning Board in mid 1934.69
Overall, the board was successful
in carrying out its function
of rationalizing public works construction,
with the exception of projects
where other agencies already had
made heavy political or material
in-

vestments.™

Congress ended the board's
appropriation, and thereby its

existence, in 1942.

At least one author attributes
this event to the

then dominant conservative coalition's
wish to prevent the presumably
liberal agency from shaping development
in the post war period.'^

In

any case, the experience of the
National Resources Planning Board In-

formed the structure and operation of
future EOP boards with coordinative functions, for example, the Council
of Economic Advisors.
If the realigning surge of 1932 made
an activist government pos-

sible, and with it the need for institutionalized
forms of coordination,
the elections of 1934 and 1936 shaped the
forms those coordinative

entitles would take.
a

Most observers interpreted the election of
1934 as

tremendous victory for the Roosevelt administration.

In an off

election, the Democrats made substantial gains
in both houses of
Congress, gaining better than two third majorities
in both houses.

year
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Further, many of the newly
elected Democrats were more
activist and
radical than either FDR or
most members of his administration.
The

victory of the Democratic party
in 1936 was perhaps the
greatest electoral victory in the nation's
history.
Democratic congressional majorities were raised to at least
3 to 1 in both
houses.

small states, nearly sweeping the
electoral

vote.

FDR won all but two

1935 had been

a

year

of programmatic innovation producing
the greatest wave of social
reform
in the 20th century, including
the Social Security Act and the
National

Labor Relations Act.

However the 1936 victory was very
different than the one in 1932
and size was the least of the
differences.

From 1936 onward, the basic

voting patterns that would structure
American electoral competition for
at least the next five decades, admittedly
with gradually weakening

effect, were set in place.

Those reference groups later identified
as

basically Democratic, e.g., city dwellers,
organized labor, and various
racial, ethnic, and religious minorities,
voted for FDR by much greater

margins in 1936 than in 1932.

Similarly, members of those groups subse-

quently identified with the Republican party,
e.g., businessmen, white

collar labor, and small town dwellers, were

in 1936 much

vote for Roosevelt or other Democrats than in 1932.^^

Zingale's term, the 1936 election demonstrated

surge."

a

less likely to

Using Nancy

"realigning interactive

That is, the election results demonstrated long term
patterns

of political polarization.^^
The electoral alignment, and to

a

lesser extent the coalitional

lineup, that emerged from the 1936 election had some appearance
of
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representing

a

class cleavage 1n A.encan
society.

While the guasiclass .akeup of the realignment
can be greatly exaggerated,
it 1s clear
that its composition was hardly
what Roosevelt originally
sought.
Rather, the adnlnistration
intended to bring together
a grand coalition
to meet the emergency of
the Great Depression.
Roosevelt's aim is

summarized by Leuchtenburg as
follows-

Lime, wnen class and sectional
animosities abated and the rlaimi nf
^-"^--^
--ific^^d' tt^l7ei:i
TnllTonl^

ZlTl^^'^'^^'

The truce lasted barely

year.

a

By 1934 much of the business
com-

munity had stopped backing the
administration and began to favor the
restoration of the old political order
and the dominance of the Republican party.
Much of the resulting political rhetoric
portrayed the New
Deal as a proto- total

i

tarian phenomenon, closely related to
the twin

horrors of Bolshevism and Fascism.

Typical of this discourse was Her-

bert Hoover's 1934 book. The Challenge
to Liberty

wrote that the New Deal was

.

.

,

in which the author

the most stupendous invasion of the

whole spirit of Liberty that the nation has
witnessed

discourse proceeded through action as well as word.

.

.

."^^

This

For example many

employers refused to abide by Section 7(a) of the
National

Industrial

Recovery Act, which gave government protection of
the right of labor to

organize and collectively bargain.

Perhaps the most important form of

anti-New Deal activity was located in the national
government.

Begin-

ning in 1934 an increasing number of federal court
injunctions were

directed against the New Deal.

The Supreme Court's resistance is well
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known.

e-1

Less

courts.

cc^only appreciated

is

the resistance of the
district fed-

At this ti.e any district
court could issue an
injunction

suspending the enforcement
of

a

law or regulation nationally.

During
1935-36 the federal district
courts issued an unprecedented
1600 injunctions of this kind 7^

The creation of the American
"welfare state" after the 1934
elections was in part attributable
to Roosevelt's need to
solidify his left

wing support.

Roosevelt sought to protect his
administration from leftist inspired electoral
insurgencies.
No doubt he felt this need
because
the political right had
largely abandoned the New Deal.
However the

administration's actions in 1935 further
increased the polarization that
would be demonstrated in the 1936
election returns.
President Roosevelt
realized that increased polarization
worked to his electoral benefit
in
the short run.
He told his advisors that the
most effective Republican
campaign strategy for 1936 would
stress moderation.
He thought the
Republicans could adopt the general
goals of the New Deal but criticize
it for excess and waste.

This insight was related to
Roosevelt's

growing interest in governmental reorganization.

Clinton Rossiter

states that Roosevelt's intention to set
up an EOF came from

".

Roosevelt's own candid recognition that an
otherwise professional per-

formance during his first term

...

had been hampered by

staff to help him stay on top of his ever-growing
duties.
vein, FDR appointed

a

a
"'^^

lack of
In this

Committee on Administrative Management in March

1936, chaired by Louis Brownlow.

The committee's report coincided with

Roosevelt's increasingly strong views that reorganization
should
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strengthen presidential
cont™, over the executive
branch.
When the
administration submitted
reorganization legislation to
Congress based on
the Brownlow Committee
report in January 1937,
the administration
expected the measure to easily
wi„ approval.
Unfortunately for the

administration, the polarization
that led to the great
victory of 1936
would prove to be an increasing
problem in terms of Congress
and public
opinion.
Reorganization was not the only
approach to improve executive
capacity that Roosevelt hoped
to use.
Since 1932 the administration
had
some success in using the
Democratic leadership and caucus
in Congress
to pass p res identi ally
endorsed legislation. After
1936 these efforts
were augmented by attempts to
ensure that pro-administration
candidates
got party nominations.
This effort culminated in the
notorious and

counterproductive attempt to purge some
conservative Democrats
1938 primaries.

in the

A second attempt to increase
administration control was

Roosevelt's attempt to expand or pack
the United States Supreme Court
in
1937 and thereby to get a working majority
willing to uphold New Deal
legislation.

Whatever impact the court packing measure
submitted to Congress in
February 1937 had on the Supreme Court's
later decisions, the court
packing legislation resulted in the delay
and ultimate defeat of the
first reorganization proposal.

Further, the incident worked, along with

the concurrent wave of sit down strikes,
to weaken the middle class

political support for Roosevelt and liberal
Democrats.
political support, combined with

a

This decline in

severe economic turndown in 1937,
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resulted 1„

a

strong Republican
comeback 1„ the 1938
elections

The

newly enlarged Republican
congressional delegation,
while as a group not
openly against the New
Deal, was virtually
devoid of the progressive
.embers who had been a
significant part of the
party before the 1930s
The Democratic
congressional delegation had
never been entirely
reformat. Many .embers of the
party remained committed
to the conservative
policies and constituencies
that had been central
features of American
politics from the 1890s until
the Depression.
By 1936, it is likely
that the occupational
/demographic profile of Congress
was returning to
the lawyer dominated, high
status pattern of the past.^O
Thus, by

1937
the basis Of what is now
termed the conservative
coalition was in place
After the 1938 election, the
conservative coalition would
become the

dominant force in Congress.
The main reason for the defeat
of the 1937 Reorganization
Bill was
that it became a rallying symbol
for a variety of anti-New
Deal interests.
Charges of executive usurpation
made sense to the broader
public
given the court packing episode,
the rise of European fascism
and the

possibility of war.
public support.

Initially the reorganization measure
seemed to have

However, this support dissolved
by the summer of 1937.

Public support for the bill decreased
to 22 percent (as measured
in
polls taken in March and May of
1938).
Support for reorganization was
only 36 percent even among individuals
who described themselves as

Roosevelt backers.^l

The remarks of a woman interviewed in
Philadelphia

by the Roper organization were
typical, reflecting a new hostility

toward political experimentation:

"We are just confused with so many
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Changes and theories, and
want to stop „nt1l we
get on our feet

again. "^^

Nevertheless, the fate of the
proposal was probably sealed
by the
peculiar internal discourse
of Congress itself.
The bill was defeated
almost by accident. The
Senate floor manager forgot
to n,ove that a con-

ference co™ittee be for.ed.83

p^.^aps such parliamentary
mistakes

would not have happened if
Roosevelt had consulted relevant
members of
Congress about the proposal in
late 1936.

In addition,

those parts of
the bill that involved or
implied reorganization of the
structures and

jurisdictions of line agencies created
another problem in Congress.
Interest groups and bureaucratic
agencies effectively worked with
their
congressional allies to kill objectionable
parts of the legislation.
Nearly every pressure group in
American society took exception to

gamzation remained neutral, and their
influent counted
Al

foMU-

ready the pattern of subgovernmental
politics was beginning to take

hold.

Another factor in the defeat of Roosevelt's
reorganization bill
was that members of Congress still
evaluated reorganizational issues

mainly in terms of their traditional
standards of economy and administrative efficiency.

The Roosevelt administration put little
effort into

explaining the experiences that informed their
proposal.

In

particular,

the key member of Congress on these issues,
Senator Harry Flood Byrd of

Virginia, still maintained that only economy
justified reorganization.

Byrd had the tactical advantage of having
generated

a

report from the

Brookings Institution
that tended to
reinforce
reinrorce thP
the congressional
perspective on reorganization.
The effect
^'^^^^ nf
this report was to
0^ th.-c
negate the
Brownlow Co^lttee's
clal. to un1,ue
expertise on organizational
p™.l-s. Beyond ai..e.ences
1n the understandings
of what goals a
reo.ganization plan should
achieve, there
cnere were
wp>-p also
,1c„ a= number
of substantive
differences between the
presidential and congressional
approaches
These differences Involved
disputes over the placement
of certain agencies, changes In civil
service administration,
and the Independence
of
the comptroller General
from the White House.
Even some liberal Democrats opposed the first
reorganization bill because
of these concerns.85
In 1939 the Roosevelt
administration submitted a
second reorganization bill to Congress.
Despite the major Republican
gains In 1938
congressional elections, the
bill passed with little
difficulty.
No
doubt the previous two years
proved to most members of
Congress that
there was little chance of
a presidential
dictatorship, while the reality Of a prospective general
European war and its potential
danger to
the United States was becoming
increasingly obvious.
This time Roosevelt consulted with Congress
before sending the proposal.
The President
and congressional leaders
found compromises on those
substantive Issues
that had resulted In conflict
during the previous two years.
Congress
saved face by Including some
language in the measure stating
that the
main purpose of reorganization
is economy; Congress also
retained a veto
over presidential reorganization
plans.
The bill passed in late March.
In early April Roosevelt
submitted a plan to establish an
Executive

m

Office of the President Including

a

White House office, the National
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sented by the end of the
month.
The basic structure and
purposes of the EOP were
codified 1n Executive Order 8248 of
September 8. 1939.
In the case of the
Bureau of
the Budget. Order
8248 sl.ply formalized the
practices that the agency
had developed and enforced,
often before full
presidential backing, during the preceding five
years.
These included, among
others, budget
preparation and supervision,
advising functions in the
area of administrative management, serving
as a conduit for information
about the

activities^of most other federal
agencies, and of course
legislative
clearance.87 Another duty of
the Budget Bureau was to
recommend,

on the
basis of its own analysis and
the comments of other relevant
agencies,
'

whether the President should sign
or veto legislation passed by
Congress.
That is, the bureau became the
chief institutional advisor
on
legislation.
Neustadt claims this function,
combined with the clearance
function, became the Budget Bureau's
principal source of power.
The
agency could now monitor the executive
branch's participation throughout
the legislative process.
The Budget Bureau had given advice
to the President on enrolled,

that is, passed appropriations as far
back as 1921.

However, because

there was no efficient way to get copies
of the legislation to the agencies and back to the Budget Bureau
and the President within a ten day

period, the Budget Bureau was rarely In

influence in these matters.

a

position to have effective

Beginning in 1934, the White House, because

of the great increase in legislative business,
required fuller and more
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rap,d information on
enrolled bills.

This task fell

to the Budget
Bureau due to its previous
experience and institutional
resources.
Much
as in the case of
legislative clearance, the
agency aggressively too.
advantage of this opportunity.
I„ particular, the
Budget Bureau taMng
advantage of recent advances
in copying technology
began to insist on
rapid and detailed responses
fro. other agencies.
By early 1939. well
before the establishment of
EOF, the Bureau of the
Budget codified
evolving practice into Budget
Circular 346.
Vet the practices formalized in Budget Circular
346 had been in widespread
use for at least a
89
year.
In

this chapter

I

have used the development of
the EOP after the

1932 critical election to show how
various forces within and
outside of

government impinged upon existing
institutional practices and understandings, resulting in their
transformation and ultimate codification
into formal

institutional structure and process.

Budget Bureau
phenomenon.
give

a

is

The evolution of the

an important example of the
implications of this

As the agency's capabilities
grew, so did its potential

President

a

to

way of integrating the activities
of an otherwise

highly fragmented executive branch.

However, the internal development

of the Budget Bureau since its inception
had been directed at restricting programmatic initiative.

Roosevelt gradually turned legislative

clearance over to the agency for this reason,
to protect his administration from the unsupervised innovation
of agency officials.

Unfortunate-

ly, the end result of reliance upon
the Budget Bureau, and the institu-

tionalization of its gatekeeper role, was to
leave the evolving

Presidency without an
institutionalized capacity to spur
innovation.
Thirty years later this role
would fall to the White House
Office.
However, given that senior White
House officials necessarily
tend to act
in the immediate partisan
interests of the incumbent
president, and that
they cannot duplicate the
experience and memory of an agency
like the

old Budget Bureau, the White
House Office has shown that it
cannot

effectively perform this role.
Finally the initial development of
the EOP suggests that institutional change, even following
realignment, tends to be conservative
in

nature.

Institutional change, at least in this
case, follows pre-

existing courses of development.

That is, to borrow Skocpol's and

Finegold's terminology, institutional change
tends to occur where there
is previous

institutional capacity.

tion, let alone
sense.

a

The EOP represented

a

new institu-

new institutional form, in only the
most artificial

The EOP was constituted from existing
institutions

(e.g., the

BOB) and crystallizing forms of institutional
activity (e.g., the White

House staff).

In

contrast, the Roosevelt administrations' attempts
to

create new coordinative institutions, with the
exception of the National
Resources Planning Board, failed before the creation
of the EOP.
Thus, in the case of the EOP, institutional change is
mainly the

result of changes in institutional practice.

For example, the BOB un-

dertook new kinds of governmental functions such as
legislative clearance and the evaluation of enrolled legislation that were only
distantly

related to its earlier clearance functions.

By performing these func-

tions, often on its own initiative, BOB strengthened its position vis

a

V1S .est other
government agencies,

m

particular BOB was able
to sur-

vive and prosper because
it was able to
transform its routines (i
e
institutional capacity) to
fulfil, the need of the
administration and
the new coalition of
dominant interests for an
agency that would help
™prove the capacity of the federal
government to coordinate its
actions.
While coordination was not
a major policy goal
of the newly
dominant coalition, it was
a necessary condition
of the extension of
federal activity into new
policy areas.

CHAPTER
CASE STUDY #2:

IV

REALIGNMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD

MlLgjTmeirt_a^^
In

this chapter

I

emphasize the effects of
realignment upon the

internal operation of institutions.

By doing so

hope to bring into
even greater relief the
relationship between changes
in political purpose and their institutionalization.
The subject is the initial
develI

opment of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).

m

a strictly forsense the NLRB was created in
1935 with the passage of the
National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or
as it is commonly called,
the Wagner Act.
In the half century since
its inception, the National
Labor Relations
Board has been the central federal
institution regulating the relationship between private sector
employers, organized labor, and
workers
seeking to be organized.
It is the NLRB that has primary
responsibility

mal

,

for interpreting and enforcing the
provisions of the NLRA and its subsequent amendments.^
Indeed, the ongoing development of the
NLRB as

governmental

a

in-

stitution parallels the development of
both labor law and social practice.

The Wagner Act, as Karl

openness and divergency, not
post indicating

a

a

Klare points out,

".

.

.

was a texture of

crystallization of consensus or

solitary direction for future development."^

a

signThe NLRB

would serve as the chief interface between the
ongoing social conflict
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over labor issues and the
adjustment of those issues
within the tradition of American Jurisprudence.
However, the NLRB's capacity
to undertake this mediating
function rested upon the
evolution of appropriate
institutional practice by earlier
labor
boards.

While the NLRB-s powers are
intelligible in the context
of United
States experience with
independent regulatory commissions,
the NLRB is a

singular Institution relative
to the patterns of
regulation of the
capital-labor relationship in other
democratic nations.
In most of
these countries the right to
organize and bargain evolved
with less government participation.
Indeed, as McCulloch and
Bornstein have pointed
out, given the United States
judiciary's hostile application
of the
common law tradition toward labor,
any governmental initiative
aimed at
rectifying this situation required
the creation of a new labor
law and a
new forum for its interpretation."^
The NLRB is
a

a

singular institution in another sense.

regulative agency that is mandated to
regulate

tently opposed party.4

a

The NLRB is

powerful and consis-

The NLRB has largely fulfilled that
mandate.

While the NLRB regulates labor as well
as business, the board's primary

regulatory focus has been the latter.

The normal history of federal

regulatory bodies has been to reach some
accommodation with powerful
interests in the agency's immediate environment.

The more powerful

the

interest is, the more likely the accommodation will
be on terms advantageous to that interest.

In a

number of cases regulatory agencies have

been "captured" by those interests the agency was
designed to regulate.
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That is, the public
policy made and/or
implemented by captured
agencies
primarily serves the end
of the "regulated"
interests.
Vet most observers agree
that the NLRB has
favored the less powerful interest in its
environment, organized
labor, over the potentially
greater power of private
business.
While it can be argued
that NLRB
actions have generally served
to incorporate organized
labor into a subordinate position in the
United States capitalist
syst™, it cannot be
denied that the NLRB has
often decided specific issues
against the expressed wishes of the business
community.
Judgement on this matter is
highly dependent on the choice
of a comparison model,
whether that be
pre-1930s American practice,
current practice in other
industrial nations, or a potential form of
social relations.
Nonetheless, despite
the institutionalization
of management-labor conflict
since the 1930s,
there remains enormous business
hostility to the purposes as
well as the

specific application of the NLRA.
nearly

McCuUoch and Bornstein, writing

decade ago, said, "Today, nearly
forty years after the passage
of the Wagner Act, the Board is
required to act as a policeman to
halt
patently lawless conduct by parties
who only grudgingly obey the
law."^
With a very conservative administration
in Washington today, the exa

pressed hostility of some segments of
the business community toward

organized labor has, if anything, increased.
Still, the status of organized labor
in the United States has

changed radically since the early 1930s.

organized labor

is

as powerful

Few observers contend that

as business or the government itself.

Many observers even believe the economic
and political strength of
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organized labor

is

in decline.

Nevertheless, it does not
seem silly to

talk about "big labor" in
the sa.e breath as "big
business" or "big government." In contrast, a
similar statement would have
seemed nonsensical or at best wishful
thinking before 1935.
The notion of labor as a

power bloc capable of exercising
countervailing power

is

intelligible

only in the context of the
changes in the status of labor
following the
realignment of the 1930s.
The changes in the situation
of organized labor in the years
fol-

lowing the 1932 election were
enormous.

In 1933 union membership
had

dipped to under three million workers,
barely 10 percent of the nonagricultural workforce.
In 1920 there were over five
million unionized

workers who made up 19.4 percent of
the nonagricul tural workforce.

Most
of this decline took place in the
prosperous 1920s, despite the historical

tendency for union membership to grow in
prosperous times.

To this

1.6 million decline in union membership, the
depression by 1933 resulted
in a loss of nearly 500,000 more
members.

Unionization was largely re-

stricted to the traditional crafts and had
only minor footholds in basic
industries.

Further, union leadership was demoralized, being
primarily

occupied with retaining their organizational bases
and fighting over
internal and jurisdictional questions.^

Politically, the labor movement

maintained its traditional posture of non-involvement.

Unions had

little involvement in either electoral competition
or in most areas of
public policy making.
The New Deal brought
labor.

a

massive change in the status of organized

By 1946 the ranks of organized labor had quintupled
to 15
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-llion persons.'

,„ the sa.e year the percentage
of workers organized

as eligible under the
NLRA, had reached 48
percent.^

became

co^on

that there is

in

basic industries, so much
so that it

Labor organization
is

only recently

general recognition that basic
industries are far from

a

fully organized.

Organized labor also became
politically active.

Since
the 1930s the labor movement
has generally been both
the largest single
source of contributions for
Democratic, particularly liberal,
candidates
and extremely active 1n promoting
or opposing proposals for
public policy.
Labor became concerned with policies
that had no direct Impact on

either labor-management relations
or the Immediate welfare of union
members.
In

particular, organized labor since the
1930s has been closely

associated with the Democratic party,
perhaps the most important interest group associated with the party.
While labor's ability to mobilize
its members at the polls is
questionable,

union members, even fifty

years after realignment, are significantly
more likely to vote for Democrats than the general

population.

Of course, some of the most impor-

tant expressions of the changes in labor's
status were reflected in

public policy.

The passage of the National

Labor Relations Act and the

establishment of the National Labor Relations Board
are only the most
important of these.
only

a

However, as will be seen, organized labor played

modest role in framing and adopting these policies.
It is

unusual for a weak group in the United States to secure
ad-

vantageous public policy.
numbers and leadership.

In 1933 organized labor was weak in both

Given the longstanding hostility of powerful

elements in American society
to organized labor,
how did such a weak
member of the political
community gain such a
fundamental improvement in
its status?
For fundamental it was,
or at least as great a
change in
the material as well as
symbolic situation of any
other social group in
United States history.
On one point there is
near universal agreement.
Although the unions benefited
from the policy innovations
of the 1930s,
the unions' role in obtaining
those policies was minor.
Union leader-'
ship, especially the top
leadership of the American
Federation of Labor
(AFL), often resisted the attempts
of unorganized workers to
form
unions.
Craft based unions were often more
interested in maintaining
the privileged position of their
members. ^
If the unions were secondary
and sometimes reluctant participants
in their rise to social and
political

power, who were the primary actors?

There are two basic understandings
of who was most responsible for
the change in the status of labor in
the 1930s and the passage of the
NLRA.

One understanding focuses on the role
of political elites in

realizing the time was appropriate for change.
political action had substantially changed.

By 1933 the context for

The composition of both the

government and of the individuals and groups with
excellent access to

government had been transformed by two factors:

the massive electoral

shift to the Democratic party and the concurrent
delegitimation, however

temporary and symbolic, of business leadership.

The new leadership

"cadre," faced with the emergencies of underproduction
and mass unem-

ployment and less hampered by anti- union ideology, was
willing to take
steps that would help to maintain social stability
and to increase

P-cduction.

Support for unionization
In this context .ade
sense both In
ter^s Of Its potential
stabilizing Impact on
production and consumption
and as a fo™ of symbolic
recognition for a constituency
of some size
Further, the economic weakness
of that constituency,
the craft unions
was encouraging them to
.ake some efforts toward
mobilizing unorganized
workers.
A second approach focuses
on the importance of
labor instability

especially strikes and
disruptions that occurred in
either the absence
Of a union or without the
sanction of union leaders,

m

this view, it
was the growing worker
insurgency, most of it
"spontaneous," that forced

the response of political
elites.

Indeed the rapid growth of
unions

came only after the government
conceded that the right to
organize
should be protected by state
power.
When the insurgency ended,
despite
the growth of unions, so too
did further governmental
initiatives to

improve the status of labor.^^

These t.o kinds of understanding
are not

mutually contradictory, although to
know which understanding is
closer
to the truth would provide

a

change in the United States.

valuable insight into the nature
of social
The first understanding implies
the re-

sponsiveness and perhaps the wisdom of
political leaders and institutions given an appropriate context
for action.

The second understanding

stresses the resistance of leaders and
institutions to mass based

change, requiring those seeking change
to press their demands in the

most vigorous way possible.
In both these

understandings the general public, especially
in the

form of an electorate, has

a

modest role to play in the process of

Change.

The puhl^Vs actions
a.e viewed as a
contextual condition
favon-ng o. discouraging
action 5y othe.sj^ Fo.
exa.ple, McCulloch and
Bornstein believe that the
passage of Section 7(a)
of the National Industrial Recovery Act and
of the Wagner Act
reflected 1n part a gradual
softening of public opinion
toward labor that had been
apparent at the
t1.e Of the passage of the
Norrls-La Guardia Act In
1930.
They point to
the growing public displeasure
with the federal courts'
Indiscriminate
use of anti-strike
""^
injunctions in the 1920s.

Although the current basic
labor policy and law of the
United
States dates back to the 1930s,
policy in this area, especially
on the
subnational level, dates back to
colonial

area was unremittingly hostile
to labor.

criminal conspiracies.

ti.es.

Early policy in this

Unions were at first viewed
as

Later when unions were recognized
as legal,

strikes and many organizational
activities were still judged illegal.
Before the 1930s, even when the
laws were neutral toward labor
activity,
the actions of governments were
not.
Government use of court injunctions, police power, and often
military force was blatantly
anti-union.

Further, governments on all levels
tolerated the use of intimidation
and
violence by private parties against
workers.
At first federal

involvement in labor disputes was undertaken
by

the executive and judicial branches.
this policy area after the Civil War.

centered on railroad disputes.

Congress, however, began to enter
Initial congressional

interest

Legislation such as the Railroad Arbi-

tration Act of 1888 and the Erdman Act of
1898 were in the context of
the era sympathetic to the interests
of organized labor.

By the early
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1890s Congress began to
consider legislation
restraining the use of federal court injunctions
in labor disputes.
This policy goal was
seemingly accomplished with the
passage of the Clayton Anti-Trust
Act in 1914

However, the Supreme Court, in
Duplex Printing vs. Deering.
managed to
render the Acfs anti-injunction
provision useless.
Congress finally
passed an effective anti-injunction
measure, the Norris-La Guardia
Act,
in 1930.

Even in the anti-labor climate
of the 1920s, Congress had

passed the relatively pro-labor
Railroad Labor Act of
1926.
This pattern of congressional rather than
presidential initiative in the field
of labor policy would continue
through most of the Roosevelt
administrati

on

There is no evidence to suggest that
in 1933 President Franklin
Roosevelt, or any leading figure in his
administration, was interested
in using state power to promote
labor organization or collective bar-

gaining.

While there is ample indication that
Roosevelt had genuinely

wanted to improve the living and working
conditions of American workers,
his

interests seemed to lay in the area of social
welfare policy, in-

cluding legislation covering unemployment
insurance, pensions, wages and
hours, and the ending of child labor.

Roosevelt and his advisors gener-

ally emphasized the potential for cooperation
between business and
labor.

While this was

a

pragmatic position in terms of encouraging

economic recovery, this position also reflected the
progressive underpinnings of much New Deal thought and action.

Roosevelt's views were

manifested in his first appointments of officials responsible
for labor
policy.

The new Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, came
out of this

social welfare tradition.

Her appointment was
opposed by the AFL

mainly because of Perkins'
lack of connection to
labor leadership'
Similarly, Donald Richberg,
a man sympathetic
to labor concerns, but
Without close ties to organized
labor, was appointed
second in command
at the National Recovery
Administration.
Richberg, the principal
author
of the 1926 Railroad Labor
Act, supported collective
bargaining.

However, he emphasized that his
support rested on his
expectation that

collective bargaining would
encourage cooperation between
capital and
labor.

Given the political weakness of
organized labor and the lack of
interest on the part of the incoming
administration, where did the push
for an explicit labor policy
come from?

In

particular, given that labor

issues per se were not an
important element of the Democrats'
1932 campaign rhetoric, how can one claim
that there can be an organic
relationship between the realignment and
subsequent labor policy?
One striking characteristic of post
1932 voting patterns was their

strongly class based character relative
to earlier United States electoral alignments.

Apparently the strength of this relationship
was

strongest in the elections in the decade
following 1932 (not in 1932
itself), with

a

significant and steady weakening of this
relationship

after World War II.

While the concept of class

is

defined in

a

number

of different ways, there is general agreement
that unsalaried nonagricultural workers and their families provided an
extremely important

source of electoral support for the Democratic
party from the New Deal
period to at least the late 1960s.

That is, the blue collar voter was

the most important element
in the national

Democratic electoral major-

ity.

contrast, the blue collar
voter in the 1896-1932
political era
was, at least initially, save
in locations with large
immigrant populations, more likely to vote
Republican than Democratic.
Most observers
explain this fact by noting the
various sectional and ethnic
cleavages
of the day.
The political system was
organized to suppress openly economic or class issues. ^0 Late in
this period of Republican
dominance,
the Democratic vote among workers
began to increase, reflecting
secular
trends such as the growing voting
strength of immigrants and their
children.
Concurrently, the sectional conflicts
of 1896 were slowly being
In

replaced by the class related economic
and cultural conflicts arising
out of industrialization and
urbanization.

While the blue collar vote

shifted overwhelmingly to FDR and the
Democrats in 1932, so too did the
vote of almost every other identifiable
group.

Only later in 1934 and

particularly in 1936 did the quasi-class nature
of the Democratic coalition become apparent.

Yet, through most of the pre-1936 period
the

Roosevelt government was sincerely committed
to
operation, not class conflict.

a

program of class co-

If realignments are

"processes" through

which government policies are readjusted to coincide
with putative

majority preferences, then the NLRA should have been
passed in 1937, not
1935.
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Transformi nq~j hp]]ngjt^

However the NLRA did pass in 1935.
organic relation between the evolution
of
the realignment process?
a

Does this mean there was no
a

national labor policy and

Must one conclude that the NLRA's
passage was

result of political forces unrelated
to the realignment?

I

think not.

Realignments are more than changes in
voting patterns and party coalitions.

Realignments are also

societal debate.

defines it.
elements of

As before,

a

I

kind of institutionalization of

a

major

am using the term "debate" as
Touraine

Debates are the "Public expressions
of the tensions between
a

system

."22
.

.

p^^ates do not necessarily refer to ex-

plicit dialogues or overt conflicts.

Participants in

a

debate can speak

and act in ways at least partially
unintelligible to other participants.
Indeed participants' actions need not be efforts
to communicate; their

actions need only be responses to the tensions
embedded in their lives.
As a process involving transformation in
agendas, elites, and so forth,

realignments can be viewed as an important stage in the
institutionalization of important social debates.

As these debates become structured,

first as systems of common discourse and then as systems
of social action (Touraine uses the terms "discussions" and "deliberations"),
it

becomes increasingly possible to initiate new public policies
and/or new
forms of institutional activity that in some way respond to
the social

tensions expressed in the original and possibly incoherent debate.
The 1896 realignment is often interpreted as

a

resolution of the

conflict over who would direct the political, social, as well as
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economic development of the
United States
uniLea
states in
in the emerging age
of technology and industrialization.
In short the answer
was that large scale
financial capital and industrial
capital would remain the
main architects and movers of that
development.23 on the surface
it seemed that
most workers agreed, but the
role of labor in industrial
America was far
from settled. While it would
be an exaggeration to
say that labor issues were absent from the
political agenda of the post
1896 political
order, the dominant members of
the era's majority coalition
were generally hostile to an economically
and politically strong
labor movement.
Still, the size and economic
importance of the industrial labor

force grew rapidly during the first
three decades of the twentieth
century.

Despite the growing weakness of
organized labor in the 1920s, the

secular trends that supported the slow
rebound of the Democratic party
suggested the fragility of the post 1896
"social contract."
The same
pressures that were forcing some sort of
new accommodation between capital

and labor in other industrial democracies
were also at work, if

somewhat less apparent, in the United
States.
for

a

In

retrospect the need

new accommodation seems inevitable, assuming
the continuation of

liberal-democratic order.

modation was not.
dation was

a

However, the nature and timing of the
accom-

The debate over the form of

long one.

a

capital-labor accommo-

Frequently there was no real dialogue, although

there was often intimidation, violence, and other
forms of repression.
It was the Great Depression and the rejection
of Republican political

leadership that removed the greatest barriers to the
clarification and

institutionalization of the debate of the previous half century.

a
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Earlier

noted two possible
explanations for the adoption
of a
national labor policy despite
the weakness of organized
labor.
One form
Of explanation centered on
the efforts of a reconstituted
political and
economic elite willing to
negotiate a new social contract
to promote economic recovery and to make the
reforms needed to prevent a
reoccurrence
of the Great Depression.
The second type stresses the
importance of
spontaneous worker action in wrenching
concessions from elites.
On
I

their face these explanations may
appear contradictory.
that if mass protest was the
crucial
tary concessions.

One could argue

factor, then elites made involun-

Similarly, one could argue that if
major change

resulted from elite action, then mass
insurgency had little positive
effect.

Perhaps, given this line of reasoning,
insurgency may have been

counterproductive in that it tended to mobilize
opposition within the
elite or the public more generally.

Yet

I

would argue that these two

kinds of explanation are not intrinsically
contradictory.

of elites and insurgents can have
impact.

As parties in

their actions, may have

a

The actions

reinforcing and perhaps symbiotic

debate, the various social actors, through

a

a

role in generating responses by other actors

tht would not have otherwise happened.
For example, let us assume that Section 7(a) of
the NIRA was in

fact an elite concession that was meant to be symbolic;

a

sop to workers

or to organized labor intended to get their concurrence
with the industrial self-regulation provisions of the legislation.

Even if powerhold-

ers regretted the spontaneous wave of labor organization
and recognition

strikes that followed, the very existence of these conditions produced

a

structure of incentives and
penalties that had to be
taken into account
in future policy making.
Similarly, one could generate
a comparable ar-

gument focusing on how elite
responses to spontaneous worker
insurgency
influenced the future course of
labor protest.
In fact, this
is

perfect example to demonstrate
that

a

social

a

debate does not require

explicit communication among the
conflicting parties.
While

I

claim that the debate over the
need for

national

a

policy can be traced back almost
to the 1896 critical election,
to focus on the

labor

want

I

"heating up" of that debate in the
period immediately

before the passage of the NIRA.

For it is only with the efforts
to de-

fine and implement Section 7(a)
that the debate over national labor
policy entered into its more explicit
and institutionalized forms leading

rapidly to the adoption of the National
Labor Relations Act.

Beginning

in the late 1920s with the rapid
decline of economic prosperity,

first

for the worker and only later for the
industrialist and financier, the
social debate over labor policy moved to

a

high level of engagement both

for potential insurgents and for the members
of political and economic
elites.

Generally speaking, the Stock Market Crash of October
1929

said

is

to mark the start of the Great Depression.

However the prosperity of

the 1920s did not come to so sudden an end.

Indeed for some groups,

most notably the nation's farmers, there had been no boom
at all.
industrial workers the characterization of the 1920s as

prosperity was more genuine.
by mid-decade.

a

For

period of

Still, serious unemployment was apparent

By conservative estimates, unemployment between 1925 and

1929 always remained above
6 percent,

other observers clai.
that unem-

Ploy.e„t 1n this period was
always over 10 percent of
the workforce
In
this sane period Industrial
wage levels were stable,
despite a significant Increase in both prices
and productivity. 2"
Despite the fact that organized
labor had largely abandoned
the
strike as a tactic, and that
some industrialists felt
that the fear of
unemployment promoted a more docile
labor force, there was a marked
growth in labor conflict as the
economy declined.
Of particular note
was the wave of largely
spontaneous strikes in the southern
textile industry, as they demonstrated
a new degree of militancy
among a formerly
docile workforce. As unemployment
grew and the real wages and working
conditions of employed workers declined,
the strikes spread to other
regions and industries. As in
the case of the textile strikes,
the new
strikes were organized by either
non-unionized workers or by union members against the wishes of their
national leaders.
Further, advice and

support for these actions was in many
cases provided by left wing activists.

25

Left wing participation and/or sponsorship
of militant labor

action or of unions of the unemployed
had

labor struggles of the 1930s.

Their activism accustomed workers to the

idea and benefits of labor organization
as

weapon.

siqnificant impact on the

a

a

political and economic

This helped to undo many workers' education
in docility, an

education that had been provided by the official
leaders of organized
labor.
The increase in labor insurgency that was well
underway even be-

fore the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) was an
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easily observed phenomenon.

There was also an increased
level of debate

among elites, although the
situation
the term "elite" has been

ences.

a

is

more complex.

The proper use of

highly contentious issue
in the social sci-

No single formulation of
the concept can please
all

analysts

since all formulations reflect
differences over the nature and
locati on
of power.
However, for the purpose of
my analysis of the events
leadi
to the establishment of the
NLRB,

I

have adopted two working
principles.

First, it is useful to distinguish
between members of

a

political

elite,

either holding public office or
constantly interacting with public
officials, and an economic elite
which controls the major
institutional
units of a corporate dominated
economy.

society one should expect

a

members of the two elites.

Granted, in

a

capitalist

large measure of mutual accommodation
among
Yet the degree to which such
accommodation

takes place, or that individuals
belong to both elites, or that one

elite dominates the other is

a

matter of substantial empirical varia-

tion.

Similarly, the term "elite" connotes substantial
cohesion among
the members in terms of both belief and
action.

Since no definition of

"elite" requires complete unanimity among
members, the pertinent question becomes how much community of interest
and cohesive action must be

present to refer to an aggregate of individuals as an
elite.
tice

I

think the following criteria are sufficient:

an elite have a commitment to an overall

tice and share
social

a

general

In

prac-

that the members of

pattern of institutional

prac-

conceptual and normative understanding of

life (e.g., "liberalism" in the United States).

Of course elite

-bers

.ust hold app.opHate
positions of Institutional
authority o.
influence.
Thus I feel justified In
talking about the actions
of an
economic elite, or of disputes
within that elite, even
thouoh Its .e.bers nay be substantially
divided on specific Issues.
These differences
may reflect differences
In concrete economic
Interests or In partisan or
ideological preferences.

Realignments result in significant
turnover in elected officials.
This turnover often includes
shifts in the ideological and
occupational
backgrounds of officials, as well
as changes in partisan
identification.
Still

this turnover can disguise
continuities with the past.

The Demo-

cratic legislative gains in
1930 and 1932 meant that the
party members
who would hold most committee
chairmanships and other leadership
positions would be individuals who
came from relatively safe, and in
this

circumstance, mostly conservative
districts.
sional

That is, these congres-

leaders would be relatively insulated
from pro-labor political

pressure.

Nonetheless, Congress as

a

whole was more Democratic, some-

what more "progressive," and certainly
given the dire situation more
likely to accept substantial

innovation.

Pro-labor members, like Sena-

tor Wagner, would now have much greater
access to the President, to much
of the executive branch officialdom,
and to the majority leadership in

Congress
The 1932 election also brought significant
changes in the execu-

tive branch.

In

the 1920s about 80 percent of high federal
appointees

came from high corporate positions or
were from families with large cor-

porate holdings.

In

contrast, this declined to under 50 percent in
the
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Roosevelt ad.ins1t.at1on."

On a .ore specific level

I

have already

mentioned that sone key
administration officials were
concerned with the
status and condition of the
working class, even 1f these
officials were
at most lukewarm about
unionization and collective
bargaining.
Of equal importance to changes
in recruitment patterns
were the
Roosevelt administration's actions
to substantially limit the
role of

officials and institutions with
close representational or
constituency
ties to the business community
in making or enforcing
labor policy.

During the 1920s, the Commerce
Department had

a

major role in this area.

In the

1930s the Department would have
virtually no impact on labor
28
policy.
While this separation was not as
clear in the case of the
National Recovery Administration (NRA),
the pre-NLRB labor boards were

never placed under direct NRA control.

Therefore, while the formal

powers of these labor boards were weak,
the boards' administrative inde-

pendence allowed them to openly contest
the NRA's attempts to define
Section 7(a) to the advantage of the
corporate sector.
The 1932 election, especially in terms of
its effect on executive

branch composition, clearly represented an
important event.
tion "gave" institutional power to those
elements of

more sympathetic to

a

national labor policy.

a

The elec-

political elite

Further, the Roosevelt

government increased the political role of those elements
of the business community willing to tolerate unionization.

Throughout the post-1896 period at least some business leaders

wanted to reach an accommodation with organized labor.
hoped business would obtain labor stability

in

These leaders

return for relatively
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modest concessions to workers
and their unions.

Yet the dominant view

of business toward organized labor
remained hostile.

These views were
pressed forward not only by individual
firms, but by trade and peak
(i.e., cross-sector) associations
as well.

Indeed, some major business

groups, for instance the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM)

were organized specifically to combat
unioni zation. ^0

The development

of trade and peak associations had been
encouraged by the Republican

administrations of the 1920s, which saw

in these groups

way of promoting the cooperative action
needed in

economy.

a

an acceptable

large capitalist

One effect of this connection between
these organizations and

the Republican administrations was the largely
unsympathetic administra-

tion policy on labor and social welfare issues.

The 1932 election represented

a

transition in the relation between

the economic and political elite in the United
States.

Even though by

1932 corporate power was increasingly institutionally rather
than entre-

preneurally based, there remained (and still remains)

a

pronounced cor-

relation between "family" holdings and corporate institutional
power.
In

the 1896-1932 period, the influence of the "House of Morgan" and

those associated with it was especially great.

Phillip Burch contends

that the Morgan financial empire was the single most important political

and economic force in this period, although its power was often con-

tested by other members of the corporate elite.^^

Burch also claims

that until Roosevelt's election in 1932 every elected President back to

Cleveland had been strongly linked to the Morgans.

In

contrast, the Roosevelt
administration received .uch
of its political and financial support
from a coalition of other
powerful family
groups.
While this coalition contained
long established members
of the
politico/economic elite, e.g., the
Rockefellers, W. Averell Harriman,
etc., the coalition also included
emerging financial interests.
Many of
these new "families" (e.g., Lehman,
Giannini, Kuhn-Loeb) had little
influence in the previous Republican
administrations.
In general these
interests believed that their limited
access and influence were closely
related to the antisemitic and
xenophobic attitudes of much of the
old

corporate/banking elite. ^3

while this coalition was only one
force in

the new administration, its members'
desire to reduce the influence of

the Morgans encouraged the new
coalition to be open to policy approaches

that the Morgans and their allies had
worked against during the Hoover

administration.
Just as the 1932 election can be seen as

a

critical

point in the

House of Morgan's political decline, so
too does that election represent
a

moment when the increased economic and political

rate managers became much clearer.

importance of corpo-

Although the importance of this

trend has been exaggerated, particularly by FDR
brain trusters Adolf
Berle and Raymond Moley, the "managerial revolution"
required
in outlook on the nature of effective
corporate practice.

shift to greater managerial control promotes

a

a

change

For the

tendency to look at

problems from an institutional perspective instead of from the
personal
or entrepreneurial perspectives common to owner
dominated firms.

fically, managers tend to look for institutional

Speci-

rather than personal
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solutions to the problems of
labor stability and
productivity.
Thus
members of the corporate elite
who were more fully
incorporated into the
managerial ethos found it easier
to contemplate and sometimes
to support
a

national labor policy.

Walter Teagle, and

H.

I.

High level managers, such
as Gerard Swope,

Harriman, had an enormous
influence on the

drafting and passage of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, including
Section 7(a).
The National

Labor Board and the old National
Labor Relations

Board were administrative entities
created to mediate or settle disputes

arising out of Section 7(a) of the
NIRA.

Most observers contend that

7(a) was intended to be a relatively
minor part of the Act.

That is.

Section 7(a) was aimed at gaining labor
support for the seemingly more
important industrial self-regulation parts
of the measure and to symbolically demonstrate that the legislation
would be of general benefit

rather than

a

piece of class legislation.

Yet the possibility remains

that 7(a) could have been made either stronger
or weaker.
is

Therefore, it

important to ask who was in fact involved in the
drafting of the

NIRA.

The Roosevelt administration usually sought information
and advice

from diverse sources.

Thus, there are

a

number of accounts about the

importance of various sources of input into the original bill.
count stresses the role of

a

One ac-

group of non-governmental officials, who

can be characterized as members of the corporate elite.

Included in

this group were corporate figures such as Bernard Baruch, Swope,
H.

Harriman, and James Warburg.

However, Roosevelt also asked Senator

I.
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Wagner to produce his own
version of an econo.c
recovery measure, which
given^Wagner-s history would
certainly contain a strong
pro-labor component.

In April

1933 Roosevelt was still
unprepared to support any

particular industrial recovery
plan.

However the unexpected Senate

passage of Hugo Black's proposal
to li.it working hours to
thirty per
week forced the administration
into action.
As would often be the case,
the administration backed
meaningful

proposals only to head off more

drastic congressional action.
The composition of the group
who wrote the actual draft of
the

NIRA suggests the strong corporate
influence on the legislation.

Of

this group including Moley,
BOB Director Lewis Douglas, future
NRA head
Hugh Johnson, and Donald Richberg,
only Richberg had any real knowledge

of or sympathy toward labor.

Further, the strongly corporate stamp
of

the NIRA would become clearer soon
after its enactment in June 1933.
For example, the NRA Director, Hugh
Johnson, had

association with Bernard Baruch.
boards, especially the crucial

a

close professional

More significantly, the members of NRA

Industrial Advisory Board, would for the

most part come from corporate positions.

Of special note was the role

played by the Business Advisory and Planning
Council (BAG).

This group,

again composed of members who held important
positions in very large

private concerns, was attached to the Commerce
Department.

BAC's main

purpose was to institutionalize corporate input in
the administration
and to mobilize corporate support for New Deal
policies.

there was intense conflict in BAC.

members who would have

a

Nonetheless,

This ended with the departure of BAC

major role in forming the anti -Roosevelt

Of the corporate elite
wini„g to cooperate with
(and secure cooperation
fro.) the administration.
The ubiquitous Gerard
Swope of General Electric was BAG'S first
chairman.

Notwithstanding the corporate
sector's dominance of the
agency and
advisory boards that would
implement the NIRA, the most
important actor
1n the drama remained
President Roosevelt.

On the labor issue, as
on

many other controversial
matters, FDR avoided giving
complete approval
to any single policy approach.
Vet his Interest in speeding
recovery
resulted In a community of Interest
with capital, i.e., those
who di-

rectly controlled production.

When signing the NIRA into
law, Roosevelt

stressed workers' obligations to
act responsibly to aid recovery.

He

specifically noted that 7(a) was not
intended to encourage greater labor
34
discord.
Roosevelt's actions in the period
up to the passage of the
NLRA were generally consistent with
this position.

fused to interpret 7(a) strictly
in business

's

Still, Roosevelt re-

short term interest.

For

example, the NRA sought industry code
provisions, so called merit

clauses, that would either force employees
to join company unions or to
refrain from joining unions at all.

interpretation of the NIRA.^O

Roosevelt promptly rejected this

similarly, while Roosevelt would some-

times overturn the decisions of the labor
boards, he resisted pressures
to put the boards under direct NRA
authority.

Section 7(a) of the NIRA dealt with three matters:

(1)

that indi-

viduals had the right to organize and engage thereby
in collective bargaining; (2) that membership in any labor organization be
voluntary; and
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that enforcement of these
rights should be worked
out through the
NRA code making process.
However Section 7(a) did not
deal with these
natters in enough detail so that
contesting parties could agree
on the
basic intent of the section,
let alone its application
to specific
cases. As early as June
1933, the NRA argued that labor
provisions in
the industry codes did not
have to be collectively bargained
to be enforceable. The NRA quickly began
to approve such codes.
Only in those
(3)

industries that were already strongly
organized did the unions have any
real

influence over the drafting or
implementation of the codes.

Despite this, and the continuing
depression, employees in many firms

attempted to unionize.

The typical employer response to this
wave of

largely spontaneous organization was
to refuse to recognize the new
unions.

Thus the summer of 1933 witnessed the
greatest number of

strikes since 1921. 4 2

To promote labor peace and to mediate
problems

arising out of conflicting interpretations
of Section 7(a), Roosevelt
set up the National Labor Board (NLB)
on August 5, 1933.

Evolving Practice:

The National Labor Board

The National Labor Board and its successor the
old National Labor

Relations Board provided institutional settings that
allowed the development of practices that would ultimately be codified
in the NRLA and
the enforcement of that law by the NLRB.

Historian James A. Gross notes

the importance of these labor boards when he states.

These boards, proceeding less by ideological
premeditation than by
the pressure of circumstances, hammered out
the essentials of a
labor policy on a case-by-case basis in a series of turbulent and
dramatic conflicts with employers and unions, President Roosevelt,
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League, the press

In this process,

and thp

n»L

?

I

"f^cturers

,

the Liberty

the boards themselves
changed as they reciprocally

modified their practices and
their understanding of their
functions.
In
1933 the NLB stressed mediation and
generally flexible interpretation
of
the NIRA.
By 1935, the successor board,
the old NLRB, had evolved
into
^ 9"3sijudicial body of neutrals deciding
cases bv settina
fnUl.
forth principles of law, conducting
formal hearings
issunS rules
and regulations, and requiring
legalistic uniformit; In prScedure!44

Roosevelt established the National
Labor Board without the use of
an executive order.
As such the NLB's powers and
jurisdiction were always in doubt. The board's composition
reflected the precedent created
by the World War

I

National Labor Board.

The NLB included three labor

representatives, three business representatives,
and
In terms of
a

a

public member.

purpose and function, the NLB was meant to
operate much like

NRA code authority; that is, to promote
government sponsored self-

regulation among the immediately affected
parties.

The NLB's first

chair was Senator Wagner, the board's public
member.

The three business

representatives were appointed by the BAC dominated NRA
Industrial Advisory Board.

The appointees included BAC Chairman Swope,
Walter Teagle

of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Louis Kirstein
of Filene's.^^
The original board had only the reputation of its
members and the
moral support of the President to persuade parties to settle.

The NLB

had no power to subpoena persons or records and witnesses
did not testify under oath.

Board procedures were reputed to be extremely informal.

Yet the initial activity of the NLB suggested the beginning of a
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consistent policy approach.

Typical settlements provided
for an end to

the work stoppage, worker
reinstatement, NLB supervised
representation
elections, and an employer
agreement to negotiate with
the elected bargaining agent.

At first glance the NLB
appeared to be

a

major success.

In its

first three months the board
settled about 90 percent of
its cases
through mediation and largely
avoided having to explicitly
interpret
Section 7(a).
Still, the NLB had not intervened
in conflicts involving
either large firms or anti-union
industries.
In particular the NLB had
not yet faced the issue of the
legal status of company unions.

more,

a

number of internal weaknesses were
becoming clear.

Further-

These weak-

nesses included insufficient member
time and staff support to handle
the

increasing demand for mediation services
and problems stemming from the

tripartite structure of the board.

To the extent that the NLB's deci-

sions split along industry vs. labor lines,
the board was less able to

effectively mediate disputes.
of objectivity."

Losing parties attacked the board's "lack

While the NLB tried to solve the first problem
by ex-

panding its staff and setting up reaional offices,
the use of tripartite
boards continued to pose difficulties until the
passage of the NLRA.^^
By late 1933 the NLB had moved toward
tic mode of operation.

a

more uniform and legalis-

These initiatives laid the foundation for the

evolution of labor board practice.

The reasons for this shift in prac-

tice were in part internal, reflecting the inevitable
confusion arising

from the independent activities of the regional boards.

However, the
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external

pressures toward greater
rationalization were far .ore
i.por-

tant
The NLB was faced with two
problems.

First, business opposition

and resistance to NLB decisions
was growing.

have the power to enforce its
decisions.

Secondly, the NLB did not

The NLB had to depend on ei-

ther the NRA Compliance Division
or the Justice Department for
enforcement action.
It was obvious by early
1934 that neither of these organi-

zations was willing to help the NLB.

Even in the NLB there was

a

major

conflict over whether the agency
should emphasize mediation or
attempt
to carve out a more authoritative
role in making and enforcing labor

policy.

In general

this conflict reflected differences
in perspective

between the board members and the
staff.
a

Board members,

"representing"

constituency from outside the agency, generally
wanted their constitu-

ency to retain final decision making
authority.
labor and business members.

In

contrast the staff formed

commitment to the activity they performed on
wanted to be effective.

This was true for both

a

full

a

greater

time basis.

They

Senator Wagner, as the public member and an

important member of Congress, proved to be the
pivotal figure within the
NLB.

As

he slowly became convinced that the NLB could
become effective

only if it operated in

a

more formal, legalistic way, the staff increas-

ingly acted in that legalistic mode— even though it had
no formal

authority to do so.
The NLB's original

"...

instructions to its regional boards were to

make settlements even though you are told it violates all the

laws of the land, if it meets the dictates of sound judgement and common
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sense

"^^
,

.

Regional

boards also were directed
not to interpret Sec-

tion 7(a) or to determine
violations of the law.

exclusive jurisdiction over these
cases.
take on such cases.

The NLB would have

Yet the NLB was reluctant
to

When, in the Berkley Woolen
Mills case, the NLB de-

cided that workers could choose
non-employees, i.e., union officials,
to
represent them, the decision was
seen as pro-union.
However the opposite decision would have been
seen as pro-business.
Any substantive

decision weakened at least one party's
perception of the NLB's capacity
to be an objective mediator.^^

While this effect was

a

result of the

rising level of conflict between
capital and labor, the NLB's tripartite

composition aggravated the problem.
In the internal

NLB debate over this quandary, the
staff led by

its director, William Leiserson,
contended that to continue to stress

mediation instead of authoritative action
would result in labor settlements favoring the stronger economic
party (i.e., usually business).
Their position was confirmed when the business
dominated NRA decided to

interpret and enforce 7(a) itself.

In general,

the activities of anti-union employers.

General
plural

NRA decisions condoned

Both NRA Director Johnson and

Counsel Richberg announced that 7(a) permitted
company unions,

representation, and did not oblige employers to agree
to any la-

bor contract.

Further, the NRA set up local compliance boards in rival-

ry to those of the NLB.

Only Wagner's threat to resign from the NLB

forced the NRA to retreat on these issues.

blocked enforcement of NLB decisions.

Still, the NRA effectively

The NRA either refused to
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prosecute cases or was willinn tn h^w^ 4.u
^"""^ ^° ^^^^ those proceedings draq on
indefinitely.
'

The NLB's weakness became
all too apparent in
late 1933.

In the

Budd and Weirton cases, the
employers completely refused
to cooperate
With the NLB.
indeed, in the Weirton Steel
case, the employer conducted
an election for a company
union under the company's own
direction.

Weirton Steel took this action
despite having previously agreed
to an
NLB supervised election.
Given this challenge, the NLB,
through Senator
Wagner, approached the President
for

Roosevelt complied, but in
the NLB's status.

a

more formal grant of authority.

manner that created further ambiguity
about

a

Executive order 6511, issued on
December 16, 1933,

formally established the NLB and
gave it authority over its own procedures and administrative structure.

However 6511 gave the NLB no

explicit authority to interpret Section
7(a), nor any authority to oversee representational elections.
Thus, employers interpreted Roosevelt's
order as largely symbolic in intent.
of Executive Order 6511 and

a

In the period between the issuance

second stronger order in February, the NLB

had almost no success in either getting
mediated agreements or compli-

ance to previously negotiated agreements.

Nonetheless, at this time the NLB began to conduct
most of its ac-

tivity in

a

quasi-judicial manner.

These actions cannot be understood

in terms of any sense of increased authority;
6511

did not provide any.

Instead, there was an increasing public debate over the
necessity and

desirability of such power.

Wagner did not publicly commit himself to

support of greater NLB powers until after 6511.

Anti-NLB organizations,
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especially the NAM, quickly
counterattacked.

The increasingly formal

operation of the NLB must be understood
against its hope that it would
be granted more substantive
authority and its realization that
the NRA
and the Justice Department would
continue to be recalcitrant on enforce-

ment issues.

By the end of 1933 Senator Wagner
was beginning to prepare

the 1934 Labor Disputes bill with the
technical assistance of the NLB
staff.

From this time the NLB staff began to mold
the agency's prac-

tice to fit the provisions of the draft
legislation.

Without formal sanction for its substantive
decisions, the NLB operated very cautiously.

ordered

a

For example,

representation election.

restraining order from

a

in the

Dresner case the NLB

The Dresner Company then obtained

state court to block the election.

believing that it had little chance of winning in
entered into

compromise agreement with Dresner.

a

held, but was conducted by
by Dresner.

a

a

a

The NLB,

hostile state court,
The election was

third party under the conditions specified

The NLB made similar compromises in other cases involving

the definition of good faith bargaining and the connection of
bargaining
to union recognition.

Nevertheless, in this period the NLB worked out

an alternative "labor law" significantly more favorable to workers
than

the common law tradition.

Gross contends that:

Despite these compromises in pursuit of employer and union cooperation, the board had begun to develop a common law of labor relations
from mid-December 1933 to February 1, 1934 by ruling that an employee discharged for union activity be reinstated with back pay
that the employee's right to bargain imposed a corresponding duty on
the employer, that the parties approach negotiations with open minds
and exert every reasonable effort to reach an agreement, that selforganization and representation elections concerned employees exclusively
that strikers be given reinstatement priority
that all strikers be reinstated at the end of the strike when the
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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The NLB's inability to get
or enforce settlements
soon forced it
to seek additional presidential
support.
In particular, the NRA
had
again begun to encroach on
NLB jurisdiction.
The NRA Compliance Division began to hold de novo
hearings in cases sent to it
for enforcement.

That is, the NRA chose to disregard
the case histories developed
by the
NLB.
Apparently interested in preserving
NLB independence from the NRA,
Roosevelt issued Executive Order
6580 on February 1, 1934.
This order
was amended on February 23.
Executive Order 6580 gave the NLB
the power
to make rules for and to
exclusively conduct all representation
elections.

The order also affirmed the NLB
practice of allowing exclusive

bargaining agents based upon

a

majority vote in the relevant unit.^^

The NRA immediately sought to negate
the impact of Executive Order
6580.

On February 3, Johnson and Richberg
told employers that 6580 did

not prohibit minority bargaining agents
or even bargaining by individual

employees.

Thus the White House was forced to deal
with the new public

conflict between the NLB and the NRA.
to

back the NLB.

For the moment, Roosevelt decided

The February 23 amendment to 6580 explicitly
deprived

the NRA Compliance Division of any power
to review NLB actions.

How-

ever, the new version of 6580 did not settle
the enforcement question.
In

fact, in the coming labor crisis in the automobile
industry, FDR

would retreat from his previous support of the NLB.
The enforcement issue was more forthrightly addressed
by Senator

Wagner in the Labor Disputes bill.

Introduced on March 1, 1934, the
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legislation provided for

National Labor Board that
would have the ex-

a

plicit authority to interpret
the legislation (replacing
Section 7(a)),
to issue binding orders,
and to enforce those orders
through the federal
district courts. 60 After the
promulgation of Executive Order
6580
(amended) and the introduction
of the Labor Disputes bill,
an emboldened
NLB moved further into a
legalistic mode of operation and
made more
assertive decisions.
On April 16, the MLB directed
its regional boards
to conduct their business in
a more judicial manner.

would now be required to collect
and use evidence

Regional

in a

boards

uniform fashion

and to maintain complete transcripts
of all testimony.

In

the NLB was no longer willing to
compromise its authority.
to the Dresner case, the NLB insisted
that unions elected by

addition
In contrast
a

majority

vote would be exclusive agents and that
only the NLB could supervise

representation elections.

Early 1934 decisions, especially those in
the

Denver Tramway and Houde Engineering cases,
continued this trend.
However, while the NLB was establishing the
procedural and sub-

stantive foundations for the future NLRB, the NLB
also faced
that led to its destruction.

a

crisis

By March 1934 Roosevelt had to choose be-

tween actively supporting the NLB or accommodating

Roosevelt chose the latter course.

a

major industry.

This decision was not surprising

given Roosevelt's interest in promoting economic
recovery and his normal

caution in acting against the interests of
Nonetheless, Roosevelt took

a

a

powerful constituency.

course of action, that according to his

Secretary of Labor, the President would later regret.

During 1933 and

early 1934, the United Auto Workers, under AFL tutelage, had organized
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son^e

50.000 workers.

Concurrently, the automobile
companies had scram-

bled to set up company unions.

In March 1934 the DAW
asked the NLB to

supervise representation elections.

The companies replied that
they

would not allow any election under
NLB auspices to take place.
The companies also appealed to the
sympathetic NRA for assistance.
NRA Director Hugh Johnson convinced Roosevelt
to create an independent
labor
board for the auto industry outside
of NLB jurisdiction.
Further,

Roosevelt directed this Automobile
Labor Board to accept the NRA backed
concepts of plural representation and
the leqitimacy of company
unions.
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Clearly, if the auto industry could
get its own sympathetic

labor board, by implication, so too
could other powerful

industries.

Thus Roosevelt, through his actions in
the auto crisis effectively

nullified his Executive Order 6580 of
the month before.
The automobile industry settlement and
thereby the gutting of the
NLB, severely weakened labor confidence
in the government's willingness

to protect workers' rights under 7(a).

Indeed, strikes and other forms

of direct action had become increasingly
common since the NIRA's adoption.

Piven and Cloward claim that Section 7(a) encouraged
and legiti-

mized workers' translation of their private troubles
into social and
political
federal

issues.

"Felt grievances became public grievances, for the

government itself had declared the workers' cause to be
just."^^

By spring 1934, although the government seemed in
retreat from its ear-

lier commitment, the government's new policy could not by
itself serve
to delegitimate worker grievances.

The spring of 1934 witnessed

a

massive wave of labor unrest, including the nearly unknown phenomenon of

general

strikes.

It 1s

important to note that these
actions were dis-

couraged by the leaders of
the AFL and its .ember
unions.
The protests,
even when union led. were fed
by the militancy of
rank and file workers!
However the 1934 worker
insurgency ™st be understood
against the
backdrop Of business resistance
to the enforcement of Section
7(a) and
to labor organization
generally, as well as the
government's failure to
enforce its apparent labor policy.
In addition to the general
reluc-

tance of business to abide by NLB
decisions or mediation agreements
and
some businesses' attempts to
create docile company unions,
during this
period many firms, encouraged or
aided by trade associations, took
more
direct action to limit the spread
of labor organization.
In the late 1930s, the La Follete

"civil liberties" subcommittee

of the Senate Education and Labor
Committee documented the vast sums of
money spent on anti-union activities.
The subcommittee also documented
the use of intimidation and violence
against labor, whether directly

conducted by private firms or by public
authorities at the request of
business.
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The public as well as private discourse of
some business

interests was brutally frank.

During the 1934 New England textile

strikes one trade journal editorialized that,
will have

a

quieting influence. "^^

extreme opinion.
armed federal
1934.

"A

few hundred funerals

No doubt this remark represented an

Nonetheless, members of the corporate elite sought

intervention into the large scale labor disputes of spring

During the San Francisco general strike, Hugh Johnson,
Cordell

Hull, Homer Cummings, and other high officials with
strong ties to the

corporate establishment placed enormous pressure on President Roosevelt

to send troops.

Roosevelt refused to acquiesce.^^

indeed, an increasing number of other public
officials, on both the state
and local level,

refused to use force against
strikers-even in situations where
the use
of force would have been
common before 1932.
Clearly, the nature of
permissible governmental action
was changing.

Another indicator of the growing
intransigence of the business
community was its expressed hostility
toward labor leaders and even
government officials in the context
of official contacts.
actions are condoned in an official
context, there

is

If hostile

every reason to

expect even more hostile actions in
less public situations.

presents two examples of this phenomenon.

Schlesinger

He reports that Secretary of

Labor Frances Perkins organized an NIRA
code meeting between the presidents of six steel companies and AFL
president William Green.

Despite

the fact that Green was generally
supportive of the industry's draft

code, none of the corporate leaders was
willing to be introduced to

Green.

They were afraid that simple action, and
the public recognition

it demonstrated, would encourage labor
organization in the steel indus69
try.
Similarly, during a 1933 visit to Homestead,
Pennsylvania,

Secretary Perkins attempted to meet with

a

group of steel workers.

In

this company town, the mayor refused to allow the
meeting to occur in
any public facility.

Schlesinger properly notes the questionable status

of first amendment rights in such business dominated
communities.

What

expectation could an ordinary citizen have that his or her rights
would
be respected when even a high federal official

had problems?^^
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In this situation of
increased labor-capital

hostility, Roose-

velt's actions in support of
the auto industry and the
NRA had important
effects beyond weakening the NLB.
His actions also implied
opposition
to Wagner's Labor Disputes bill,
despite the fact that Roosevelt
pri-

vately expressed strong support
for the measure even after his
auto decision.
Thus, perceiving a more hostile
political situation, Wagner
introduced amendments to soften his
bill.
The draft measure no longer

prohibited company unions or placed
violated the proposed law.^^
tee.

a

retroactive ban on contracts that

jhe bill was further enervated in commit-

The bill's final version was so vague
that almost all members of

Congress and the administration could support
it.

However, by the start

of June, it was clear that neither industry,
organized labor, nor the
press would support passage.

The Labor Disputes bill

seemed doomed to

failure.

Nonetheless, Roosevelt was convinced by the rising
labor insurgency that the government needed stronger machinery
to deal with industrial

conflict.

In particular,

the threat of

a

nationwide organizational

strike in the steel industry, and the steel owners' preparations
for

a

possibly violent response to that strike, moved the President
to quick
action.

create
tions.

Roosevelt had the NRA draft
a

a

measure that would allow him to

new labor board with the ability to hold representation elec-

This measure. Public Resolution Number 44, passed Congress in

June 1934 with little difficulty.

Supporters of the Labor Disputes bill

had still hoped to get action on that measure, but Wagner decided to

support PR 44 at the last moment.

Bernstein reports that Wagner,
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feeling that 1t was no
longer possible to get
strong labor legislation
the 73rd Congress, thought
that conditions for such
legislation would
be .ore favorable after
the 1934 electlon.^^ ^^^^^^^.^
^^^^
^^^^
despite its public silence on
the issue, business was
generally pleased
by the passage of PR
44.
As evidence he quotes
the statement of a U.S.
Steel vice-president:

°^

resolution with equanimity
It
LllTfl^.t t''''^'
^^^t mo?e tha a'ye r
Se
oe substituted
subsJftuldT.Th''''"'"'
for the permanent legislation
proposed

personal

opinion is that

U

t

will
Hn

is^^^^ilJI^'o ^b^oih^rTf JeJ;°:uch"^5"^^

This opinion would prove to be
wrong (and Wagner's correct) for
at
least two reasons.
The 1934 election resulted in
a massively Democratic

and very liberal Congress.

Members committed to social and labor
reform

were elected in even traditionally
conservative districts.

In

Zingale's

terminology, the 1934 election was the
beginning of the realigning in-

teractive surge that would peak

in the

1936 election.

That is, while

voting patterns favored the Democrats
as they had in 1932, by 1934 one
began to see the electorate unify and
divide on the political and demo-

graphic bases that would be characteristic of
the coming electoral era.
The quasi-class nature of these voting patterns
helped to convince

Roosevelt and his advisors that the President
could govern and be re-

elected without the massive support of organized
business.

Indeed,

there could be partisan benefit to actively strengthening
the status of

organized labor. 76

Much of the administration's legislative activity in

1935-36, the so-called second New Deal,

is

best understood as an attempt

189

by the administration
to consolidate and
control

its left winp support

However, the Roosevelt
administration would still not
support the Wagner
bill until very late in its
legislative history.
Secondly, the new
labor board, now known as the
old NLRB, took a more activist
stance than
might have been predicted when
Public Resolution 44 passed
Congress.
The old NLRB operated in a fashion
that both continued and expanded
the

institutional practice originated by
the NLB.

Evolving Practice:

The Old NLRB

On June 29, 1934, through Executive
Order 6763, Roosevelt created
a

National Labor Relations Board as mandated
by Public Resolution 44.

The Board's powers were comparable
to those of the NLB.

were significant differences

in the

Still, there

authority given to the two agencies.

While the NLRB was given stronger authority
to conduct investigations
and elections, it was weaker than the
NLB in several

areas.

Executive

Order 6763 did not mention the majority rule
principle previously recognized in Executive Order 6580.

Further, 6763 allowed the President to

create labor boards for specific industries.
of separate labor policy for powerful

This allowed the creation

industries.

By early 1935 Roose-

velt used this authority, removing the auto, coal,
and newspaper industries from the NLRB's jurisdiction.

lished

a

The Executive Order also estab-

clumsy administrative relationship between the NLRB and the

Labor Department.

Further, the ultimate enforcement of the Board's

rulings remained in the hands of the hostile NRA Compliance Division
and
the Justice department.
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one genuine innovation
in 6763 was that
NLRB .embers would no
longer represent or be
selected by constituencies.
All .e.bers would be
-sponsible to the public. As
significant, whether by
chance or design
was that all three NLRB
appointees, Lloyd Garrison.
Edwin S.1th. and
Harry Millis, either came
fro. legal backgrounds
and/or institutional
positions that predisposed the.
to favor uniform over
expedient action
Garrison would soon leave.
He was replaced by a
lawyer, Frances Biddle
Given that the old NLRB
retained ™st of the MLB staff,
there was a
solidification of the prior support
for a legalistic approach
to labor
policymaking in the "new" organization.
The NLRB soon made its
intentions known to FDR and the
leaders of
relevant federal agencies.
The Board intended to act as
the primary

interpreter of Section 7(a), thereby
overseeing the activities of its
own regional boards and the
special
industrial boards.

^ ^^^^^^

Roosevelt in August 1934, the NLRB
insisted that,

™f<"-«d, as it must be enforced,
some'aaInrv'^j°t"h»'r'
the Government must pass
authoritatively upon each
unset?iBH
'"^ '^^^
^'^^
to be the duty of
this Board"!'

f

Of course this position required
further deemphasis of mediation activities.

While the primary activity of the NLRB
was to strengthen and
extend the nascent labor law the NLB had
created, the NLRB undertook
several organizational

reforms to insure that it and particularly
the

regional and the special

istic manner.

industry boards would handle cases in

a

legal-

The NLRB stopped all mediation activity and
limited the

other boards to mediating only those cases in which
the dispute did not
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require an Interpretation
of 7(a).

The NLRB also worked
to Insure that

regional boards followed
standard procedure and
kept c^plete case
records.
Eventually this led to a
bureaucratization of these
offices
as board .e.bers or
staff were restricted to
either judicial or administrative functions.
During 1935-36 even the
regional boards began to end
their mediation activities.
This was only partially
a result of .LRB
encouragement.
Rather, the end of mediation
activities mainly reflected
the increasing hostility
between business and labor
members of the regional boards.
In turn, this trend
Increased the NLRB's role in
decision making, since the
regional boards were paralyzed
by their Internal

conflicts.^^
Still, the real mission of the
old NLRB involved the substantive
matter of the evolving new "labor
common law.'- Two cases, Houde
Engineering Company and the San
Francisco Call-Bulletin, demonstrate
how the
NLRB extended the practice of
the NLB.
The Houde case focused on the

substantive interpretation of Section
7(a) of the NIRA.

The Call-

Bulletin case, while involving
important substantive considerations,

focused on the jurisdictional
question.
exactly the way the NLRB wished.
7(a) was replaced by

a

Neither case would be resolved

This would be impossible until
Section

genuine labor law.

Nonetheless, the old NLRB

through its work on these (and other)
cases contributed to both the

passage of the National Labor Relations
Act and the practice of. the new
NLRB that was formed to enforce the NLRA.
The Houde Enginering Company case
involved critical questions

about the nature of representation
and good faith bargaining.

The case

was first considered by
an NLB regional board.

election at the Houde Company.

That board ordered an

Houde claimed that neither
the regional

board nor the NLB had any right
to compel the company
to deal with a
union.
The company also objected
to the regional board's
order for a

secret election.

In a March 1934 ruling,

the NLB rejected the Houde

position and subsequently supervised
an election at Houde.
tion, also in March 1934, resulted
in the selection of
as the bargaining agent.

right to bargain with

a

However, Houde still

a

This elec-

UAW affiliate

insisted that it had the

company organization, the Houde
Welfare and

Athletic Association, that had gotten
about 30 percent of the vote.
this time the NLB was willing to
agree to having plural bargaining

At

agents in return for Houde dropping
its demand to know the identity
of
UAW supporters.

all

However, the union rejected this accord
and pressed

its demand for recognition as the
sole bargaining agent for the unit.
In

the six months prior to the NLRB
decision in the case, Houde refused

to seriously negotiate with the union.

Houde did negotiate an employee

insurance plan with the Welfare and Athletic
Association, although it

never discussed this matter with the union.
As an important case,

and as one of the NLRB's first decisions,

the Houde case received exceptionally detailed
consideration.

years later NLRB Chairman Garrison reported that the
NLRB

Several

"...

devoted

to no other case as much thought and discussion
as to this one."^^

its August 1934 decision, the NLRB took positions
in

with

a

a

In

form consistent

legalistic approach to labor relations and which in turn
would

become codified in the Wagner Act.
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that under Section

7

a)

,

^Lp

gamze and bargain collective

in self-organizatio
that "the right of
on the part o? the

ye^^

v

Lh
'"^

'

'f^r Ihe^^^
tn

emoWp.

7

I

I'

^'J^'t
^P^^ctive
bargaining,"'

•

^

'^^^ht to or-

^'"terference

'
duty
eZloylr to^,^^^^^^^^^^
that "without this dutVto
^^P»:^^^"\^ti ves ,
barga n ? ^ r aht tn'h
sterile," and that "the only
^n?e?p^etat on
.
^^''^.r^^^^^^"^^
can give effect to its
^^'^
purpLes is thlf ^^e
Jh^ representative
of the
majority should constitntl Jh!
''''''''' ''''''
collective
bargaining'w??h the e:plo^e^ "iS'

The implications of this
decision were obvious to the
business
community.
If the NLRB ruling in the
Houde case could be enforced,
then
employers would have to bargain
in good faith and in most
cases with labor organizations they did
not sponsor.
The NAM responded to the
Houde
decision by telling its members
to simply ignore the NLRB.
Indeed, NAM

correctly noted that the NLRB's
decision

in the

Houde case contravened

Roosevelt's decisions in the automobile
crisis earlier that year.
business seems to have followed NAM'

s
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advice in the following months.

In the period between the
Houde decision and the NLRA's

passage, only

2

percent of the cases that came to the
NLRB involved units of over 1,000
employees.
After the Houde decision, business
members of the regional

labor boards resigned in large numbers.

While to some extent the resig-

nations reflected business hostility
toward the NLRB and organized
labor, some business members resigned
because few serious disputes were

coming to the regional boards.
However, the NLRB's main problem following the
Houde case' was that
it was still

not able to enforce its decisions.

in the Board's strongest area of
jurisdiction,

tational elections.

This was true even
the conduct of represen-

Many companies began to use the court review
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provision of Executive Order
6763 and of Public Resolution
44 to create
delay.
These companies understood that
the federal courts were
unsympathetic to the New Deal.
In 1935-36 alone, federal
courts issued over
1600 injunctions suspending the enforcement
of federal laws and regulations.

However, the NRA and the Justice
Department remained the most

important institutional centers of
resistance to NLRB decisions.

Justice Department failed to obtain

a

The

single favorable judgement in any

of the thirty-three election related
cases the NLRB submitted for en-

forcement.

This was less the result of hostile
courts than of the

Justice Department's unwillingness to
prosecute.

Similarly, through-

out the period after the Houde decision,
the NRA remained hostile.

The

conflict between the NLRB and the NRA reached
its peak in early 1935

with the San Francisco Cal 1 -Bui 1 etin Case.
The case was brought to an NLB regional board
by

a

former Call-

Bulletin employee who claimed that he was forced
to resign because of
his pro-union activities.

Soon after, the regional board was incorpo-

rated into the NLRB structure.

The Cal

1

-Bui letin claimed that the NLRB

had no jurisdiction over the matter because Roosevelt
and the NRA had

given jurisdiction to

a

different board established under Executive

Order 6763, the Newspaper Industrial Board (NIB).
also claimed that as

a

newspaper it served

a

The Cal

special

1

-Bui letin

public function

that exempted it from most forms of government regulation.

The NLRB was

initially reluctant to pursue this case, no doubt remembering the fate
of the NLB following the auto settlement.

However, the NLRB finally

agreed to decide the Cal 1 -Bui 1 etin case because of the agency's
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co™it.ent to the pn-„c1p,e
of

a

consistent and rational
labo. policy 87

The NLRB realized that
the case would result
1n a direct confrontation
with the NRA, NLRB Chairman
Biddle later stated,

Jh^^Sn^^ro%"::^e1u;

Zu2ir.

the air, emphasize the
Inconsistencies
vagueness of the way

h»

'

felt
'
^^owdovm would clear

labo^S^spJ^er^l^e^^^rrS^^Sfedlis™^^^

In a

December 3. 1934 decision,
the NLRB defended its
jurisdiction
over the Call-Bulletin case and
by implication all
other private sector
labor disputes. The NLRB
claimed that Executive Order
6763 gave it ultimate authority over the
principles and procedures used
by the code
boards, including the NIB, that
were outside the administrative
control
of the NLRB. While the NLRB
acknowledged that it would defer
to the de-

cisions of such boards, provided
they used correct procedures
and interpretations of 7(a); given the NIB's
inability to reach a decision in
the

Call-Bulletin case, the NLRB would
also make
dispute.

a

substantive ruling on the

The NLRB then ruled in favor of
the former Gal 1 -Bui letin

employee.

The NLRB concluded that the Cal 1
-Bui letin had interfered with

the former employee's right to
self-organization under Section 7(a).
The NRA quickly responded to the NLRB's
challenge.
the NRA asked that the case be reopened.

Donald Richberg, now the NRA

Director, supported the Industry position
in
NLRB.

On December 6,

a

confidential memo to the

Richberg contended that the NLRB's job was
still to mediate labor

disputes in the interest of effecting economic
recovery.
on to ask for private hearings on the
case,

Richberg went

insisting that public hear-

ings would make cooperation among relevant
government agencies more dif-

ficult.

Finally, Richberg visited NLRB offices the next
day.

He hinted
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that he and Roosevelt had
already reached

a

secret understanding with

the Call-Bulletin and the
newspaper industry.

While the NLRB agreed to reopen
the Cal 1 -Bui letin case, the
NLRB
refused to retreat from its
procedural rules, including the
public hearing requirement.

While the NLRB's toughness in this
matter can be in-

terpreted as stemming from its desire
to promote its conception of
good
labor policy, the simpler explanation
is that the NLRB sought
to protect
its institutional

integrity.

This integrity rested on the
legalistic

mode of operation developed by the
NLRB and its predecessor the NLB.
For reasons that are not fully clear
Richberg conceded the NLRB's procedural claims and sent NRA representatives
to the public hearings.

hearings added nothing significant to the
case.
presented.
case.

These

No new evidence was

As a result the NLRB upheld its
previous decision in the

91

During the period between early December 1934
and February 7,
1935, when Roosevelt "resolved" the Call-Bulletin
problem, all parties
to the dispute attempted to apply maximum
political

administration.

pressure on the

This maneuvering was not limited to just business
and

labor interests, but was also rampant within the administration.

Rich-

berg continually protested to the White House about NLRB's
"arrogant

self-assertion."

More substantively, given that the Cal 1 -Bui 1 etin case

did not involve issues touching on representational elections,
the NRA

Compliance Division was the agency responsible for enforcing the NLRB
decision.

The NRA refused to enforce the Cal 1 -Bui 1 etin decision.

Instead, the NRA raised the level of conflict by sending the case's
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the Illegitimacy of the
NLRB's claim of jurisdiction.
The NLRB's attempts to
gain presidential

Bulletin decision failed.

By late January, Roosevelt
took the news-

Paper/NRA side in the conflict.

In a

admitted that the Board's decision

correct one.

support for its Call-

in

meeting with the NLRB Roosevelt
the Cal

1

-Bui letin case was the

Yet Roosevelt also reprimanded
the Board for not recogniz-

ing his need for political
flexibility in such matters.

Roosevelt ap-

parently did not comprehend the
internal development of his
labor
boards.
That is, the NLRB, because of
its past practice and its members' and staff's understandings
of that practice, could no longer
shift

easily into
tion.

a

predominately expedient (i.e., "political")
mode of opera-

In a January 22 memo to the
NLRB,

Roosevelt for the first time

denied that the NLRB had any substantive
authority over labor disputes
in those industries, e.g., newspapers
and automobiles,

under NRA authority.

that he wanted

At most the NLRB had a right to
investigate.

Roosevelt ended the Call-Bulletin controversy
on February

7,

1935 when

he dirrected the NLRB not to consider
or discuss the Call-Bulletin
93

case

Thus by February 1935 Roosevelt, perhaps
inadvertently, accom-

plished two things.

First, he made clear his willingness to remove
any

politically controversial case from NLRB jurisdiction.

Second, the NLRB

could consider cases similar to the Call-Bulletin
only if the NLRB would
turn its back on the legalistic mode of practice
that it and the NLB had

created.

The NLRB was not willing to do this.

The Board was now
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convinced that it could net
get the Roosevelt
administration to effectively enforce Section
7(a).
But the NLRB's .e.bers
and staff for the
most part remained with the
uie agency
aqencv in hnno
hope ^-p
of encouraging the passage
of
Wagner's new labor bill.^^
On July 5, 1935 Roosevelt
signed the National

into law.

same name.

Labor Relations Act

As a result the old NLRB
was replaced by a new board
with the

The new NLRB would have

a

strictly "judicial

function and
it would be the primary
interpreter and enforcer of the
NLRA.
In those

cases where the NLRB needed to
seek federal court action,
the NLRB would
no longer need to use an
unfriendly intermediary like the
Justice

Department.

Further, the substantive provisions
of the Wagner Act

reflected, indeed largely codified,
the substantive decisions
made by
the NLB and the old NLRB in the
two previous years.
Of course, the activities of the
NLB and the old NLRB did not di-

rectly result in the Wagner Act's
adoption.

Rather, the NLRA's passage

was rooted in both the alteration
of elite members and the growth
of

labor insurgency that occurred because
of the Great Depression.

circumstantial factors played

a

role in the NLRA's passage.

Even

For in-

stance, the Supreme Court's decision in the
Schechter case destroyed the
NRA.

The decision also invalidated Section
7(a) as

voiding the entire National

Industrial Recovery Act.

a

consequence of
The Court's action

forced Roosevelt to consider alternative mechanisms
for promoting recovery.

In the field of

labor policy, this meant that Roosevelt was
more

amenable to the passage of legislation, like the
Wagner proposal, that

might help to limit the number and severity of
strikes that occurred
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around recognition issues.
boards was

a

Nonetheless, the experience
of the old labor

relevant factor in the NLRA's
passage.

became convinced of the need for

a

Wagner himself

legalistic approach to labor policy

only after seeing the contradictions
involved in the NLB's mediation
activities.
Indeed the labor boards served as
experiments in organization, process, and substance.
the debate over labor policy.

The boards'

very existence gave focus to

Congress, relevant interests, etc.
could

finally argue about the concrete impact
of given principles of labor law
and labor board procedure, instead of
engaging in a relatively unfocused

debate over abstract principles.

Finally, the modes of practice devel-

oped by the labor boards proved an
important resource for the new NLRB
in its initial

operation.

One could argue that the legalistic style

gave the new board the weapon that it needed
to survive the initial

challenge to its existence.
Many observers expected the NLRA to be voided by
the Supreme Court
as an unconstitutional

expansion of the national government's power.

The new NLRB, relying on the institutional capacity
developed under the
old boards, found itself in

a

strong position to develop

a

strategy that

would maximize its and the NLRA's chances of surviving the upcoming
court challenge.

The Supreme Court decision to uphold the NLRA in the

Jones and Laughlin case was largely traceable to the decision of swing

Justices to make an accommodation with the New Deal.

However, the

NLRB's own decision to limit its activities to those disputes that the

NLRB thought were most easily sustainable under past interpretations of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce certainly made it easier

for the Supreme Court to
render

a

favorable decision.^^

of the labor boards proved
important to the NLRB in

The experience

second respect as
While the members of the NLRB
board were new, the core
staff of
the agency was carried over.
That is, the NLRB began
with a set of
practices and ideas that were highly
developed by past institutional
experience.
The new agency did not have
to face the constitutional
challenge, or subsequently hostile
political interests, without
the
benefit of previous institutional
a

well.

1

In this chapter

I

earning.

showed how the realignment of the
1930s, through

both its initial electoral surge
and its subsequent creation of
new

patterns of electoral conflict,
encouraged and molded the substantive
and more importantly institutional
development of

policy.

I

a

national

labor

also elucidated how the early labor
boards, through their

practice, greatly influenced the codification
of United States labor law
and the institutional development of
the NLRB.
The critical actions in this process were
the NLB's early decision
to adopt a legalistic form of institutional

practice and the extension

of that practice in virtually every situation
where the labor boards'

power was contested.
by the boards'

conflict.

This developmental

path can be understood in part

limited abilities to engage in other forms of
political

The NLB and the old NLRB could not successfully
compete with

the NRA or business groups for either presidential
or congressional

favor.

The boards had neither the resources nor the organized
constitu-

ency to engage in interest group politics on favorable
terms.

Further,

as governmental agencies, the labor boards did
not have the capacity to
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mobilize worker protest.

Indeed, it is likely the
boards would have

been su^arily disbanded
had they tried.

At best the boards could
use

worker protest to strengthen
their position vis

a vis

other agencies and

interest groups.
However, the labor boards"
cal

inability to win in explicitly
politi-

contexts does not explain their
development of

legalistic mode of

a

practice.

Rather, the boards' actions
must be understood within the
general American tendency to
disguise substantive political
actions as
procedural, especially legal, actions.
While in the post 1896 period
this mode of political action
had been used mainly and
rather directly
for the benefit of propertied and
other dominant interests, under
the
twin pressures of depression and
realignment judicial and administrative

agencies began to use procedural
decisions to facilitate new accommodations between different components of
the social order.

In the area of

labor relations, the NLB and the old
NLRB began this process before the
federal courts.

As

a

result the labor board decisions often
seemed to

contradict previous judicial decisions made
before the NIRA.
less, the labor boards'

Nonethe-

decisions were firmly within the new under-

standings of the appropriate forms of judicial
action that became dominant by the end of the

1

930s.

Before the 1930s the federal courts maintained
cal

a

strict ideologi-

separation of state and society by claiming that
decisions were

essentially deductive applications of the general
principles of law.
the mid 1930s the federal courts,

By

if only to preserve their authority,

began to openly recognize situational, that is,
political considerations

in .ak1ng their
decisions.

The challenge the federal
courts have faced

since the 1930s has been to
adopt the doctrine of
legal realis. in a way
that would be compatible with
maintaining the public/private
distinction
upon which a capitalist society
rests.
More cynically, the courts'

function was to find ways to
justify state action in behalf
of powerful
private interests while protecting
those interests from "disruptiveexercises Of state or state
supported power." Klare shows
that the
federal courts pursued just this
course of action in its treatment
of
cases arising under the NLRA.
In particular, the federal
courts interpreted the NLRA in a way that limited
the scope of spontaneous worker
QR
action.
The members and staff of the pre-NLRA
labor boards, especially the

old NLRB, were aware of the conflict
and gradual accommodation between
the proponents of the legal doctrines
of conceptual i st formalism and
legal

realism.

In general

tions of labor.

the boards were sympathetic to the
aspira-

However when the Boards chose to mold their
administra-

tive practice and their substantive
interpretations of Section 7(a) in

forms akin to legal

practice, they channeled labor conflict in
direc-

tions alien to the spirit of the militant
labor action that played

a

large role in both the adoption of the Wagner
Act and its "acceptance"
by employers.

As labor conflict became incorporated into
a legalistic

mode, procedure became more important than substance
and moral rights

became privileges under
other parties. 99

a

statute to be balanced against the rights of

•

The benefits and costs of this structure of labor-

capital conflict have been extensively debated and will continue to be

so.

However, the pre-NLRA
labor boards' shift
to legalistic practi
ce
certainly presaged the federal
courts' treatment of labor
relations
under the NLRA.

CHAPTER
CASE STUDY #3:

V

THE 1980 ELECTION AND

THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
PROCESS

Introduction

had

a

The 1980 election, at least
in popular discourse,
is said to have
strong impact on public policy.
The commanding victory of
an ex-

plicitly conservative Republican
presidential candidate, along with
the
election of the first Republican
Senate ^jority in a generation,
is
said to have laid the groundwork
for the subsequent major
alteration of
the United States government's
budgetary priorities.

Some attempts, if

not fully convincing ones, were
made to show that these policy
changes
were a result of a recognizable
electoral mandate.

According to some observers, the 1980
election resulted
of the political process as well
as of public policy.

in changes

Many of the cri-

tical policy changes were in the
areas of spending and taxation.

Simi-

larly, much institutional change
occurred in those parts of the political process where budgetary decisions
are made.

the political
".

.

.

Lance LeLoup, examining

success of the fiscal 1982 Reagan budget,
notes that

It appears that the reconciliation bill

passed by Congress repre-

sents the first time in budgeting that Congress
has really been able to

overcome its decentralized structure and its general
pattern of accommodation."

While the Reagan "budget blitz" of 1981 was not fully

repeated in 1982, one observer of the process, Richard
Cohen, reported
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that the process of
institutional change apparent
the ,ea. before had
continued.
In a demonstration
of how conarp^<;inn;,i nv,^^ a
refined or exercised to sati^fv thi
/T^'*'''^"

cuts by authorizing committees

In

addi?Z

informally

spending
h

Yet even after the fiscal
1983 budget was adopted/ some
observ-

ers, including most members
of Congress, were not ready
to say that important institutional change had
occurred.

packaging scheme has already worn out
its welcome and
arCo^qress
will quickly return to its traditional
legislative ways 5

1

In this

chapter

I

argue the contrary.

I

claim that the movement to an

"omnibus" budgetary process is permanent,
although the eventual form of
that process may be significantly different
from the one developed

during the past two years.

Nonetheless, that process, whatever its de-

tails, will strengthen the capacities
of the Presidency to encourage the

adoption of relatively coordinated public
policies in behalf of some

form of national constituency.

The basic aim of this chapter

is

to de-

scribe, explicate, and interpret changes in
the use of the Budget and

Impoundment Control Act of 1974 toward that end.
Important changes in public policy and, by implication,
political process, have been associated with realignments.

in

the

At present
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^ost 05se.ve.s have not
found substantial
evidence to support the
,ud,e-nt that the 1980 election Is
a realignment
or represents a major
Change In the Ideological
or policy preferences
of the electorate «
Still, the 1980 election.
In terms of Its
apparent Impact upon public
policy, closely resembles
previous realigning elections.
Walter Dean
Burnham notes that
virtually without exception,
.
previous policy
Shifts Of this magnitude
have been crucial symptoms
of critical realignments."
Burnham. while not claiming
that 1980 Is a realigning
election, thinks that the
Implementation of the Reagan
program by Congress
and executive branch action
may by Itself reconstitute
the structure of
political conflict In the United
States.
.

^^'^

amorphous but decisive
evenrirAmerican do^^^

wnicn nas been in the majority
in Conqress during the Dreredinn
fifty years
Accordingly, most voteri
may well not have bee

entf^fface^rAL'ric'a^'o^Uic'i'
In

this chapter

I

"

^'^^

In

^'^'^^

look at the evolution of the budget
process in

1980-82 to describe the character and
process of institutional change in
this area.
My purposes in doing this are
largely conceptual rather than

historical.

To the best of my knowledge,
conventional journalistic

accounts of this history are accurate. ^

My goal

is

to use the descrip-

tive material about the budget process
to inform my discussion of how
general economic and political forces,
mediated by elections, encourage

specific institutional change.

This discussion appears
in the next

chapter.

Just describing the budget
process itself presents
ceptual

problem.

a

thorny con-

It is never clear when
and where the budget process

either begins or ends.
finishes

a

It is too simplistic to
say that Congress ever

budget, whether that

is

thought of as the completion of
all

pending authorizations and
appropriations, or since 1975 the
passage of
a final budget resolution.
Congress may be asked to pass
supplemental

appropriations, or contrawise may have
committed itself to spending in
future fiscal years.
Even if Congress completed all
of its budgetary
work by the start of

a

new fiscal year, significant
changes in

a budget
can occur through the executive
branch's execution of that budget.

While some of these alterations now
require Congress' approval, decisions taken on either the presidential,
departmental, or agency level
can significantly change the actual use
of public resources.

Any number

of events beyond the control of government
officials (e.g., recessions,
natural

and military emergencies, etc.) can change
the actual patterns

of government activities.

Nevertheless, there still

is

value in using

the standard conceptualization of the budget
process, if only for its

familiarity.

That is, the budget process

components; the formulation of

a

is

divided into three basic

budget proposal within the executive

branch, congressional action on that proposal, and
finally the executive
branch's implementation of the congressional
ly approved budget.

While

there is considerable and increasing overlap among these
components.

they can be thought
of as occurring in
roughly sequential order.
In
theory, each component takes
approximately one year to finish.
While changes can happen in
all three parts of the
budget process,
I
li-t my examination of budget
process changes to the first
two components of executive formulation
and legislative action.
I do not look at
budget implementation because,
in part, it is still
in process (at the
time Of writing) for the first
two Reagan budgets.
Further, the locations of budget execution
decisions are multiple.
Therefore it is difficult to separate technical fr^m
political considerations in any
budget
changes that take place.
Finally, I believe there is a
certain elegance
to stopping my examination at
the adoption of a formal budget
by Congress and the President.
This budget can be viewed as a
basic statement

of the government's priorities and
purposes, one that is more important
than other "statements" in that it
ties tangible resources to intended
goals and has been approved by both
"political" branches of the national

government.
tion.

Certainly this statement

is

in reality something of a fic-

However, the status of the implemented
budget as

governmental intent is far from dubious.

a

statement of

The alterations that are made

in the congressional
ly passed budget occur in a highly privatized poli-

tical environment and are thus produced by
"subversions" of the more

legitimate modes of public policy making.
Even within the two remaining segments of the
budget process, exe-

cutive budget formation and congressional action, the
problem of privatization affects the attention
the process.

Regrettably,

I

I

choose to give to different aspects of

give more attention to congressional
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action.

I

say .eg.ettably because

a

knowledge of EOP
Interactions with

bureaucratic agencies
constitutes as important
an aspect of the budget
process as EOP or departnient/agency
interactions with Congress
itself
While I look at so.e material
on budgetary politics
in the executive
branch, .y largely journalistic
data is far ™re complete
in regard to
relations between the Presidency
and Congress and those
internal to
Congress.
Yet there are some positive
aspects to this necessary
focus on
congressional action in the budget
process.
First, the action is relatively public. Therefore
participants' interpretations of
electoral
forces are more likely to be
an important consideration
in their actions.
Second, if it is true that
Presidents, provided they can
reasonably claim coattails, find that
they can build partisan
coalitions on
Issues In Congress, then Congress
will be an important location
of any

effective efforts to change either
budgetary process or priorities.
Beyond the obvious fact that Congress
is in part organized on
a partisan
basis, and that Congress must
pass or appear to pass (i.e.,
continuing
resolutions)

a

"budget" for the government to operate;
the legitimacy of

fiscal decisions made outside Congress
is still generally questionable.

This was demonstrated by the political
conflict, litigation, etc. that

followed Nixon's attempt to make major
changes in the budget through

strictly executive action.

Clearly, if President Nixon had a fairly

disciplined congressional majority, opponents
of Nixon's budgetary
priorities could not have as effectively used
the potent claim of ille-

gality against Nixon's policy changes.
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In any case Congress

is

presently

a

very attractive setting
for

studying alterations in the
budget process.

One unintended product of

Nixon's efforts to remake the
budget through executive
action was to
encourage Congress to reassert
its formal authority
over spending.
The
Single most important act in
this reassertion of
congressional power was
Congress- passage of the Budget
and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974.
This law was aimed at two
problems.

The first problem involved
the

regularization and limitation of
executive activities
tion of the budget.
I

I

in the

implementa-

discuss this aspect of the Act
only in passing.

focus most of my attention on
the new budget process that
Congress

mandated in the 1974 Act.

Nevertheless, this process did not
emerge

from the 1974 Act fully developed.

As Allen Schick points out,

"Since

1975, Congress has been making budgetary
war and peace within the budget

process it established in previous
years.

"^^

My focus will

be on the

evolving use of this process from the
initial use of the reconciliation
process in 1980 through the beginning of
the 1983 fiscal year.

artificial in

a

While

budgetary sense, this timeframe encompasses
the politi-

cally relevant period of the 1980 election
campaign through the Republican setback in the 1982 midterm election.
To identify changes in the actual

it is useful to establish

a

practice of the budget process

baseline for comparison.

The basic process

and timetable set forth in the 1974 Budget
Act serves this purpose.
the years since the passage of that legislation
Congress has more or
less followed the specified process, at least in its
broad outline,

every year.

While

a

number of observers have argued that the process

In
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^ad only .a.g1„al
effects on gove.n.ent
spending

-conciliation

In 1980,

It Is

untn the f1.st „se of

Important that Congress
.ade .eal efforts

to ab.de by at least
so.e of the

fo™al requirements of the
Budget Act

Congress might sl.ply have
Ignored the process In
the same way It Ignored those provisions of
the 1946 Legislative
Reorganization Act requiring the Appropriations
Committees to coordinate
spending through the
use of an omnibus
appropriations blllj^ th1s
change In congressional
behavior suggests that by the
.Id 1970s members felt
growing pressures
for at least the appearance
of spending control.
Pre-1980 Practice of the Budget

flrt

Before the passage of the 1974
Act, the congressional
ly approved
budget was basically an abstraction.
That Is, the "budget" was the
to-

of appropriation measures and of
backdoor spending mandated for the
coming fiscal year. Backdoor
tal

spending refers to spending resulting
from

authorizations alone, for example
entitlements, contractual authority,
and guaranteed loans.
Indeed part of the pressure for
budget reform is
traceable to members' concerns with
the increasing percentage of federal

spending that was beyond the control
of the yearly appropriations process.

13

The procedures set up under the
Budget Act gave Congress the

potential of creating

a

evitable ambiguities in

mitments could be

a

true budget document, one that despite
its ina

world of uncertain revenues and spending
com-

cohesive statement of national priorities.

The law

also authorized the institutional resources
needed to carry out the budget process.

It established standing Budget
Committees

in both houses

Of congress and

a

pe^anent budget office

-dependent analysis of the
P.esidenf
The 1974 Act gives
Congress

a

s

to provide Congress
with an

budget and tax requests.

roughly nine .onth period
to pass

a

budget before the start
of the new fiscal year
on October 1.
This ti.espan is somewhat artificial.
Budget Co..1ttee staffs in
both houses and
the congressional Budget
Office (CBO) anticipate the
new presidential
budget proposal for months
before the start of the
for^l budget cycle
After the end of the formal
cycle Congress .ay still
be involved In the
passage of supplemental
appropriations.
The congressional budget
cycle is divided into four
basic stages:
(1) the preparation of a nonbinding first budget resolution
by the budget committees,
(2) congressional passage of the first
budget resolution, (3) committee
and congressional consideration and action
on appropriations bills
(concurrently the budget committees are
preparing their versions of the
second
budget resolution), and
(4) the passage of a second budget
resolution
and the adjustment of spending
bills to this resolution.
The first stage of this process
begins with the President and OMB

submitting the proposed executive
budget with an estimate of the future
cost of current levels of government
programs and activities.
The CBO
is

required to evaluate the accuracy of
the economic assumptions, reve-

nue projections, and program costs
included in the presidential proposal
and to report its conclusions to the
budget committees by April

(although In practice the CBO reports in
February).

1

Meanwhile, other

congressional committees are expected to submit
their own budgetary

estimates and views to the appropriate budget
committee by March 15.
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The Budget
to

Us

Co^Utee

1„ each house reports the
f,>st hudget resolution

parent body by April 15.

Congress is expected to pass
It

a

first budget resolution by
May 15

is

important to note that this
concurrent resolution contains
more
than a total limit on spending,
addition to the total spending
limit the resolution must
specify expected revenues,
all new budget authority and outlays, projected
surpluses or deficits, and debt
authority.
Further, this specification must
be made within functional
categories.
At present there are nineteen
of these functional areas.
Originally the
first budget resolution was meant
to provide general guidance
on spending rather than impose definite
legally or politically binding
limits.

m

The Budget Act also requires
that committee reports on new
authorization
bills be finished by the same May
15 date.

While the Budget Act did not explicitly
alter past congressional
practice

in

the third stage of the process,
committee and floor consi-

deration of spending bills, the Act implied
two forms of constraint.
The first constraint was the limited
time frame imposed by the four

month separation between the first and
second budget resolutions.

Appropriation committees and subcommittees would
have far less time to
complete their business.

Second, though the functional targets
speci-

fied in the first resolution were not legally
binding, the fact that

Congress as

a

whole had already recommended

a

general apportionment of

federal funds before Appropriations Committee
action had taken place

suggested that those committees would have less
autonomy than
past.

in the

That is, any member of Congress who was unhappy
about major

Changes f.o. the fi.st
resolution 1„ an
app.opHations Ml, reported to
the floor could argue
that the Appropriations
Co^lttee had frustrated
the will of Its parent
body.
The last stage of the
mandated budget process

is the passage of
a
second concurrent budget
resolution and the adjustment
or reconciliation
of spending measures to
its terms.
While it is clear that
the second
budget resolution was meant
to be binding, Congress
did not fully provide the machinery needed
to accomplish this task.
Congress, through
section 311 of the 1974 Budget
Act, did rule out the
passage of new
legislation that would raise
spending above or reduce
revenues below the
levels specified in the second
resolution.

still, the original process required completion of
spending legislation before the
adoption of
the second resolution.
This appears to mean that
reconciliation could
take place within rather than
after the second resolution. Given
the
small amount of time Involved, It
is likely that either of
two things

could happen.

First, the Budget Committees
could incorporate all of the

bills passed by Congress into the
second resolution.

In this case the

Budget Committees would exercise little
or no Independent judgement,
thereby acceding to the largely
uncoordinated requests of other standing

committees.

In this

ornamental.

The second basic option was for the Budget
Committees to

report

a

circumstance the budget process would be
largely

resolution embodying the committees majorities'
perspectives.

While this course allowed the Incorporation
of some spending not anticipated in the first resolution. It

is

still

likely that there would be
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™Jo.

differences between the
.epo.ted second
.solution and the actual
spending bills passed by
Congress.

mentioned above.

However, neither of these
options

Of binding budget
resolutions.

1s

binding upon

While this provision
was Intended to le-

gn,.ate necessary spending
co™it.ents ™de after the
adoption

of the

second resolution, the
provision could also be used
to resolve differences between a second
resolution and actual spending.
Functionally,
this is really a variation
on the theme of
incorporating all of the
spending measures already
passed into the second
budget resolution.
The
Act provides another option
in section 310.
During the period between
the adoption of the second
resolution and the start of the
new fiscal
year the Budget Co^ittees can
ask their parent bodies
to amend legislation already passed to bring
spending and revenues in line
with the

second resolution.

This is the essence of the
Idea of reconciliation.

Yet this optional reconciliation
procedure technically must take
place
in a mere two weeks.
Obviously the short time available
mitigates
against the use of section 310,
even in the absence of political
opposition (an unlikely event in any
case).
In initial drafts of the
1974

Budget Act. the first budget
resolution was binding.
allowed

a

Tt,1s

would have

longer period to accomplish
reconciliation, provided the poli-

tical will to accomplish it was
present.

Thus the Innovative use of

reconciliation In 1981-82 had been anticipated
years before by the
drafters of the Budget Act.
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There is

consensus that the process
established by the 1974 Act
had little impact on the
substantive content
a

or size of the federal

bud-

get before 1980.

Have.ann points out that the
budget's rate of growth
remained about the sa.e and
that there were no .ajor
changes in spending
patterns.
He also judges that the
President's budget remained the
most important determinant
of discretionary federal
spendingj^
to substantially agrees
with Havemann's assessment
of the budget pro-

cess.

out

Ippolito also notes that the
Budget Committees had not yet
carved
truly independent legislative
role.
"Both committees are, in

a

truth, adding-machine committees
that take the demands of
spending committees and impose as much restraint
on them as the current
congressional

mood allows.

At most the congressional mood in
the 1975-1979

period supported modest budgetary
restraint, whether restraint meant
expenditure control or the coordinated
setting of governmental priorities.

Schick succinctly explains why the
process tended to continue old

priorities and to lead to higher expenditure
totals.

The targets set by

the first resolution were widely
viewed as budgetary floors rather than

ceilings.

Thus the targets served to institutionalize
existing spending

patterns, especially those in policy areas
where there were strong con-

stituency oriented coalitions.

Schick quotes one close observer of

budgetary politics as saying,

-/ecipients of federal funds ... are going to expect
the full
amount of the ceiling. And the pressure will
build against the
Appropriations Committee, and the appropriations process,
not to
provide less than the ceiling.
My point is that lobby groups,
organizations, associations, people who represent
other people with
human needs, are going to figure out how to
get up to that ceiling,
and then they re going to figure out how
to bust the ceiling 20
.

.
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Thus

a

kind of symbiotic
relationship developed between
the Appro-

priations and Budget committees.

By establishing targets
the Budget

committees made it politically
easier for the Appropriations
committees
(especially the House committee)
to pursue their traditional
role as

guardians of the treasury.

Appropriations committees could
turn down

requests from authorization
committees and/or clientele
groups, noting
that they were but enforcing
the Congress' will as
expressed in the

first budget resolution.

However, as long as the Budget
committees were

unwilling or unable to enforce
their targets, the Appropriations
committees were still able to reward
those constituencies they or their
sub-

committees supported.

The Appropriations comr^ittees
also appreciated

the implications of targets for
potentially limiting the growth of back-

door spending.

Generally, the Appropriations committees
do not like

backdoor spending because it falls outside
their jurisdiction.
The Budget committees were the weaker
partner in this relationship.

This weakness resulted as much from
the structure and jurisdic-

tion of the committees specified in the
1974 Budget Act as from the

optional nature of the reconciliation process.

Nonetheless, the Budget

committees, when conditions were favorable,
attempted to increase their

influence over budgetary decision making.

In addition,

the character of

the Budget committees' accommodations and
initiatives differed between
the House and the Senate.

committees had

a

The separate histories of the two Budget

definite imprint on the evolution of the budget process

in the 1980-82 period.
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Standing committees derive
much of their power from
the stability
of their membership and
their control of an area
of legislative Jurisdiction. While these factors
do not ensure that a
committee will have
its way on the floor, any
committee without these
resources is at a
severe disadvantage. Yet
members' terms are limited
on the Budget committees, there is less opportunity
to accrue power through
seniority.
The committees also work with
the disadvantage of having
some of their
members appointed as representatives
of other standing committees.
A
particular Budget Committee member
may see himself as a representative
of the Appropriations Committee
or one of the revenue committees.

a

Another area of difficulty has
been the Budget committees"
lack of
distinct committee jurisdiction.
The Budget committees must deal
with

the entire range of govenrment
activity; hence, it is far more difficult

for their members to obtain deference
on the basis of presumed special-

ized knowledge.

In

theory the Appropriations committees
have

a

similar

problem, but they surmount it through
their direct control of spending
and

a

well developed subcommittee structure.

Thus the Appropriations

committees can develop and reward patterns
of strong clientele and agency support.

Their mandate
sional

This option is largely denied to the Budget
committees.
is

inevitably to limit not to enhance the normal
congres-

practice of logrolling in support of particul arl
i stic
interests.

Therefore the power of the Budget committees
ability to link their interests to those of
ample,

I

a

is

dependent on their

stronger partner.

For ex-

discussed the patterns of accommodation between the
Budget and

Appropriations committees before 1980,

a

pattern that still favored
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particular interests as long
as they had strong
ties to the Appropriations co™ittees or their
subcommittees.
Expenditure control or the
transfor,.ation of national
priorities requires an
exceptionally strong

coalition concerned with the
overall character and impact
of government
policy.
The mst obvious ally in
this regard is the White
House/OHB.
Still

the administration is often
an ally of limited value
since it does

not want to alienate the members
of other comittees.
ly the case in the 1975-80
period.

This was certain-

However the changing political and

economic environment of the late
1970s and the turnover

government
personnel following the 1980 election
established the preconditions for
an effective coalition between
the Presidency and the Budget
committees.
in

Nonetheless, if there is going to
be any Institutionally based
enforcement of the congressional budget
procedures, it will have to come

mainly from the Budget committees
themselves.

Some observers believe

that the committees have been
ineffective in their enforcement efforts.
In

their opinion the analyses provided
to Congress by the Congressional

Budget Office have furnished the only real
check, stemming from the 1974
Act, upon presidential or congressional
committee efforts to increase

spending.
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Yet there is counterevi dence that suggests
the Budget

committees made progress toward defending budget
targets even before
1980.

This was particularly apparent in the Senate
where the Budget

Committee developed
On several

a

bi-partisan consensual approach to its functions.

occasions the SBC went to the floor to oppose legislation

that exceeded budget resolution targets.

floor has been mixed.

The committee's success on the

The SBC was more effective to the extent that it

could define issues in
procedural rather than
substantive ter.s.
suggests a high level of
ne.ber support for the
ideal if not the
ity Of coordinated budgeting.23

^^^^

This

actual-

occasionally able

to use procedural
considerations to get the Senate
to enforce the

committee's views on substantive
matters.
In the House of Representatives,
the Budget Committee
generally

sought to avoid conflict on the
floor.

HBC members have preferred
to

reach accommodations with other
standing committees,
accommodations that
were usually weighted in favor
of well organized interests.
The HBC, in
the 1 975-80 period, also
developed a highly partisan style.
Co^ittee

decisions, staff activity, etc.
followed strict party divisions.

operative style was also apparent
resolutions.

in

This

floor consideration of the budget

Again voting patterns were highly
partisan, far more so

than in the Senate.

However it can be argued that this
pattern basical-

ly reflected the already high
level of Republican cohesion in
the
24
House.
The net result was that in a highly
contentious partisan

envi-

ronment the HBC limited itself to private
deals on substantive matters
and only went to the floor to defend
the integrity of clearly formal

aspects of the budget process.
issues the HBC had good success.

These issues were few, but on these
jhese patterns of committee behavior

and relationships with their respective
legislative bodies were to have
an important bearing on the development
of the budget process in later

years.

When the SBC adopted the so-called fast track
approach in 1981,

its actions were intelligible within its
past activities and traditions.

Similarly, the passage of the Gramm-Latta substitutes
in the House

is
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more fully comprehensible
given the highly partisan
tradition of budget
conflict in both the HBC and
the larger
body.

Given that Congress, under
relatively little presidential
pressure, had begun to develop
practices of coordinated budgeting
before
1980; it is important to note that
institutional change in this area

should not be thought of only in
terms of the relative balance
of presidential against congressional
power.
Too often the budget battles
of
1981-82 were described simply as the
Reagan administration's victory
over the old line Democratic
congressional leadership who were
committed
to spendthrift practices and
moribund programs.
While there is some
truth to this characterization, it
distorts the nature of the changes
that occurred in budget practice and
politics.

analysts sought to understand events mainly

motives of the individual participants.

This is because most

in terms

of the actions and

Should Ronald Reagan or some

future president fail to obtain his budgetary
program, those who under-

stand budget outcomes mainly in terms of
circumstantial or personal factors will conclude that the events of 1981-82
were ephemeral occur-

rences

.

Yet such conclusions may be wrong.

If the

reconciliation process

should remain in use, or the traditional expectations
and operating procedures of congressional committees, bureaucratic
agencies, and interest
groups remain different from their pre-1980 patterns,
then one can rea-

sonably claim that significant institutional change has taken
place.
Therefore, an examination of the budget process during the 1981-82
period must deemphasize circumstantial

factors that perhaps made budget
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process changes appear .ore
revolutionary than they actually
were.
A
greater focus on Institutionally
based change, both 1„
procedure and
outlook, will help to dampen
the extre.es of judgement
that often flow
fron, descriptions and
explanations that restrict
themselves to individual

behavior and motivations.
It is here that realignment
theory is most helpful,

providing a
Plausible explanation for
discontinuities in institutional
structure and
practice.
However, the value of realignment
theory rests on the pre-

sence of two conditions aside
from institutional change.

First, there
must be evidence that social and
economic tensions have led to the
instability of preexisting electoral
and coalitional patterns.
Second,

there must be evidence that election
results encouraged political leaders to make innovative responses
to political instability in the
interests of some identifiable political
coalition.

1981:

While

I

Presidential

Centralization

cannot prove that recent changes in budget
practice and

expectations are permanent,

I

will argue this by examining the
intelli-

gibility of events within the terms of the
impact of the economic stagnation of the 1970s upon the emerging
political discourse of the 1980s.

Although this examination will be presented in
manner, the actual sequence of events

believe

a

chronological presentation

is

is

a

largely chronological

not of primary importance.

I

the most straightforward way to

elucidate the connections among changes in institutional
practice in
several related but conceptually independent areas,
e.g., presidential-
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congressional relations,
presidentifli
,
,no„
presidential-agency
.
relations, interest group
-tivity, internal congressional
operation, and so forth.
Above all
else I a. interested in
the question of whether
the relative decline
of
the importance of
particularistic power centers,
for instance suhgovernments, in the budget
process is indeed a
permanent one.
.

There is widespread academic
agreement that both political
activists and the general public
judge presidential
performance largely on
how well or poorly the
economy is doing.
The executive budget
proposal
gwes the President a forum to
make economic predictions
and to proclaim
his administration's ideas
on how to maintain or
restore prosperity
through the activities and
the levels of spending
and taxation recommended in the document. Despite
this, and the Carter
administration's
support for the first use of
the reconciliation procedure,
a thorough
pre-election analysis of Carter's
performance failed to mention
any of
his activities in the budgetary
field.
This analysis reflected the

realities of

a

fragmented policy process often
dominated by particular-

listic coalitions.

Thus it focused on legislative
success and failure

in separate issue areas.26

Nonetheless, both Ronald Reagan and
Republi-

can congressional candidates,
individually and collectively, made
extensive use in their campaigns of
the theme of alleged Democratic
fiscal
irresponsibility.

The fullest disclosure of Republican
plans to re-

evaluate the whole budget was put forward
by the Reagan campaign on

September 9, 1980.

Reagan asserted his support of supply
side inspired

tax cuts and his desire to reduce
total government outlays by 2 percent
in each of his first two years
in

office."

Given that Republicans
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usually

™n

on the Issue of
controlling Vunaway"
federal

spending, the
Reagan statement was seen
as .a1nly symbolic,
despite the changing political atmosphere of the
late 1970s. However
after the election the
incoming administration began
to act to exploit the
changed environment
Shortly after the election,
the Reagan transition
team began to
take substantive action
on three fronts; generating
a new budget proposal for fiscal 1982 to
replace the one that the lame
duck Carter
administration would submit to
Congress in January, discouraging
the

cooptation of new agency leaders by
their employees and the
constituencies their agencies serve,
and preparing for the use and
strengthening
Of the reconciliation process
in Congress.
Much of the initial budget
and tax planning was carried
out by two of Reagan's principal
preelection economic advisors, Caspar
Weinberger (who headed the budget
transition team) and George Schultz.
Both of these men were familiar
with past budgetary practice.
Both had served as 0MB Director
in previous Republican administrations.
Weinberger's and Schultz's efforts were
aided with staff and input from a
number of sympathetic organizations

including conservative think tanks, like
the American Enterprise Institute, a House based task force headed
by future 0MB Director David

Stockman and Phil Gramm, and perhaps most
importantly the Republican
staff of the Senate Budget Committee.
a

The Republican SBC staff prepared

detailed report on possible cuts that more
than any other document

laid the basis for the specifics of the Reagan
budget.

The budget

transition team also had an opportunity to plan major
revisions in the
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1581

budget.

The 96th Congress
adjourned without
appropriating .one.
for numerous agencies
Including four departments.^^

Nevertheless, the Incoming
administration was hardly of
one .Ind
as to What needed to
be done.
There were proponents of
three major policy approaches to economic
problems.
At times the President-elect
seemed to agree with all three
groups, although to some
extent the three
approaches were contradictory
In their expected affects.
Reagan and his
chief advisors settled the
conflict by avoiding It.
They rationalized
that the counterlmpacts of
each approach would be minor.
To begin, they
decided to give each faction In
the administration control
of one policy
area or track of its own.
Those who most feared the
impact of large
federal deficits on private
investment were to be satisfied by
the

efforts to control or cut
non-defense spending.

The monetarists were

satisfied by the incoming administration's
strong backing of the tight
money policies of the Federal
Reserve Board.
Finally, the supply siders
were given their due with the three
year tax cut plan.^^
Yet It would be unfair to say this
exercise in conflict contain-

ment was simply a new application of
particularistic politics.

The

Reagan people claimed, at least publicly,
that all three of these policies would have reinforcing effects.

Spending control and tax cuts

would release private Investment capital
to promote economic growth.
The expected growth would generate
additional revenue which, hopefully
by 1984, would make up the deficit
that would initially be caused by the

tax cuts.

Similarly the tax cuts, by allowing more investment
out of

current Income, would more than make up for
the discouraging effect of

h^gh interest rates
on investment.

Vet because high
interest rates

would tend to dampen the
high inflation rate,
economic recover, would
take Place without a
.ajor inflationary spurt.
This was the rationale
l>eh,nd the incoming
administration's "riverboat
gamble." However flawed
this plan might prove
to be on 'enection,
reflection it
it- had
h»H a=
u
cohesiveness
not
often seen in American
economic
policy.

It is however one thing
to make plans and
another to achieve them

To effectively control

spending the administration
had to limit the

usual scope of the
particularistic politics so
typical of American government.
This involves not only
the problem of constraining
the actions
of legislatures and
constituencies, but also the
problem of controlling
one's own bureaucracy.
However dubious one may be
about how cohesive a

philosophy informed the Reagan
administration's economic proposals;
it
is clear that the
administration acted in a rapid and
coordinated fashion to gain unusual control
over the federal

bureaucracy.

Most incoming presidents announce
that the Cabinet will have a
greater role in making major decisions
than in the previous administration.

Then things return to normal.

The President develops close
ties

with members of the so-called inner
Cabinet, i.e.. the heads of departments such as Defense. State. Justice,
and Treasury that have important
coordinating functions. Other Cabinet
members become immersed in the

constituency oriented politics of their
home departments.

While the

inner/outer distinction was again replicated
in the Reagan administration, the administration initiated

a

new pattern of White House rela-

tionships to the outer Cabinet and
other agency heads reminiscent of the

pattern that was developing
in the Nixon presidency.
These relationships stressed effective
control.
'The Reagan White House
has shown
What it means by "Cabinet
Government.'
It has imposed discipline
akin
to that of a military chain
of command.

The immediate reason for imposing
tight control on agency heads
was to keep new appointees from
forming alliances with agency
staff and
constituencies as long as possible,
at least until initial
budget decisions were made.
Senior Reagan advisor Ed Meese
was the principal architect of administration efforts
in this area.
He designed the transition operation so that major
appointees would learn about their
agencies
mainly from conservative task forces
rather than from agency personnel.
In many cases

sub-Cabinet agency heads were assigned
deputies with close

ties to the White House in order to
set up

a

parallel chain of author-

ity, bypassing, if needed. Cabinet
officials who might choose to act

independently of administration wishes.

Meese also went to great

lengths to insure that Carter holdovers
were encouraged to leave promptly.

One result of this was that many sub-Cabinet
posts were empty when

Reagan entered the White House.

Yet this too served to weaken the

ability of newly appointed agency heads to understand
the full implications of the proposed spending cuts.^^
In

the first days of the administration, Meese and 0MB
Director

David Stockman developed another technique to enforce
budgetary re-

straint on agency heads.

They formed

a

budget working group for each

department to review possible cuts.

Members included the relevant

Cabinet member, Meese, Stockman, and

a

number of other officials.

As

stockman late, pointed out,
the membership of the
groups were stacked to
enforce the presidential
perspective.
Cabinet secretaries had to
fight
for their budget and program
against a roomful of
opposition. While a
few Cabinet officers were
able to salvage some of
their losses through
private negotiations with the
President or later congressional
action,
the working groups generally
resulted in acquiescence to
White House/OMB
views. 32 These working
groups were eventually
institutionalized in the
form of several "Cabinet councils,"
again reminiscent of the Nixon
ad-

ministration innovation of the Domestic
Council.

Still

the new councils

could not provide the administration
with the same leverage as the
original budget groups.
Agency officials, by then, had
become socialized,
and perhaps co-opted, to their
agency's environment
The Reagan administration, by its
actions to insulate agency leaders from their agencies and usual
constituencies, weakened the potential

strength of interest groups

in the

coming budget struggle.

For the same

reasons the White House also directed
0MB to ignore the requests of some

interest groups for either information
or negotiation over specific programs.

34

Indeed the White House and 0MB hoped to
create

a

public

perception that sacrifices would be required
of all, not just the poli-

tically weak.

In this,

the administration was trying to do two
things.

They were trying to focus budgetary discourse
in terms of what could be

called broad or public interests in

a

national economic emergency.

Not

only did this language make it somewhat harder to
raise specific interests, more importantly it justified the administration's
delay or avoid-

ance of negotiations with affected groups over budget
details.

Second,
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this language provided
a .oral posture
that the administration
hoped to
use to mobilize public
support. Stoctan's
statement to WilHa. Grelder
IS typical

of this discourse.

ents";"*'''?h??elr

ofTh^l^rf ''^^

attack wea clients
Je
powerful c^^lllTlnu wea

LI
"

h

"-^

cll-

""1

a ^s
M rtha;^""^-j"^
''^''"^
success-both political and economic
success!'?'

''''''
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While the initiatives outlined
above, if successful, would
weaken
the ability of interest
groups to press their budgetary
claims, the Reagan administration would still
need active support to
persuade Congress
to adopt its budget and
program priorities. Toward this
goal it would
be helpful to have substantial
interest group support.
Thus the Reagan

administration needed to mobilize some
interest groups support in terms
Of general economic goals as well
as discouraging action in
support of

particular government benefits.

Given the nature of traditional
coali-

tional patterns, the most obvious
source of potential support was the

business community.

Indeed, that community has been so
important a

source of Republican financial support
that if the Reagan administration
failed to mobilize that support on the
budget and tax Issues, there

would be much less incentive for Republican
members of Congress to support the President.
As

a

group the leaders of the business community were
aware of the

increasing disjunction between the demands placed
upon government and
the resources available.

Essentially, they had already convinced them-

selves that the general weakness of the economy
overrode the value of
the specific government benefits they
received.

However, the matter
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goes deeper.

Earlier

I

noted that government
policies, whether in ter.s

of spending or revenue
production, can be divided
into two basic kinds.
Some policies promote
profitability, others can be
viewed as state efforts through either the
carrot or the stick to maintain
order and legitimacy.
Relatively speaking the business
community has little direct
stake in what O'Connor calls
legitimation.
Rather they are more concerned with the nature of policies
intended to aid capital accumulation.
While the upper levels of the
business community could be and
in large
part were persuaded to accept some
reduction in specific benefits in
return for tax breaks, reduced
regulation, and if federal spending
was

controlled, the hope of lower interest
rates in the future; there was no
problem in mobilizing them against what
from their point of view were

excessive expenditures for social programs.

Riven and Cloward take this

line of argument one step further with
their claim that the administration and its business supporters hoped
to improve profitability by such

actions.

That is, reductions in social programs
would mean

cure and thus docile labor force.

a

more inse-

In turn this would be translated into

lower labor costs.
Not only was it in the administration's interest
to encourage

business support, but to do so in

a

way that would lessen the bargaining

power of specific firms and industries.

Coalitions of interest groups

perform this very function by encouraging their members
to reach some
accommodation with other member having somewhat different
interests.
Such accommodations are needed before common action
can take place.

In

the case of the business community, coalitions
must be formed by members

of different industries.

Otherwise
fwibe, the m.int.-.
coalitions remain trade
associat.cns seeding .e.y specific
policy ends.
The Reagan administration
was
fortunate In that this
sort of coalltlonal
behavior was heco.ing entrenched before the 1980
election.
in
In part
oart thi.
h.h
this behavior
was a response
to the increasing Internal
fragmentation of Congress
during the 1970s
as co^lttee chairs^
prerogatives were limited and
the number of subcommittees expanded.37 Nonetheless
some of these groupings
were already
organizing around general
economic concerns.
For example, one such
coalition, known as the Carleton
Group, formed In 1978 to
push for the 105-3 tax plan.
One of Its organizers,
Charles E. Walker, headed
Reagan's
tax advisory group for the
election campaign. The Reagan
administration
would effectively use such
groups and more formal
organizations, e.g.,
the Business Roundtable and the
United States Chamber of
Commerce, in'
the following months.
The White House even appointed
a special assistant, Wayne Vails, whose main
job was to coordinate those
actions.
Apparently, previous administrations
had not placed a high priority
on

similar efforts.''^
The third element In the old
structure of logrolling politics was
the most Important.

No matter how much the administration
succeeded in

limiting the pressure put upon
Congress by either constituency groups
or
bureaucratic agencies. Congress still
had the final say in basic spending and taxing decisions.

However, the 1980 election resulted in

a

con-

gress that in its Ideological makeup was
sympathetic to Reagan's con-

cerns on the tax and budget Issues.

Legislative success was mainly

a

matter of creating the Incentives necessary
to maintain the Ideological
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™Oon-t. 0. Republicans and
conservative Oe.oc.ats.
administration thinking on
this point as follows:

Schlc.

"P™.

su.™n.es

the outset the

had to get the marginal
member on his slde."^^
The notion of what
constituted

ferent for each house of
Congress.

a

marginal member was somewhat
dif-

While there was

a

clear Republican

n-ajority in the Senate,
and several senators
who attributed their election to the Reagan landslide;
the body had a tradition
of bipartisan

accommodation on budget Issues.

The Institution also had

approach to spending than the
House, often acting as
peal" on such matters.^

a

more liberal

a

"court of ap-

The administration's goal
was to achieve

greater voting cohesion among
Republican members.

achieve this had two elements.

The basic strategy to

First, the administration
sought to re-

enforce the widespread perception
that the electorate had
demanded
spending restraint and tax cuts.
Second, the administration hoped
to
rapidly move its budget cuts
through the Senate as a package.
At least
at first, the new Senate Majority
Leader, Howard Baker, saw his
job

primarily as

a

presidential agent.

His chief goal was

.

lize the Senate into an Instrument
of presidential power. ''1

.

to mobi-

Baker,

along with SBC Chairman Pete Domenici
and Stockman, sought to establish

politically strong budget targets even
before the passage of the first
budget resolution.
They agreed that Reagan's election
mandate and the unexpected GOP
takeover of the Senate gave Republicans a
rare and probab" brief
opportunity to implement their campaign
promises of paring federal
spending and the size of the bureaucracy.
.
By compress Ino the
budget cuts into a single bill and
a short time-span
fheThoped
.

.

233

they could hamstrina
the intprpcitargeted for cuts and

..uTZllZTol lZTel".VTS.ir'

42

Th,s agreement was
the beginning of the
so-called fast track
strategy
With the Democrats 1n
control of the House,
the nature of the .
margmal .e.ber there was different.
If the Reagan
administration could
get Republicans to vote
as a unit, the
administration would only
need to
Pick „p Just over fifty
Democratic votes to win.
Thus there were two
problems, maintaining
control of Republican
votes from relatively
liberal districts in the
Northeast and Midwest and
picking up the necessary
conservative Democrats, who
were mainly from the
South.
Even before the
1980 election. 95 percent of
House Republicans were
voting against the
HBC budget resolutions.
Similarly many of the
conservative Democrats
had already voted against
their party leadership on
budget Issues during
the same 1975-80 period.^
I„ the previous Congress.
Phil Gra™, had already begun his pattern of
active budget cooperation with
the Republican
.embers of the HBC.^^ Thus the
administration strategy was based
on

encouraging existing voting
patterns and „«k1ng those
acco-odations
necessary for victory.
It turned cut, at least
for spending issues,
that neither the Gypsy Moths
or the Boll Weevils extracted
much in the
way of concessions.^^
Besides their emphasis on their
electoral mandate, the Reagan administration found other ways to
increase the pressure on Congress.

They made effective use of
congressional campaign contribution
disclosures, both for informational
purposes and to mobilize pressure from
campaign contributors.

The President also made effective
use of the

inherent difficulty that Congress faces
in drafting coherent legislation

0. its own.

While cla1.1„g to hold
out the hand of
cooperation to Congress. Reagan continually
stressed that his budget
had to be passed
because there was no real
alternative to it other
than profligate spending.
The effect of these
persuasive efforts was all
the greater given
the increasingly grave
economic situation and the
electoral instability
demonstrated the previous November.
Although the House incumbency
rate
was still nearly 91 percent,
this seemingly impressive
figure hid a
trend that could strike
terror into the hearts of
™st public officials
Traditionally, the surest way to
be reelected was to
stress constituency
relations and service. This
had been particularly
true in the 1970s.
Often members could turn marginal
districts into safe ones by
following
this formula.
Yet by 1980 this route to
a safe district seemed
less
certain.
For example, seventy-five new
Democratic House members were
elected in the 1974 post-Watergate
election.
Of the 74 who ran for reelection in 1976 only 2 (3 percent)
were defeated. Because m.y of
these members came from marginal
districts, they devoted substantial

effort to constituent service.

Normally this would be expected to

strengthen their electoral prospects,
but

in the 1980

election

9

(16

percent) of the 57 remaining members
of the 1974 cohort were defeated.''^
Thus, the Reagan administration,
claiming

a

mandate, had the advantage

of an unusually fluid electoral
situation in which to influence the

Congress

While the strategies the administration
and its allies used to

accomplish reconciliation

in

1981

were different in the two houses of

Congress, both strategies accomplished the
same goal.

"The aim of

-conciliation

Is

to dete. challenges
to Individual

packaging the. In o.n1bus
legislation.

spendin, cuts by

,„ both the House and
Senate

the 1981 use of reconciliation
Involved .edifying the
precedents established 1n 1980 to the
political circumstances of
each body.
The .ost

^portant of these precedents was

the inclusion of savings
taroets for

all

functional budgeting areas in
the first budget resolution.
Although
there is some doubt about
the substantive effectiveness
of this require-nt in 1980, it established the principle
that standing committees had
to alter their work to
fulfill at least the formal
requirements of the
budget resolution. On paper
Congress made about 8.3 billion
of the 10.6
billion dollars of savings and
revenue Increases mandated by
the first
resolution. 50 Congress also gained
some experience with the unwieldy

conference procedure necessary to
implement the reconciliation process.
On the other hand, attempting
to avoid lobbying and electoral
pressures,
Congress delayed work on reconciliation
until after the November election.

This placed Congress and the
Budget committees in the familiar

bind of having most of the spending
legislation already

a

fait accompli.

This is one reason that Robert
Hartman claims that the 1980 reconcilia-

tion procedure had disappointing
results.

He also contends that many

committees were able to meet targets by
shifting fiscal 1981 spending to
future years.

Because of this, these conmittees were able
to both

abide by reconciliation and to protect
favored interests.
Thus the Reagan administration's major
task was to find ways to

make the budget targets stick.
to "hold" the total

Previous congressional practice had been

spending figure to that specified in the relevant
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budget resolution.

The nineteen factional
targets were largely ignored. even 1n the binding
second resolution.^^
However, since 1977
House Republicans had sought
to maintain fi™ li.lts
on functional totals after the passage of
the first resolution.
It was this idea of
reconciliation that would prevail
in both houses of
Congress in 1981,

although In

a

more flexible form in the
Senate.

Indeed by the starf'of

the 97th Congress both
Democratic and Republican members
of the Budget
committees were actively looking
for support for various
proposals aimed
at converting budget resolution
targets from pliant floors into
Impregnable ceil ings.

The path toward adoption of

Senate was

a

a

relatively smooth one.

strong reconciliation measure
in the
This was largely attributable
to

the Republican party's majority
status, which besides ensuring
the votes
in any strictly partisan
showdown, gave the administration
effective

control of the budget process.
get action also had

a

The Senate tradition of bipartisan
bud-

reenforcing impact.

immediate need to frame

a

Democrats did not feel an

partisan alternative and could expect
some

accommodation to their individual needs.

The SBC passed

a

resolution

containing reconciliation instructions by March
23, even before it began
formal consideration of the first budget
resolution.

The vote was 23-0.

The Democratic minority voted for the final
version of the resolution;

their support was viewed as
ity.

.

.

an admission of Reagan's popular-

"^4

Substantively the resolution meant approval of almost
all of the

administration's specific program and spending cuts.

The resolution did
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not add new spending.

This reconciliation
.easu.e. S Con Res.
9. also
di-cted specific spending
c.ts and changes In
current laws to both
authorization and the
Appropriations co^lttees.
as well as establishing
binding functional targets.
Further, co™ittees
were expected to .a.e
mandated cuts for fiscal
1982 and 1983.
The SBC expected that
this

™it,-year procedure would overcome
the 1980 proble. of
co™ittees

In-

validating cuts by .aking
future spending co»1t.ents.
However the SBC
resolution, while reco^endlng
specific progra. cuts,
allowed co™,1ttees
to n,ake their own final
decisions on progra. reductions
provided the
co™ittees regained within their
allot.ents.55 ^he SBC and
the majority
leadership also .ade It clear
that they would take
vigorous action on
the Senate floor to enforce
reconciliation.
Enforcement proved unnecessary
In the Senate.

By late March, SBC

Chairman Domenlcl received
general commitments from all
other committee
chairmen that they would abide by
the SBC targets 1f they
were adopted
by the whole Senate. 57
s. Con. Res. 9 was adopted
on April 2, 1981,
four days before the SBC began
Its formal consideration of
the first
budget resolution. Only two minor
flaps developed before the final

passage of the omnibus reconciliation
bill on July 31. 1981.

A number
of SBC Republicans, worried about
the size of the Impending deficit,
joined with the Democratic minority
to defeat the administration
backed
version of the budget resolution.
The Republicans were brought
back into line by Stockman's "magic
asterisk," the promise of unspecified

future budget cuts to make up for
some of the revenue shortfall expected
from the Reagan tax package.

Potentially more serious were the
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™n,bl1„gs out Of senate
Appropriations

Chai^n

Mar. Hatfield, who was

promoting the view that the
budget targets could
not be binding. „e
strongly objected to
authorization con™ittees .aking
cuts that heretofore were in his con^ittee's
jurisdiction.^S
^his

potential conflict had no immediate bearing
on the passage of the
reconciliation

-asure,

it proved significant in
later

™„ths.

m

both the Senate and

the House, the Appropriations
Committees would be major sites
of opposition to the budget process.

There would be no fast- track
strategy
tives.

the House of Representa-

In addition to the fact
that the Republicans were
the minority

party, there was
tion.

in

a

history of partisan budget
conflict in the institu-

Further, the 1980 election produced
an unusually strained atmo-

sphere in the House.
norms, had made

leadership. 59

a

The Republican party, violating
congressional

concerted effort to defeat members
of the Democratic

Thus the Reagan strategy was to
try to form an ideologi-

cal coalition to defeat any budget
alternative the Democratic leadership

might suggest and then to pass and
enforce the administration's own
program.
The Democratic leadership understood,
because of their safe major-

ity on the HBC, that they could report
to the floor nearly any budget

resolution they chose.

They also understood that the administration

would be much stronger on the House floor.

Therefore the leadership,

and in particular HBC Chairman Jim Jones,
were willing to include large

budget cuts in the draft for the HBC report for
the first resolution.
The HBC mark included slightly higher
total outlays than the Reagan
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budget, but the .ark
had

a

lower target for
defense spending ^0

Democrats also see.ed to
be leaning toward
loose enforcement of
the
ultimate budget totals.
Further, the Democratic
leadership did not
believe that the Reagan
administration would be able
to so effectively
constrain the operation of
subgovernments.
Early in the 97th Congress
the Nationaijournai
reported that Jones was
conducting extensive nego-

tiations With interest group
leaders.

fashioning

These discussions were
aimed at

compromise budget plan that
would cut the budget's
growth
on terms as acceptable
as possible to those groups.^l
clearly Chairman
Jones still believed that
interest groups would retain
their previous
political strength.
a

The HBC reported
the Jones mark.

first budget resolution that
was essentially

a

The enforcement provisions
of the draft resolution
were

similar to those adopted by the
Senate.

Authorization committees were

given both overall targets and
suggested cuts.

Again, the targets were

binding, but the committees had
the option of deciding the
spending
levels for specific programs.
However, while the legislation
included
provisions to block the final passage
of appropriations and other
spending that would surpass either
the functional or total limits;
there was
no provision for a mandatory
omnibus reconciliation bill.^^

of this provision became

a

major procedural issue in the House.

Republicans and the Democratic Boll Weevils
sought
vote on all reconciliation issues.

a

^^^^^^^
The

single up or down

They expected, as it turned out cor-

rectly, that adjustments in behalf of
their favored constituencies could
be accomplished through conference
committee action.

The Democratic

leadership, co-ittee
chairman, and

™ch

of the .an. and file,
wanted

the flexibility to
protect constituencies
that

separate reconciliatio,
vote on each functional area
of spending would allow.
The conservative coalition
won the first crucial
budget vote in
the House on May
7 with the victory of the
Gra™-Latta substitute over
the HBC's first budget
resolution.
The weakness of the
Democratic leadership^s position became
apparent some days earlier
with the approval
of most of Reagan's recissions
for the 1981 budget and
the failure of

fo^erly effective agencies, like

the

m

a

and the SBA, to get expected

levels of interest subsidies for
their loan programs."

Gra^-Latta

I,

beyond the substantive adoption
of the Reagan budget,
required an omnibus reconciliation procedure
and that co™,ittees spell
out specific cuts
and program changes in their
reports.
Like the HBC resolution, GrammLatta's suggested cuts were not
binding upon committees.

The legislation also for the first time
extended specific reconciliation
instructions to future years, applying
to entitlements as well as
discretionary

spending.

After the passage of Gramm-Latta as the
first budget resolution,
the HBC made

a

genuine effort to enforce the substitute's
provisions.

stringently worded directive, prepared by
HBC member Leon Panetta

(D,

Cal.), specified the limits on committee
autonomy in the reconciliation
64
process.
Generally speaking the authorization committees
complied

with the formal requirements of Gramm-Latta.

Yet these committees made

enough marginal changes so that the HBC's
reconciliation report greatly
resembled its version of the first resolution.

Although these changes

A
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were Ur.e^y „a.,1„al.
the .ea,a„ administration
claimed that the House
also calmed that some
of the House cuts were
n,uso.,. Rea.an himself
led the public attack,
claiming ^ .
the.e Is now a clea.
danger of
congressional backsliding and
a return to spending
as usual
.

At the

same t1.e Stockman and the
0MB staff were working
with
Latta to prepare

a

Gra™

and Delbert
substitute for the HBC's
reconciliation report.

Meanwhile the House Democratic
faithful were finding It
difficult
to work together in
defense of "their"
reconciliation ^asure. This

was

so for a number of reasons.

Many of the party leaders
were unwilling to

lead a frontal assault on
Reagan's budgetary priorities.

Instead they

tried to attack on the arcane
issue of the faulty economic
assumptions
that informed the Reagan budget."
Further, most House De^crats,
especially the committee chairmen,
were deeply committed to
protecting the
Interests of the constituencies
and agencies they had worked
with for
years. Had the Democrats been
willing to take an all or nothing
vote on
the HBC's reconciliation measure
they most likely would have
been able
to avoid its defeat by the
second Gramm-Latta substitute.
Members of
the HBC understood this. But
Speaker O'Neill decided to support
a more
flexible enforcement of targets and
therefore separate votes on each re-

conciliation issue.

The Speaker's approach prevailed
over that of HBC

members Jones and Panneta.^^

In 1980 the leadership had found
it diffi-

cult to overcome the resistance of
the authorization committees to the

reconciliation procedure.

To contain such intra-party conflict
in 1981,

O'Neill and Rules Committee Chairman
Richard Boiling assured several
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chai™e„ that the leadership
would not allow
reconciliation without
votes on cuts In each
functional area or In
so.e special cases for
specific progra. cuts.
In Its reconciliation
report, the Education and

Labor Co™nttee stated
that O^Nelll and Bollinc,
had ,1ven an absolute
guarantee that separate votes
and floor amendments
would be allowed "9
On June 26,

1981

the House rejected Its
.ajorlty's reconciliation

package and accepted the
Gra^-Latta

standpoint the

™,ost

I,

substitute.

Fron, a

procedural

critical vote taken was the
210 to 217 defeat of the

Rules Committee's motion
to allow separate votes
on some of the spending
cuts.
As such Gramm-Latta II
was accepted on what was
functionally a

closed rule.

Most House members had received
the details of the substi-

tute mere hours before the
vote.

Thus the House accepted the
spending

cuts negotiated between the
substitute's sponsors and 0MB and
thus Ig-

nored the decisions of its own
committees.
Latta

II

Another result of Gramm-

was that the single up or down
vote served to protect some

generally unpopular programs from
the budget knife, e.g., the
Clinch
River Breeder Reactor and the
Infamous sugar and peanut support
programs.

These programs were either not
funded or funded at

In the HBC's reconciliation

measure.™

a

lower level

The results of the reconcilia-

tion conference were almost a foregone
conclusion.

When Congress com-

pleted final action on reconciliation
on July 31, 1981, the final measure, even in its details, was remarkably
close to the proposals the 0MB

sent to Congress the previous March.
Congress also passed the Reagan tax plan in
late July.

On the

surface the plan's adoption seems to contradict
the claim that the
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administration had effectively
H.ited the play of
constituency po,1t-s. G,ven the competition
between the White
House and the Democratically controlled Ways
and Means Committee
to each claim that
they were
-sponsible for the tax cut,
large tax concessions
were made to certain
interests,
Stockman noted. "The hogs
were

real ly feeding.
The greed
level, the level of
opportunisn,, just got out
of control.
Yet .ost
Of the political science
literature on tax politics
In the United States
stresses the role played by
peak or quasi-class
organization in this
area of explicitly
redistributive policy making.'^
what happened was
that the White House, in the
tax bidding war. lost full
control over the
massive corporate coalition it
had helped organize early
In 1981 around
the budget and tax issues.
The business coalition,
so Important as a
revenue source for Republican
candidates, took advantage of its
central
role in administration lobbying
activities.
That is. the coalition

members did some lobbying on their
own behalf as well as for the
economic recovery program.
Business organizations and corporations
greatly extended the rearh
Phone bankf to ca
'''''''
CO ressionan'M^'h"
(congressional)
Members''''T.
and by urging their members and
employees to
^"''P^JSn contributors reminded Members-gently ""^
or rorciDiyforcibly
?h.t they
;h
^
^
that
wanted a pro-Reagan vote. 73
Thus corporate business reaped
benefits as

tively unified action.

a

quasi-class through rela-

On the other hand, subgovernmental

effectiveness

has usually been greater in the
area of distributive politics, that
very

area typified by budget outlays and
authority.

A Congressional Quarter -

ly Weekly Report study of so-called
sacred cows noted that while almost

all of these programs survived the
budget ax, most received substantial
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funding cutbacks.'^

Wh1,e so.e of the
political weakness of
Interest
groups can be attributed
to the speed at which
the political

env1„

changed and the slowness
of non-business Interest
to copy the coalltlonal efforts of the business
com^nlty, even In the second
year of the
Reagan administration the
basic question asked to
organizations Interested 1n legitimation policies
would remain, "What are
you willing to
give up?"''^

Those unhappy with the substance
of the fiscal 1982 budget
and the
movement of effective political
power to the Presidency in the
1981 budget process had two basic options
open to them in the coming
year.
They
could try to reassert the old
pattern of committee/constituency/agency

domination of

a

segmented budget process.

Opponents could also adopt

more centralized strategies,
particularly ones focused on political

party leadership, broad interest
group coalitions, and so on.

Depending

on their preferences and political
circumstances, opponents could use

this second approach to either frame
and then press for the passage of

budget alternative or to seek

a

compromise with the administration.

These courses would necessitate other
steps to strengthen the influence
and cohesion of the Democratic congressional
party.

Dennis Ippolito, in an analysis of the budget
process written be-

fore 1980, stressed the relation between weak
legislative parties and
the lack of incentives to engage in some
form of coordinated budget
76
action.
The events of 1981 demonstrated the obverse. Although

a
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congressional Republicans
had long tended to
act .ore cohesively
than
Den^ocrats. 1„ 1981 the
Republicans would .Intain
al^st total sollda.on final budget and tax
votes.
No doubt this solidarity
was built
in part out of so.e
circumstantial factors, e.g..
the perceived electoral mandate and the
large number of newcomers
without entrenched constituency or agency ties.
Nevertheless, while this
solidarity weakened in
1982, the Republicans still maintained
a very significant
level of cohesion on critical votes.
In contrast. Democratic
efforts to respond to
the "Reagan Revolution" were
initially made on the basis
of their traditional decentralized practices.
I
have already noted the
Ineffectiveness of these practices in the
struggle over the adoption of
the 1981

Reconciliation Act.

While these practices were to
prove slightly more

effective in the fall 1981 battle
over appropriations, the
Democrats
would in the following year increasingly
turn to more coordinated action
on fiscal

Issues.

Despite the fact that the substantive
aspects of the

budget and tax measures passed in
1982 largely reflected administration
priorities, the efforts that
congressional Democrats made to achieve

greater party cohesion demonstrates that
the political context arising
out of the underlying economic crisis
provided more rewards for coordi-

nated action and the serious use of the
budget process than incentives
to return to pre-1980 modes of
decentralized and segmented political

action
The limitations of the constituency oriented
approach were most

fully demonstrated by the administration's
victory in the series of conflicts over the appropriation of money for the
fiscal 1982 budget.

The
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Reagan administration was
under increasing pressure
fro. its alH,es in
the financial and corporate
communities to contain the
growing size of
the federal deficit.
To deal with this problem,
Reagan announced in
September 1981 the necessity for
greater government austerity.
He asked
for $13 billion in non-defense
spending cuts. $3 billion in
so-called
revenue enhancers, and the
limitation of certain entitlement
benefits.
This last proposal was quickly
withdrawn because of a highly
negative
public reaction.
Reagan also said that he would
veto any appropriation
that was larger than his March
spending requests, even if that
spending
was provided for in the
Reconciliation Act.
Despite this obvious challenge to Congress' actions, the
President hoped that the Appropriations

committees would maintain their past
practice of lowering authorized
spending

However the members of both Appropriations
committees, particularly those in the House, were
feeling increasing resentment about
their

limited influence in the evolving use
of the budget process.

Senate Chairman Hatfield agreed that
there was

a

need for

a

While
strong re-

conciliation process, he suggested that
reconciliation take place only
after the consideration of an omnibus
appropriations bill.

House Chair

Jamie Whitten also supported late reconciliation
after final appropriations action.

He hoped that this would restore his
committee's previ-

ous, and to him legitimate, authority over
spending matters.

Whitten still insisted on separate appropriations
bills.

However,

This position

reflects the strong ties between organized constituencies
and members of
the House committee.

These ties are traditionally among the strongest
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in Congress
because they rest on thp Ann
the Appropriations
y
Committee's accep•

•

tance of highly
autonomous subcommittees.
The App^pn-atlons

co™ntees.

again especial,, the
House co™it-

tee. drafted a nu.be.
of appropriations
bills that differed
fro. the

conciliation targets.

This reflected the
power of so.e organized
interests and the efforts
of the .epuhlican
.,,ps. moths'' to protect
their
electoral base in the
industrial North.
However, the sli. margins
of
passage for the HUD and
Interior ^ney bills
.ade it clear that the
eventual Reagan vetos would
be sustained.^« As
a result the 1982
fiscal

year began without the final
passage of even one
appropriation.
gress passed

a

late November.

continuing spending resolution,
followed by

a

Con-

second in

Because continuing resolutions
maintain the spending
patterns of the previous
year's budget, Reagan,
unhappy about the balance between domestic and
military spending in the
continuing resolution, vetoed the November
measure.
Most of the government had
to shut
down until congress hurriedly
approved a continuing resolution
more to
Reagan's liking.^^ After this
event it should have been
clear that the
overall power of constituency
oriented political action had
declined
significantly. This was true
even though Reagan's own
popularity and
perceived effectiveness were also
declining.
The conflict over appropriations and continuing resolutions
also represented a transition
to a
de facto omnibus appropriation.
Most of the government would
operate
through the entire fiscal year
without Congress' approval of
specific
funding measures.

°'

ccnutees would
budget issues.

s-e.

^'^^ ^ong.ess. constituency oHented

stil,

.es1st the centralization
of decision .Mn,
on
However. .0. the .ost
pan this resistance would
pas-

Before 1981 co^lttee
.embers' specializations
usually enhanced
their power, both In their
o» co-lttees and In the larger
institution
Beginning In 1981. specialization
would prove

to be a two edged
sword.
Richard Cohen reports that
members'
iciMuerb
oast
past rpii;,n.o
reliance on committee
centered
patterns of action .ade 1t
.ore difficult for ™ny
.e.bers to perceive
the new realities of their
institutional environment.
Members' old

political habits and loyalties
also lessened their capacity
to engage in
forms of inter-committee
cooperation and coordination
not based on
logrolling.80 ,„ December 1981,
the House Budget Co™lttee
asked the
other standing committees to
submit by March 15, 1982
detailed comments
on the administration's fiscal
1983 budget request and the
committees'
own proposals for alternative
spending or reductions.
The HBC's goal
was to use this infomation
to construct a coordinated
and politically
attractive Democratic budget proposal.
However, most authorizing com-

mittees did not submit reports and
those who did were unwilling
to state
specific recommendations or budget
targets. ^1
in the absence of consensus among the Democratic leadership,
the House again adopted an adminis-

tration Inspired budget substitute
in June.

As a result,

the House

authorization committees were locked out of
the decision making, process
for the second straight year.

Once again In 1982 the Appropriations
committees made the most

active assertion of committee power

in the budget process.

The most
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notable instance of
this assertion ca.e
duHn, the House's consi
deratio,
Of e,ght different
versions of the first
budget resolution on May
27

1982.

Although none of these
resolutions passed at that
ti.e, all were
aniended at the insistence
of Chair^n Hhitten to
void the "deferred enrollment" provision (section
311) of the Budget and
Impoundment Control
Act of 1974.
That is, even those
completed appropriations bills
that
approved spending higher than
the functional targets
set in the budget
resolution would again, as
before 1980. be sent to the
President for
final action.82 However,
when the House finally
passed a first budget
resolution two weeks later, the
House restored the reconciliation
enforcement machinery. Over the
subsequent months, the House
Appropriations Committee continued
its rear guard action
against the budget process.
For example, Whitten violated
the reconciliation instructions
by
changing the functional limits
for each Appropriations
subco»ittee from
those mandated in the budget
resolution. ^3

At this writing it is

uncertain whether Whitten's action
had any meaningful effect.

No appro-

priations bill passed before the
start of the fiscal year on October

1,

1982
In 1982 the

Reagan administration was again able
to get favorable

treatment for its tax and budget
proposals, although not quite as favorable as in the previous year.

In part this was

due to the slow unravel-

ing of the grand corporate and
conservative coalition, and to the inev-

itable resurgence of constituency
oriented forces in Congress, the
federal bureaucracy, and in the
private sector.

Although this resurg-

ence was speeded by the apparent
inability of the Reagan program to

produce an i.p.ove^„t 1n
economic conditions, it
is litely that the
administration's gnp over its
coalition would have
declined even had
the economic recovery
program been a huge success.
For though under
current economic conditions
there are now great
incentives for a more
centralized style of institutional
practice in the United
States, this
is so relative to past
practice and within the
constraints imposed by
liberal ideology, fragmented
government, and a capitalist
economy.
A notable example of this
almost natural fragmentation
is found in
the highly public debate
within the Reagan administration
over the probable effects of the increasing
size of the federal deficit. 8"
This
internal debate was paralleled
by

a

similar controversy in the
financial

conmunity that demonstrated that
the administration's
political allies
were increasingly skeptical
about the value of the
administration's
economic policies.
Further, the administration
lost some of its control
over agency involvement in the
executive budget process.

As might be

expected, agency heads, now familiar
with their domains and often
more
sympathetic to their agencies' programs,
took a more active role in budget deliberations for fiscal
1983.
To counteract this tendency, the

administration strengthened its system of
Cabinet councils and established

a

budget review board dominated by EOP
personnel.

Still, agen-

cy heads increasingly made end runs
to the President, supportive offi-

cials in the EOP, and particularly to the
Republican congressional
leadership.

Finally, as the economy declined and the
1982 election

approached. Republican members of Congress tried
to place Increasing

distance between themselves and the White
House.

Many Republican

officials to communicate
or negotiate with the
White House.86 Even the
previously warm relations
between SBC Chairman
Do.en1ci and the White
House became strained when
Reagan rejected Domenici's
attempt to forge a
compromise during the continuing
resolution crisis in the fall
of 1981.
SBC staff director Stephen
Bell reported in spring
1982
the dra.

.

matic contrast to the previous
year, when Domenici and his
aides worked
daily with Reagan aides
."^^
.

.

If the growing stresses in
the still

very effective Reagan coali-

tion demonstrated the inevitable
centrifugal

forces of United States

politics, the gradual strengthening
of the capacities of congressional
Democrats for cohesive planning
and action was all the more
remarkable.
For congressional Democrats,
especially the more senior members,
had
been among the chief political
beneficiaries of the half century reign
of interest group pluralism.
With the adoption of the Gramm-Latta

substitutes in 1981, some congressional

Democrats began to advocate

stricter measures to enforce party
discipline on some substantive
well as organizational matters.

as

Congressional Democrats were not yet

ready for such measures, if indeed they
ever will be.

Instead, dissat-

isfaction with party "defectors" was initially
funneled against the pet

programs of certain highly visible Reagan
supporters.

For example, in

October 1981 the House reduced peanut subsidies
from the levels agreed
to in the reconciliation measure.

The majority's main purpose in taking

this action was to punish Reagan budget
advocate Stenholm (D-Tex.).

St.l, the .est Significant
kinds of party action
revolved around
the efforts to reach
a bipartisan
compromise on the 1983
budget
As
1982 began, there was a widely
shared perception among
House Democrats
that, despite the adoption
of Gramm-Latta the
previous year, the HBC

report represented something
reasonably close to

budget issues for

a

majority of the party.

a

consensus position on

Furthermore, the Democrats

understood that a large number
of Republicans, because
of either reelection problems or the worsening
economic situation, were
willing to consider a tax increase or a
deferral of the 1082 tax cut,
a limitation on

further social program reductions,
and/or
defense spending growth.

a

reduction in the rate of

A variety of Democratic
budget proposals were

put forth, most of them in general
accord with the emerging bipartisan
understanding. Similarly, in the
Senate the Hollings (D-S.C.)
proposal
received favorable comment from the
Republican majority leadership.

Beginning in March, budget negotiations
began

in

earnest between

Democratic congressional leaders (e.g.,
Jones. Rostenkowski

,

Boiling,

Hollings), Republican congressional
leaders (e.g., Michel. Latta.
Domenici. Dole), and high EOP officials
(e.g.. James Baker, Stockman).
The outlines of

a

compromise were brought

in late April

Speaker O'Neill as the final parties to
the agreement.

to Reagan and

Although this

final negotiation narrowed the remaining
differences, the compromise

package was rejected by both men.

Nevertheless, the activities of the

"Gang of 17" were important as they reflected
the Democrats' growing

acceptance of the need for more centralized
policy making on economic
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issues.

The attempted co.pro.ise
also laid the substantive
basis for
the tax bill Congress
passed the following
August.
The administration
followed the collapse of
the spring budget
compromise with another public
offensive on the budget.
Again they
stressed that the Democrats
had an eternal tendency
to support archaic
and wasteful programs.
The Democrats, at this
point, finally attempted
to create an alternative
discourse on budget issues,
a discourse that
focused for the need for fairness
and equity in future
budget and tax

decisions.89

Nonetheless. Reagan was still
able to mobilize the conservative budget coalition in the
House to pass another
Republican substitute. However, the Democrats,
after the adoption of the
first fiscal
budget
1983
resolution, continued to make slow
progress toward greater
unity in legislative action. By
late 1982 the Democratic
party, both in

Congress and nationally, was
approaching

a

consensus on how to respond

to both long and short term
economic problems.

Further, there was

substantial support in the House for
the adoption of rules that would
strengthen the Speaker's power over the
conduct of business.
The Demo-

cratic House caucus also seemed poised
to oust some Reagan supporters

from their seats on the Budget and other
major committees (for example
Phil Gramm).^°

There are few procedural changes in the
operation of the budget

process in 1982.

This fact is in itself significant.

Given the round

of complaints that has followed each major
innovation toward

a

more co-

ordinated budgeting process, the continuation of
major changes in practice is

a

sign of their growing institutionalization.

Between 1933 and

mo,

the.e was

nearly continuous
Increase 1„ the effective
Influence
Of privatized coalitions
of (.a1nly, economic
Interests, bureaucratic
agences, and congressional
co^ittees In the budget
.aking process
Th,s trend had accelerated
since the earl, igsos.^^
Given the stability
Of this trend. In the
absence of the level of
change 1n the structure
of
political conflict typical
of realignments,
subgovern.ents as a group
Should have had the political
strength to restore the
old .odus operandi.
After all. the passage of
the Budget Act In
1974 had no effect on
the practice of budgetary
logrolling.
a

,

Nevertheless, the reconciliation
process in 1982 was essentially
the sa.e as in 1981.
The only major change
In the process was a
provision in the 1982 first
resolution to make it. including
targeted cuts,
binding if no second resolution
was passed by the end of the
current
fiscal year.
In reality this was merely
a codification of
how the process had been used the previous
year.
More significantly, the 1982

budget process witnessed the first
time all the participants used
a
common baseline for making budgetary
decisions.?^ As a result a new
and
unexpected problem in the process is
becoming apparent.
In 1981 the
Reconciliation Act required conformance
to mandated savings.

Since al-

most all the savings were accomplished
through spending cuts enforcement
was nearly automatic.
In 1982 the process mandated
about $77 billion In
savings, but only targeted about
$27.5 billion in specific cuts.
of the savings were expected to be met
through new tax revenue.

Congress did pass new tax legislation in
1982, the reconciliation

Host
While
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process did not contain strong
.echanis.s to insure that
would in fact be passed.

a

tax measure

Finally, an examination of
the changing political
discourse on
fiscal issues should attend
to both complaints
about the evolving process and proposals for the
alteration of that process,
1981-82 there
were many complaints.
Representative Silvio Conte
(R-Mass.), the ranking minority member of House
Appropriations, summarized the
hostile
feelings of many members toward
the budget process when on
the passage
of the fiscal 1983 first
resolution he said, "The best
thing this Con-

m

gress could do is repeal the
Budget Act.

.

.

.

We're almost in molasses

here.

Nonetheless, serious discussion of
budget reform for the most
part has involved proposals to
strengthen Congress' ability to make
cohesive policy. Some members have
suggested a two year budget process;
focusing on authorizations the first
year, and appropriations the second.

Other proposals seek to alter the
schedule for different parts of

the current one year process.

For example,

the Appropriations commit-

tees believe that reconciliation
should be delayed until after

lengthy consideration of spending bills.

a

more

Yet in all this discourse

there is at least grudging support for
the concept of binding recon-

ciliation and in most cases its application early
in the legislative
95
year.
Again this seems to be a function of the
perceived need to respond to long term economic difficulties.
In summary,

the 1980 election set in motion the forces
that pro-

moted the growing centralization of budgetary
decisions; through the use
of omnibus reconciliation bills, the de
facto development of omnibus
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aPP^opn-atlons (th.ou.h the
use c. continuing
spendin, .solutions,,
and
the development of both
executive and legislative
practices a1.ed at
more coordinated decision
™.1ng. Concurrently the
sa.e forces encouraged the Imitation of
constituency based Influence
In budget r^klng

CHAPTER

VI

ELECTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE

The preceding case
studies describe changes
in institutional rules
and practices following
important electoral events.
An implication of
the realignment Uerature
is that such institutional
changes are a
political response to deep social
or economic tensions.
It is the
election that both demonstrates
and confirms the opportunity
for a

transformation in the structure
of political conflict.

The preceding
case studies focus on the
process of institutional change
generally following electoral events.
In this chapter I look more
closely at how
elections can serve to encourage
institutional adaptations to social
or
economic tensions.

This examination focuses on the
1980 election and subsequent

changes in the use of the 1974
Budget and Impoundment Control Act.

One

advantage of using this case study,
instead of either New Deal period
study, is the greater accessibility
to more recent social discourse
it
presents.

However, there is

has not been

a

a

more important advantage.

Because there

classic realignment since the 1930s,
many political sci-

entists are skeptical about the probability
or even the possibility of
realignment.

If realignment

is

either nearly or completely impossible,

the United States political system will
lose its most important mechan-

ism to facilitate changes in power relationships,
major shifts in public
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policy, and

as

have argued, major
changes 1n institutional
structure
and process.
As William Schneider
notes, .'Something is
clearly chang-g, but it seems to fall short of the
popular notion of realignment
A focus on the 1980
election allows consideration
of this problem; that
how elections can have a
profound influence on
political change even
in the absence of a
classic realignment.

^Realigninq

I

Potential

I

Electinnc;

;^

nH the
'

for Change

Historically, major changes

in

governmental action have been
asso-

ciated with what are called
realigning or critical elections.

The key

indicators of these elections are
major and durable shifts in
voting
patterns and in the interest
group and constituency coalitions
associated with the major political
parties.
While realignments do not always
portend immediate major shifts in
public policy (e.g., 1896), such
shifts usually occur.
In contrast, non-realigning
elections occasionally result in major policy
changes (e.g., 1980,

not.

1964), but most often do

Indeed many non-real igning elections
exhibit shifts in patterns of

political support that can have marginal

policy process.

but observable impacts on the

Nonetheless, those electoral factors leading
to more

cohesive political action by public
officials are normally stronger during realignments.

Understanding why realigning elections increase
the likelihood of
changes in governmental activity provides
insights into why important

policy and institutional changes follow
only
tions.

Realignments present

a

a

few non-realigning elec-

special and in some ways extreme case
of
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the dynamics of .ost
1f not all othe.
national elections.
The .ea,i gn-nt provides an opportunity for
change by sen'ously
eroding prevail,'
patterns of conflict and
unity.
This occurs hoth on
the .aero level o^
voting and coalitional
behavior, and the .icro
level of replacing so.e
Officials and creating political
insecurity for others. The
realignment
also presents an opportunity
for new patterns of
political action.
Again, this occurs both on
the institutional and
individual levels.
New
coalitions are tried out on the
.aero level. On the .icro
level individual officials seek new
bases for obtaining or
protecting their positions.
To borrow Schattschneider'
s concept, realignments
are moments of
displacing and replacing the
structure of political conflict.
With this
process of displacement, new
possibilities for conflict and
cooperation
open up.
Inevitably new issues arise and
usually new policies result.^
Yet for Schattschneider and
all other students of the
realignment

phenomenon, the realigning election
is only one part of
process.

Realignments are

a

a

larger social

result of the failure of incremental
action

to result in the amelioration
of important and persistent
social and/or

economic problems affecting American
society.
turns when

a

Political stability re-

reconstituted political elite achieves

lution of the underlying social or
economic tension.

a

"successful" reso-

Realignments are

thus associated with many of the
grand conflicts of United States history.

For example the realignment of 1800
allowed a resolution to the

tensions over the initial democratization
of United States politics.

Similarly the realignment of the 1930s
permitted
long debate over the need for an activist
state.

a

settlement of the
It is the explicit

PomicUat1o„

Of such tensions that
helps create the
widespread agreement that there needs
to be a .ajor adjustment
in national policy
to
resolve the social/economic
crisis.

Realignments are "needed^'
because the usual operation
cf the political order is weighted
against non-incre.ental
governmental action
indeed, it is this very
difficulty that generates
the impetus for political readjustment in the
form of realignments.
"It can be taken as a
necessary consequence of the
realities cf incremental
bargaining politics in the United States
that they will tend to
produce crises which
will lead to non-incremental
change."* clearly though,
there have been
some important changes in
governmental activity without
realignments.
Not all of these changes can be
related to electoral phenomena,
but many
can.
For instance, the unexpected
victory of Woodrow Wilson and
Democratic congressional majorities in
1912 enabled the passage of new
leg-

islation increasing the federal role
in the regulation of economic
life
(e.g., the Federal Reserve Act.
the Clayton Anti-Trust Act).
Similarly,
the 1964 Johnson landslide
temporarily broke the power of the
Conservative Coalition to effectively block
or emasculate most domestic legislation.

civil

As a result the government adopted
new policies in areas such as

rights, education, and social welfare.

Policy innovation was pos-

sible in both these cases because the preceding
election demonstrated
the weakening, albeit temporary, of the
strength of the pre-existing

patterns of political conflict and unity.
fit this pattern, not

a

The 1980 election seems to

realignment, but an election that provided an

261

altered political elite
with both opportunities
and Incentives to fashion a non-incremental
response to serious
economic problems.
The association, if not
the causal relation,
of elections to policy Change Is well established.
The existence of a
relationship between
elections and changes in the
political process Is much
less clear
Any
particular form of political
structure and process is
likely to allow
some range of potential policies
to be adopted.
Vet it is equally clear
that institutional structure
and pmcess can constrain
the range of
probable policies.
That is, structure and
process can either encourage

or discourage the adoption of
particular kinds of policies as
well
influence the ease or difficulty

as

of adopting public policies
in general.

If one accepts the view that
institutional

structure and process

generally favor dominant Interests
and existing policies and that
realignments usually create new
political majorities seeking large
changes
In substantive policies,

then it is logical to expect
relatively large

institutional changes following certain
elections, particularly realignments.

The Reagan administration came to
office with policy goals

significantly different from those of past
administrations, including
those of recent Republican presidents.

policies as

a

Whether one conceives of these

"new beginning" or as the trojan horse
of a corporate

dominated elite, the forms of institutional
structure and process developed since the realignment of the 1930s
represented

a

potential barrier

to the fulfillment of many of the administration's
policy goals.

The

general wisdom expressed in January 1981 was that
the Reagan administration would be heavily constrained by the same
patterns of political

fragmentation and constituency
politics that constrained
previous adn,1nistrations.

Elections and Social Debates

There is another correspondence
between realigning and at
least
some other elections that
requires explication.
The very dynamics of
the realignment that produce
policy or institutional change
should be
operative in some lesser sense in
other elections as well.
To understand how change results from any
social event is necessarily
complex.
As a result observers seek
to appropriately abstract or
form metaphors
of complex events and processes
to create an intelligible
understanding
of the resulting social change.
In the realignment literature
the basic

metaphor is the electorate's exercise
of its latent sovereignty over
the
political process.
Trilling and Campbell's summary of this
view is
typical:

element-citizen control of government-exists only

I^nn^f

tro? fntn'
'"^
th.! makes
m.J°c^^r^''
that
the system democratic.^
•

in

R^^lig^n^ent translates this con^^^t that control can occur

Of course no political scientist believes
that policy or institutional

change occurs directly and automatically from
the election itself.

important idea presented in the realignment literature

is

that of elite

responsiveness to the message of the new electoral majority.

It is the

political elite that actually initiates and implements
change.^
this political elite, consciously or not,

behalf of an emergent electoral majority.

is

An

Still,

presumed to be acting in

By implication, the lesser

shifts in governmental action that occur without
realignment can be
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the exe.c1se of that
sovereignty would .e
constrained
the structure
Of political conflict
produced after the last
realignment.

Thus discussions of the
relation of elections
to political change
Pn-.arily focus on the actions
of the electorate,
though it is well understood that the meaning
of the actions of the
electorate, even in
critical elections, 1s far
fro. crystal clear.
The metaphor of popular
sovereignty can obscure as much
as it illuminates.
A better understanding would conceptualize
the exercise of popular
sovereignty as only one
element in the process of
political change.
An election, even a realigning election, may or
™y not have a major effect on later policy
and institutional changes.
Thus a more appropriate
understanding starts
fron, the position that
elections can have variable
Impacts upon subsequent change, rather than having
to overcome the potentially
false
assumption of popular sovereignty.
It is more useful

alignment as

a

to view the social

continual form of debate.

^

and political process of reBy debate

I

am not Implying a

structured interaction between conscious
and opposing social actors.
This may be the case in some
circumstances, but should not be
assumed to
always be the case.
Indeed, to the extent that political
life Is neces-

sarily organized around certain conflicts
and constituencies, some social and political debates must
necessarily be carried on indirectly.

Rather, this concept of debate is based
upon Alain Touralne's definition

of the term, the publicly observable
expression of the tensions among
elements of

a

social order.

Such tensions are always present to
some
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that can be dealt with
by gove.n.ental

Institutions.^ within any
electoral alignment political
elites will avoid dealing
as long as possible

wUh

those conflicts that
threaten to seriously
disrupt the prevailing
configuration of political
power.

United States national
elections have

a potentially
meaningful
role ,n social debates
because elections allow
the possibility of a
highly public fo™ Of debate,
both in ter.s of wide
public knowledge and
participation In that debate.
Necessarily, elections are
a highly
structured for. of public debate.
Elections are structured In
ways that
can obscure the meaning of
.ost participants' actions.
Realignments can
be thought of as representing
debates that are less obscure.
If the

literature is correct, critical
elections occur under conditions
of
widely understood context of
social or economic crisis.
The social
economic crisis Is said to
produce

a

debate, and finally politicization.

a

or

time of political examination,
It is

this gradual political

reedu-

cation and polarization that
makes it Intelligible to say
that citizens
are making or ratifying choices
in a rational manner during
the realignment period.
To a lesser extent this
process can go on at an indivi-

dual, group, or regional basis in
other elections.
The metaphor of debate, besides
not overemphasizing the role
of

popular sovereignty. Increases one's
ability to think about the Impact
of elections on subsequent political
change.

the case of institutional change.

elections and policy innovations

This is especially true In

Granted the relationship between
is

difficult enough to trace.

However,
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there 1s in fact widespread
open debate before
realignments and some
other elections, one can
reasonably Infer a relationship
between election results, through elite
mediation, and later
governmental decisions.
As a case in point, many
of the general policy
directions of Franklin
Roosevelt's first administration
could be predicted given
the preceding
half century of debate over
the need and desirability
of a positive
state.
Roosevelt was clearly perceived
as a supporter of an
activist
federal government, especially
in the context of the
Great Depression.^
Obviously, it would be more
difficult to infer public support
for specific programs, e.g., the NIRA
or the Social Security Act.
Most difficult
is the attempt to infer
voter demands for institutional
change per se.
Perhaps if one knew the public
wanted the NIRA or Social Security,
one
could then say that this implied
support for those institutional
changes
necessary to implement the programs.
However this leap of logic can be

enormous.

How then can one say that voters who
understood that they

were mandating

a

more activist government "wanted"
institutions, such as

the Executive Office of the President,
to be established to provide

a

coordinating center for that activism?

Debates and Institutional Change
Given

a

set of changes in institutional

structures and processes

following an electoral event, how does one
separate those changes re-

sulting from the election from those unrelated
to it?

It is

here that

conceptualizing realigning and other elections as elements
in an ongoing
social debate will prove most fruitful.

Realignments happen in the con-

text of a widely recognized social or economic
crisis.

Yet it is known
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ta.es Place.

This Is understandable
in that political
elites and .any
political constituencies
have a sta.e 1n
preserving existing patterns
of
power, conflict, and
policy.
Ideas about how politics
work, what are
legn«te issues, etc.. are by this
t1.e widely shared and
understood
These Ideas 1„ turn reinforce
the .ore externa,
soda, and Institutional
relationships of the era.
Thus .ost political
actors (and perhaps nonactors) work fro. the
assumption that the political
future „11, be .uch
like the present.
It Is hardly surprising
then that .any observers
expected the Reagan Administration
would find it difficult
to implement
its budgetary priorities.
Yet the realignment literature
points out that there is
another

necessary condition underlying

a

critical

election.

There needs to be

a

period of intense politicizatlon
before realignment is completed.
Given
that the political language
along with the institutiona, and
electoral
processes of any electoral era
makes it more difficult to define
new
issues, constituencies, and so
forth; in the period before
realignment,
during realignment Itself, and
often after it, emerging political
actors
and elites must struggle with
the development of a new form
of political
language.

Without a different way of talking
about political and social

life, it will be Impossible to
conceive of new responses to the social

or economic crisis or to mobilize
the political support needed to
put

those responses into effect.!"
a

This element of politicizatlon can
take

long time (e.g., preceding the 1896
realignment) or can appear to be

very rapid (e.g., the 1930s).

Even in the case of rapid politicizatlon.
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the process of retooling
political language takes

a

long ti.e

The dis-

course of the New Deal had
roots going back to the
start of the 20th
century.
The creation of new
political

endeavor.

language is not

a

straightforward

The new language must be
flexible enough to encompass
new

issues, constituencies, and
policy responses without being
unintelligible or too radical to those
citizens it is directed at.
Any new terminology Of political debate is
constrained by the near universal
acceptance of the liberal individualist
world view in American society
and at
least initially by the specific
form of those ideas emphasized
in the
current form of discourse.
It is also constrained by
the operation of
political institutions that are
structured by existing patterns of

political conflict.

Further, as the potential realignment
approaches,

the language must be adopted and
developed by professional

politicians,

most of whom are initially committed
to the old electoral system.

As

social or economic crises develop
and become the central concern
within
the political system, increasing
numbers of politicians begin to develop
an interest in the new issues,
constituencies, and politics encapsulated
by the new political terminology.

At the very least this happens be-

cause the political environment becomes
increasingly unpredictable,

indeed threatening.

However this adjustment is

a

difficult one given

political actors' fears of losing existing
support.

Similarly

new

political actors find, because of this instability,
an opportunity to

mobilize political support in ways that were impossible
before.
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This modified political
language has

a number of
functions.
However, the two nost important
are to provide an
understanding of the dynamics Of the social or
economic crisis and to
suggest how policy makers
Should attempt to deal with
the crisis.
Given this, one can ask
whether
a government action
taken after an election is
more intelligible within
the new terms of political
debate than the old.
If this criterion can
be met, then one can
reasonably infer that the
governmental action is a
response in the ongoing
socio-political debate represented
by the re-

alignment.

That is, one can infer what

call

an organic relationship
between the occurrence of the
election and the subsequent
governmental
action.
It is not necessary to prove
that the election was a causal
I

event, i.e., that the electorate
exercised the power of popular
sovereignty.
In any case this would usually
prove to be a vain undertaking.
Rather, the inference must be
supported by two kinds of additional
evidence beyond the intelligibility of
the change within new political

understandings.

First, one must show that the
election resulted in the

selection of officials and/or the
mobilization of constituencies sympathetic to the new policies or institutional
arrangements.

must show that such actions are

a

Second, one

tangible response to some aspect of

the underlying crisis.

Both substantive policies and institutional
change can be de-

scribed as having an organic relation to
realignments.
the New Deal period

a

For instance, in

measure like the NIRA could be understood

as

hav-

ing an organic connection to electoral
events because the policy was

intelligible within

a

framework that held unregulated industrial
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competition as both

nclc

.ecovery.

a

cause of the Depression
repression .nH
and as

i„ the sa.e vein
one can

a

barrier to eco-

taU

about an Institutional
development such as the
establishment of the
Executive Office of the

P-s,dent having an organic
relationship to the
1930s realignment.

That

is. the realignment
set Into motion the
forces that would produce
a

larger and .ore activist
state, and with 1t the
need to promote greater
governmental coordination.
It Is useful to look
at the Reagan administration's departures In policy
and practice 1n a
similar light.
Even If
the ,980 election did not
constitute a realignment
1n any sense, one can
still ask whether there
was an organic relationship
between the election
and the administration's
actions, especially in the
area of budgetary
pol icies

Stagflat ion and the New Political
Debate
Most analyses of the 1980 election
focus on the defeat of Jimmy
Carter rather than the victory
of Ronald Reagan.
Dissatisfaction with
the Carter administration stemmed
from the widespread perception
that it
was incapable of effectively
dealing with the nation's problems.
There
seemed to be two points of concern.
The first was the state of the
United States economy.

High inflation and interest rates
generally help

the electoral chances of Republican
candidates.

Perhaps most important

was the fact that for once the rise
in the inflation rate occurred
at
the same time as

a

general and substantial decline in real

eighteen months prior to the election.

income in the

Although real disposable per

capita income was higher
in iNovemoer
November iQfin
1980 ^-h
than in November
•

per

m

capna inco.e dropped fro.
$4,536

1

976, in the

to $4,447 (i„ 1972
dollars)

Dur
the sa.e pen'od the
unemployment rate Increased
3, percent (fro. 5
percent to 7.6 percent)
and there was over
a 1.5 percent
decline 1n the

individuals Who perceived

a

decline In their economic
position

were only halt as lUely
to vote for President
Carter as those persons
Who felt their economic

situation had Improved In
1979-80 (25 percent
versus 53 percent).
This pattern was also
evident a^ong those components of the electorate who
traditionally support
Democratic presidential cand1dates.l2 A
second area of concern was
the perception of the
diminished power and respect
of the United States in
the world.
This
concern was focused by the
Iranian hostage situation,
especially by the
series of administration
failures during the election
year to rescue or
negotiate the release of the
Americans being held prisoner. ^3
while
both these concerns were
in a certain sense temporary
and there is no
evidence that the electorate
perceived a connection between
the economic
and national security issues,
both of these concerns are
facets of a
deeper long term socioeconomic
crisis.

The last realignment, that of
the 1930s, was signaled by
the massive shift of votes to Franklin
Roosevelt among almost all groups in
the
electorate, what is called an electoral
surge.

parent in the 1980 results.

A similar dynamic is ap-

Most voting shifts in 1980 were
quite large

and were almost all in the same
direction.

Even when the shift was

small, as in the widely publicized
case of the female vote, Reagan
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the Ideological breakdown
of the vote for .ajor
party candidates was
virtually the sa.e as in
1976. implying
,,,,,
^^^^^^^^^^
structure of political
ccnflictJ= Vet this „.y be
misleading, for an
electoral surge, as in
1932, .ay provide an opportunity
for .ore permanent electoral and coalitional
change.
Indicative of this possibility

were the results of

a

NewJTor^JijHes exit poll.

While only

11 percent
Of those Who said they
voted for Reagan said they
did so because Reagan

was

conservative, about 40 percent
of the Reagan voters stressed
the
need for significant changes
in the direction of
government action as
the main reason for their
votesj^
a

A parallel theme is found in
the results of the 1980
congressional
elections.
The Republican gains in the
Senate, which resulted in that
party's control of the body for
the first time in a generation,
are well
enough known to require no further
comment.
There were also significant

changes in the partisan composition
of the House of Representatives.
The loss of 28 Democratic seats
reduced that party's net majority
from
117 to 51

seats, making it easier to reenergize
the traditional coali-

tion between conservative Democrats
and Republicans.
the most prominent losers were
liberals.

As

in the Senate,

Some of these defeated incum-

bents held leadership positions; for
example, Brademus (D-Ind.), the

majority whip, and Ullman (D-Ore.), the
chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee.

Indeed, in the context of the House of
Representatives, 1980

proved to be the worst election for incumbents
in two decades, excepting
the post Watergate election of 1974.

""^

At least temporarily. House

members seemed to be
facing
y

s-ilar,

if less

in impact,

a

reduction
reauction in tho
.
the incumbency
advantage,

to that affecting
senators since the late

1960s.

The first inference to
be „ade in the
context of a strong victory by the presidential
candidate of the minority
party is that there
has been a coattail
effect.
Objectively, there is no
clear evidence
that the Reagan vote per se
was the decisive factor
in Republican congressional gains.l« Nonetheless,
the perception of
coattails. or indeed
of generalized public support,
is a significant
resource for presidents
in building legislative
coalitions.
It isn't surprising that
President Reagan and the
Republican con-

gressional delegation claimed
an electoral mandate.

What was unusual

about the 97th Congress was that
many Democratic members
conceded that
the mandate the Republicans
claimed
was a real one.

By early March

1981, the Democratic leaders in the
House announced that they would
act
on the Reagan budget and tax
proposals before the end of July.
It was

reported that the House leadership
feared that the Republicans would

effectively charge that the Democrats were
blunting the will of the
voters if the House did not pass
measures that reduced spending and
taxes.

House Budget Committee chairman Jim Jones
made the same point

more explicitly earlier in the session,
"If we are perceived as going
back to fiscal chaos, there isn't

a

Democrat or Republican who would be

safe in the next election. "^^
In
a

1982 it was well nigh impossible to find Democrats
referring to

presidential mandate because it was an election year.

attempts of House Democrats to reach

a

However the

budget compromise with the
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ad.inist.ation(i.e.,the episode of
the >.an, of ^r,
Democrats still felt strong
pressure to pass
program.

a

„ts

that the

unified tax and budget

As late as June of that
year, majority leader
Wright told

House Democrats that he preferred
the passage of even
the Reagan backed
Latta budget to that reported
by the House Budget
Committee if that
turned out to be the only way
the House could pass
a first Budget Resolution in reasonable time.^^
Representative Hefner (D-N.C.)
summarized
this acceptance of an implicit
mandate to produce a unified
budget

package when he noted that
for Jones

ni

"I

am going to hold my nose

hold my nose

simply because we have to have

a

a

a

little and vote

lot if it fails and vote
for Latta,

budget."22

p.^^^p^

^^^^

of Democratic acceptance of Reagan's
budget priorities

is

.^^.^^^^^

the fact that

both budget resolutions reported
out of the House Budget Committee
in
the 97th Congress, and even most of
the alternatives presented by
other

Democratic members, subscribed to the
basic Reagan position in terms
of
both expenditure control and resource
shifts toward defense spending.
In fact the Democratic congressional

delegation had already moved

somewhat in this direction during the 96th
Congress when the party had
substantial majorities in both the House and
Senate.

The 1980 session

witnessed the first real use of the reconciliation
procedure authorized
in the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control

Act.

The Democratic leader-

ship both on the Hill and at the White House,
apparently worried about
the electoral

impact of Republican charges of promoting inflation

through deficit spending, decided to try the reconciliation
procedure.

Although action on the reconciliation measure was not
completed until
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after the election.
Congress achieved 8.3
of the ,0.6 billion
dollars In
savings "directed" 1n
the Budget Resolution
passed the previous dune ^3
Th.s suggests that the
forces supporting the
Reagan administration's
1981-82 Initiatives were already
Influential before the 1980
election
The use of reconciliation
also suggests that
significant changes In the
practice of the budget process
were underway when Reagan
entered office
Nevertheless, the political
uncertainty that encouraged
the use of reconciliation in 1980 grew
geometrically with the November
election.
Further, a new leadership emerged
In both the executive
branch and the

Senate with

somewhat different understanding
of how the political process should and could work.
a

In a

certain sense the 1980 Republican
victory was not surprising.
Poor economic performance
during the administration
of a majority party
president is by itself sufficient
reason to expect a deviating
election
to occur.
Yet the degree of change
following the 1980 election has
been
far greater than that normally
expected when an incumbent is
removed for
apparent ineffectiveness.
While it is true that Ronald
Reagan is prob-

ably the most explicitly ideological
president in this century and that
many of the newly elected senators
are
of the same mold, these facts

would have been of small account except
that the economic difficulties
of the late 1970s were generally
perceived somewhat differently than
the

earlier recessions and inflationary
periods of the post 1945 period.
Not only were past unemployment and
inflation statistics less

severe than more recent ones, such conditions
were once viewed as temporary aberrations in an otherwise
prosperous and growing economy.
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increasing,,, economic
difficulties in the United
States are viewed as
deep and persistent,
a direct consequence
of .ost individuals'
and
institutions' experience since
the late ,960s.
So.e of these difficulties appear in retrospect
to have been inevitable,
a result of the
relative decline of American
political and economic
power ste™„ng fro. the
gradual post-war recovery
of other industrial
economies. Vet this decline should only have been
relative; it should not
have resulted in the
long ter. stagnation of the
United States economy.
Another disturbing
factor has been the attendant
social and cultural malaise
that many
Americans, though disagreeing
on its nature and causes,
seem to perceive.
Finally, it is increasingly
clear that there are some
™jor
problems facing the entire world
industrial economy, irrespective
of any
nation's political or economic
system.
It appears that the
great age of
rapid economic growth that followed
the Second World War has
finally
come to an end. Thus, the United
States faces precisely the type
of
deep and prolonged difficulties
that can disrupt old structures
of political power.

Though there is still little agreement
on the root causes of the
United States, let alone the world,
socioeconomic crisis, there

beginning of

a

is

the

consensus on the relationship between
the government and

the economic system in the United
States and its effect in causing or

exacerbating economic stagnation.

It is not that most observers share

the same analysis of these relationships,
but that something of

a

common

language is developing among experts of different
intellectual and political perspectives.

The heart of this
approach 1s that an
understanding of current
economic conditions cannot
proceed s1.p„
abstractions of econdc

behavior derived fro. the
assumptions of
of marginal choice rationality
onanty.

a

competitive hu.an nature and

in^ta^A
^
Instead, „one must^ begin
with an under-

standing of group. Institutional,
and/or class behavior.^*
A number of
economists closely associated
with the Reagan
administration or the corporate establishment, such
as the Friedmans and
Alan Greenspan, focus on
the economic consequences
that follow the long term
efforts of organized
groups to obtain government
power and resources in
contravention to the
"true public interest" in
a free market.
In their view what Is
needed
retrenchment of state power and
programs that directly or Indirectly Impede the ability of
private firms to operate or
Invest profitably." A similar analysis, though
one more supportive of state
action in
support of non-business groups,
has been developed by a number
of social
1-s

a

scientists, for example McConnell,
Lowi

and Thurow.^^

F,„,i,y^ , 3^^^.
lar language has been adopted,
though from a perspective more
critical
of capitalism, by figures such
as O'Connor, Lindblom, and
Gough." I
,

will use this third approach
because It best captures the state's
role
In providing the necessary
Infrastructure for economic activity.

case, all three approaches present

a

In any

common frame of reference that has

become Increasingly familiar to political
actors over the past decade.
This framework will be used to delineate
the organic relationship of

recent changes In the United States budget
process to the political

tension growing out of economic stagnation.
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''^""^^
Lindblo. in

I^^-filcaLCris^^

Politics.^n^^

Charles

E

.nt.oduce concepts that
facilitate

understanding the actions of the
Reagan administration in
altering the
practice of the budget process.
In brief, both authors
see government
and private business locked
into a permanent relationship
requiring cooperation but full of potential
for significant if limited
conflict.

Governments in capitalist societies
are basically tax states.
They cannot directly generate most of
the resources they need
to operate without
changing their basic character.
They must get resources by
taxing directly or indirectly the operations
of the private sector.
More bluntly, the state is heavily
dependent on the largely independent
decisions
of business to produce and invest.
Given that economic units can in some
degree choose whether, what,
and how much to produce, these units
will attempt to induce governments
to undertake policies that will
maintain or increase their profitability

and/or that of the private sector
generally.
prises must receive

a

Indeed, private enter-

minimal level of state support to operate
(e.g.,

the establishment and protection of
property rights, enforcement of con-

tracts, etc.).
support.

Of course many firms may need or want
higher levels of

Capital, individually and collectively, has
significant capa-

cities to encourage favorable government action,
including the crucial

power to withhold investment and production.

This potential

power

is

rarely used, but is so great, that under almost all
circumstances gov-

ernments need to reach some accommodation with capital.

This is the
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essence of one .ajor
function of the activities
performed
capitalist
governments. O'Connor calls
this function
"accumulation.
Social control is intrinsic
to the idea of
government. While under many circumstances
people engage in self-control,
there is always
some probability that some
persons will oppose the will
of the governnent or of other important
institutions.
The inevitable inequalities
produced in capitalist societies
create a permanent reason
to expect
occasional lapses in social order.
Serious breakdowns in social
order,
besides threatening the
government's capacity to enforce
its policies,
also threatens the stability
needed by most businesses to
operate profitably.
The control and prevention
of these lapses, whether through
incentives, penalties, or manipulation,
constitutes what O'Connor calls
the second basic function of
capitalist government, that is
"legitimation."^"
O'Connor, and by Implication Lindblom,
make three critical points

about the relationship between the
functions of accumulation and legitimation.
society.

First, both must be performed to
some degree in any capitalist

Without social order accumulation

is

difficult.

Similarly,

failure to promote profitability results
in economic problems which are

often reflected in social disorder.

In liberal

democratic systems, like

the United States, the pressure to perform
the legitimation function is

usually greater because other interests besides
capital are legitimate
competitors in political life, if often at
disadvantageous terms.
Second, the performance of the two functions
can be mutually contradictory.

To do more in the area of accumulation means,
at least in the
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shon

run, having fewer
resources to perfor. the
legitimation function
(and Vice versa).
Further, the determination
of an acceptable balance

is not a Simply technical

political effects and

is

problem.

Any possible balance
has social and

therefore subject to being
contested.

Finally
the evolution of capitalism
into its corporate and
increasingly international form has had the dual
effect of increasing the
minimum levels at
which the functions of
accumulation and legitimation
must be performed
and thereby, because of limited
resources, decreasing the
probability
that an economically and
politically acceptable equilibrium
can be
found. 3^
It is this heightened level
of need and contradiction
which is
the heart of what O'Connor calls
the fiscal crisis.

The Limits on Debate
This crisis is exacerbated in the
case of the United States by

certain long and medium term institutional,
ideological, and structural
features of the society.
cal and social

Long term features refer to aspects
of politi-

life that have been present through
most of the history

of American society.

These features should not be thought of
as con-

stants, but as persistent themes that are
manifested in different forms
of practice, structure, and belief over time.

those specific to

a

Medium term features are

particular pol itical /economic era.

The three most salient long term features of the
American polity

are (1) the extreme fragmentation of formal governmental
authority,
(2)

the hegemony of

1 i

beral -individual ist beliefs, and (3)

ous existence of a capitalist economic and social

system.

the continu-

Without ask-

ing which, if any, of these features is most
important to the origin of
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the others, it should
be clear that
historicallv
Historically p
each. .has been reinforc-0 0. the othe.s. The fi.st the.e,
...mentation o. .o™al
authoHt.

----^

a

d,>ectl. institutional
fashion.

The

l.pUca-

tions Of concepts such
as "separation of
powers," ..checks and
haUnces
and "federalist" are
widely understood,
si.ply, institutional
powerholders can rarely act
(legitimately) without
securing cooperation
fro.
others,
conversely, .ost Institutional
powerholders are In a strong
position to block or delay
policymaking and implementation.
This ex
treme fragmentation was
created to respond to a
particular set of
political concerns. Briefly,
the aim of the "framers"
was to create a
stronger central government
without seriously endangering
their liberty
and property.
Part of their solution
to this problem was
to tolerate
widespread rights of political
participation but to ™ke it
difficult
for majorities to mobilize
and to translate their
preferences into government action. The expression
of this solution was the
institutionalization of the principle of
extreme fragmentation of
formal authority.
However, from the point of
view of reformers and
Increasingly of
dominant Interests. It is necessary
to find ways to overcome
this frag'

mentation to gain effective control
of governmental activity.

In parti-

cular, as capitalist societies
have become more complex and
interdependent, and as a result less selfregulating, the need for positive

government action has 1ncreased.32

So too has the need to bridge
legal

fragmentation, whether by public majorities
or private minorities.

Many observers have commented on
the limited range of political
ideas in the United States in
comparison to other liberal democracies.

'
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virtually all powe.holders
1„ the United States,
whatever they call
the.selves-l1berals, moderates
or conservatives-subscribe
to the
general political perspective
called liberalise.
Even .ost Insurgent
™ve.ents have largely phrased
their aspirations and
demands within the
framework of liberal Ideology
In this broader sense.
This phenomenon 1s
not of recent origin.
It dates back to the
earliest days of the society.

Whatever the reasons for this
historical persistence of
liberal

beliefs,"

key to liberalism's current
dominance Is Its nearly com-

plete translation Into social
practice, not merely the lack
of competing
Ideological traditions.34
i„
.^^^^^
^.^^^^^.^^
on American political life is
that framework's limitation
on definitions
of the realm of the political
and on the forms of
appropriate political
activity and governmental response.
For example, the difficulty
of
defending any substantive notion
of public interest within the
terms of
liberalism has encouraged the definition
of Issues and policy responses
in terms of individual

and narrow group Interests.

Because political

institutions are organized in ways
compatible with liberalism, such
political definitions and responses make
good sense within the limits of
the system.

In

turn, the winners in this political
quasi-market now

have Incentives to maintain and expand
political Institutions and processes, formal and informal, that overcome
fragmentation in ways favor-

able to the goals of relatively narrow and
privatized interests.
The final theme Is that of capitalism itself.

Certainly the ag-

rarian and commercial capitalism of the nation's
first century Is not

directly comparable to the concentrated industrial
and financial

capitalism of the 20th cenrury.
centurv

^tiii
still,
certain important similarities
4.

•

•

remain; the protection of
property, the bundle of
use rights attached to
property, the profit motive,
the generation of
inequality out of the
social relations of
production, etc.35 ,13,,
,3^-,^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
acting as an organized class,
has had two very
important points of contact with political life.
It has controlled a high
proportion of
available social resources that
can be used to gain and
maintain political power.
Capital also makes crucial
social decisons (e.g.,
investment, technological development,
income distribution, etc.) in
a relatively autonomous fashion.
As capital has become
increasingly centralized, especially in finance
and critical areas of
production, its power
has increased.
Due to the increasing complexity
and interdependence of
United States society, this
increased ability to mobilize power
occurs
in

a

context of an ever larger need by
advanced capital for higher

levels of governmental

support.

As a result there are ever
greater

incentives to convert plentiful resources
into effective power.
However, capital exists as individual
firms or as economic sectors
as well as a "class."

Firms certainly have an interest in
the protec-

tion and profitability of capital as

a

whole; but they also have

immediate interest in their own profitability.

Particularly, in

a

very

a

culture that stresses the legitimacy of self
interested behavior, firms
find it more prudent, under most conditions,
to pay more attention to

their own or their industry's needs than those
of their class.

A

highly fragmented political system provides
an additional incentive for
this kind of behavior.

Yet, if such interest group activity in
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aggregate is widely perceived
to endanger the
profitability of capital
general, then incentives
for "class action"
would be greater, despite
the barriers raised by
extensive governmental
frag.entation.38
While these three themes
of fragmentation,
liberalism, and capitalist have been continuously
present, their manifestations
change over
ti.e.
One can specify historical
periods in which the
operation of the
political process has been
noticeably different than in
the preceding
and succeeding periods.
These periods are of course
the spans of time

-

roughly corresponding to
periods of party alignment.

If the Reagan

administration, as Burnham claims,
is attempting to
implement the scale
of policy and institutional
change usually associated
with realignments.
it is then useful to focus
on the nature and perceived
shortcomings of the forms of governance
the administration is seeking
to
replace.
The last realigning period,
that is universally recognized
as
such, was that of the New Deal.
Like all such periods, the New
Deal

brought changes in how powerholders
sought to overcome institutional
fragmentation, as well as changes in
electoral coalitions, issue agendas, and policy responses.
It is not only important to note
that the

New Deal resulted in an increased
role for government in economic
and
social life, or that it did it in

a

way compatible with the interests

of large scale capital; but that the
New Deal gradually produced
distinctive form of institutional action.

a
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1930s

Realianitifi nt

and 1970s Gnvprn an^

Perhaps the .ost distinctive
and Important

action that evolved during
this period

Is

fo™

of Institutional

that of tripartite bargain-

ing.

This phenomenon Is well
known but does not always
receive the
attention It deserves as an
Important and cordon form
of political
practice In the United States.
There are other names for
this sort of
relationship; e.g., subgovernments,
c1 lenteleism, and Iron
or cozy triangles.
It is this last na^e which
provides the simplest but
essential
institutional description of
tripartite bargaining.
In brief, the

triangle"

is a largely self contained
political unit involving relevant

members of the executive and
legislative branches and representatives
of
organized Interests. These triangular
coalitions seek to ™ke government policy In a narrow subject
area of mutual Interest to the
members.
As might be expected, the unit's
basic aim is to make policy which
favors the interests of Its members.

The triangular coalition holds

together because members are better
able to provide each other with
desired policy and political support
than outsiders.

These triangles

are normally well Insulated from
external Interests and pressures.

While part of the triangle's autonomy
comes from the lack of resources
or Immediate Interest of potential
competitors, part comes from the
conrnon frame of reference that
gradually develops among triangle parti-

cipants.

Alternative views of the nature of problems
or the range of

appropriate policy in

a

given subject area have

ing legitimate in the eyes of triangle
members.

a

difficult time becom-
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My concern here is
not with individual

patterns of tripartite bargaining, but With an overall
system of many such units;
that is, with a

government where policy making

is

to a

large extent segmented and
dis-

tributed to largely autonomous
quasi -private units.

Clearly, this form
of policy making increases
the total fragmentation
of the policy making
process.
However, for their members,
patterns of tripartite bargaining
serve as a way to reduce the
effects of fragmentation in
the very area
of most concern to participants
by privatizing both
conflict and decision making to themselves.
Notice that these arrangements
overcome both
the formal separation between
the executive and the
legislative branches
of government and the public and
private spheres.
To understand the

persistence of this form of political
organization, one must look into
the basic relationship among the
different units of tripartite bargaining,

a

relationship which is more often cooperative
than conflict laden.

The best place to examine this relationship

is

in Congress, especially

in the appropriations process.
It is well

known that the most important source of
direction and

power in Congress has been its system of standing
committees.

Other

sources of power such as party leadership or
the President have been for
the most part less important.

Much of the weakness of other power cen-

ters can be traced back to the fragmentation of
power discussed earlier.

However, congressional committees are themselves

a

tion as they are largely independent of each other.

source of fragmentaAt least until

1981, it seemed that any form of coordination must begin with
the recog-

nition of

a

high degree of committee and sometimes subcommittee
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autono.,.

Given that no co..1ttee
contains

than

a

s^al,

of the total membership,
how can Congress act?

faction

The major operative
principle of cooperation
between individuals
and/or committees is
logrolling. Quite simply
logrolling is an agreement, open or tacit, to
cooperate with a particular
member or committee
in return for later
cooperation on some matter
of importance to the
second party. As most (though
clearly not all) issues
are of only secondary importance to most members,
this process allows a
substantial
amount of business to take
place.
For the most part the
average member,
particularly in the House, is
irrelevant to what gets serious
consideration in Congress.
Committees and their key members
are by far the more
important actors. Thus committees
and their members can often
secure
passage of what they want by aiding
other cor^ittees and their
members
in obtaining their goals.
Put more broadly, a triangular
alliance
rooted in one committee can often
get what It wants at the price
of

conceding to other alliances control
of other areas of government
policy
making.
Therefore, logrolling
usual sort.

is

a

form of bargaining, but of

a

most un-

It is not bargaining over the
substance of an issue.

It is

an agreement not to interfere in
each bargainer's respective "business."

To the extent that the constituencies
engaged in triangular alliances

are necessarily those with significant
resources and power, this system

of mutual accommodation serves to maintain
the existing distribution of
power, resources, benefits, and burdens.
capital

is well

In

represented in this system.

practice this means that
Groups unable to form
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triangles fo. eithe.
materia, o. ideCogica,
reasons have found that
even when congressional
co^Utees have been sympathetic
to their
concerns that those co^ittees
were generally unable
to engage in
effective 1 ogrol 1 i ng.^^

While patterns of ™tual
non-interference occur
rization and appropriation
processes in Congress, the

in both the autho-

appropriation process is the more appropriate
place to demonstrate the
implications of
the material presented
about the relation between
the state and large
scale capital. After all,
government policies, whether
directed at Promoting accumulation or
legitimation, require the spending
of money
Clearly appropriation by logrolling
can get to be a very expensive
proposition to the extent decisions
are made by the principle
of mutual noninterference. Most triangular
alliances will get most of what
they want
most of the time. This system
may be fiscally tolerable
for participants and even many non-participants
under some conditions.
Indeed, if
there are slack resources new
participants can easily be added to
the
system.

In

situations where resources are equal
to or exceed organized

demands there will be no fiscal crisis
per se.

The system also works

better when issues are largely independent
of each other and can be
dealt with through small adjustments
in the status quo.

Although such

conditions have never really existed,
something approaching them was

widely perceived to exist in the United
States for much of the post
World War

II

period.

However, since about 1970 the United States
has faced increasingly

severe and intractable economic difficulties.

In addition,

since the

1960S the nunber of claimants
for government
expenditures has increased
especially in the area of
legi ti.ation.^3
^^^^^^^
ic, energy, and
environmental problems associated
with advanced industrialization have demonstrated
the futility of ameliorating
such intertwined concerns through
incremental action.
In O'Connor's terms,
there
has been a massive and in
large part necessary increase
in demands for
both accumulation and
legitimation at exactly the time
the political

system's ability to respond has
been severely reduced.

This crisis

provides an impetus for the gradual
reversal of the political dynamic
which supports segmented policy
making.
To be more specific, the
fiscal
and economic crisis has provided
an impetus toward greater
coordination
of policy and expenditure at the
expense of the autonomy of units of

tripartite bargaining.
In

the preceding material

I

have discussed some of the reasons

that the patterns of governance
developed in the post 1932 period have

proved incapable of dealing with current
economic problems, especially
the gap between public resources and
effective public demands.

Under

these conditions it is not surprising that
decision makers have begun to
look for new institutional

patterns and procedures which speak to cur-

rent problems and yet are reasonably compatible
with the existing social
and political structure and culture of the
United States.

Still, these

new forms of institutional action must be able
to neutralize the impact
of subgovernmental politics to have any capacity
to promote

a

more

economically and politically acceptable resolution to the
tension between the accumulation and legitimation functions of
the state.

While
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th,s and the preceding
chapter focus on Reagan's
efforts in this direction. I believe that
serious attempts at
adjustment began in the first
Nixon administration.
Before discussing the
aborted developments that
took Place in the decade
before Reagan ca.e to
office. I want to briefly
discuss why members of
economic and political
elites in the Great Depression and in subsequent
years found government by
tripartite bargaining so attractive, that
is beyond the prospect
for material gain.
Given that the development
of capitalism in this century
required
greater levels of government
support, it became important
to develop
institutional forms that would
respond to this need without
seriously

disrupting existing patterns of
economic power.

While it

is possible

that there were other basic
solutions than those embodied in
the New
Deal, tripartite bargaining
satisfied two essential conditions
reasonably well.
Not only was tripartite bargaining
compatible with corporate
capitalism, but it gave organized
sectors of capital a particularly
fe-

licitous way to translate their
resources directly into political
power.
Secondly, governance through
tripartite bargaining was ideologically

defensible in that it was decentralized
and allowed the most directly
involved interests to participate in.
and often control, policy making.
Thus, it provided
ism.

44

a

way to defend against charges of statism
and social-

Needless to say. any foreseeable solution
to United States

economic/political difficulties must be seen as
compatible with American

traditions of decentralization, liberalism,
and capitalism.

Reagan and

most members of his administration are particularly
bound to these
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traditions and to political
support from business,
particularly the
corporate sector.

The Opportunity for Changp
As the costs, electoral,
economic, and otherwise, of
the post New

Deal

pattern of governance grow, so
too do the incentives for a
greater
degree of coordination and explicit
priority setting.
On the micro
level this may be seen as arising
from the more or less rational
calculations of political actors and
interests.
To the extent such actors
come to judge that the injuries they
individually suffer from the de-

terioration of the general social and
economic environment outweigh the
specific benefits they obtain from
government action, they will be

increasingly willing to consider trading
those specific benefits for

more coherent public policies.

In

short this would mean less support

for the subgovernmental politics so typical
of the post 1932 political
era.

While many Americans have always been dubious
about the value of

government expenditures serving constituencies
to which they do not
belong, until recently these attitudes could
only occasionally be mobilized into political action, and only then
against the interests of the

weak or unorganized.

At present there seems to be

a

widespread percep-

tion of an "overload" of the political process and
upon public re-

sources, thus of

a

greater need to explicitly choose among priorities.

Of course there is only limited agreement on which
government purposes

should have priority.

Thus, while there may be increasing structural

pressures for some degree of governmental retrenchment, the form
of this

291

retrenchment depends greatly
upon the nature of the
interests, if any,
that hold effective political
power.

At present any political
coalition must act within an
institutional

environment that will remain legally
fragmented.

It is also reasonable to expect the ideological
environment will remain essentially
liberal.
Therefore, in the short run, the
possible institutional bases for
greater programmatic and budgetary
coordination and control are quite
limited.
Indeed there are only two likely
candidates.
The first of

these is the use of political parties
to achieve cooperative activity

among formally independent officials.

The second means is the one that

has traditionally been the most
centralizing element of the government

structure and the electoral system, the
Presidency.
Most observers see American political
parties as poor candidates
for effecting greater governmental control
and coordination.

parties seem to be

a

At best

form of holding action, i.e., they keep the
system

from fragmenting more.

It is well

parties have developed in
in which they operate.

a

known that United States political

way that reflects the fragmented environment

Factors such as the institutional arrangement
of

elections, state regulation of political parties,
and the formal frag-

mentation of governmental authority itself severely
mitigate the possibility of "responsible" parties along European lines.

Through most of

the twentieth century the trend has been in the
opposite direction,

toward greater disaggregation, as other social institutions
increasingly

share in the functions once largely performed by parties
alone.

Despite

certain centralizing moves in recent years by the Republican party

in

the areas of campaign
advertising and fund raising,
political parties by
themselves can do little to
promote cohesive action
,y their .e.bers
In particular, this is
true of congressional
parties where both institutional organization and
.e.bers' normative ideas
work strongly against
.ost for.s of party discipline.
To the extent that
parties can be

effective agencies of policy
coordination, it will be in
large part
because of presidential action
to promote that
effectiveness.
The Presidency, the second
obvious source of coordinative
potential . is the one more likely
to be the Institutional
heart of such
efforts.
Several observers have noted
the increasing responsibility

placed on the executive by both
economic elites and the general
public
for developing and coordinating
aggregate economic policy.^
This

his-

torical

tendency has again been demonstrated
by events in the first two

years of the Reagan administration.

In any case, the evolution
of the

office, at least since the 1890s, has
been in this direction.

Of

course the Presidency refers to an
Institutional apparatus as well as to
the individual who formally holds
the office.
Occupants of the office

acquire

a

number of resources that can aid in any
coordinative efforts.

The President is the only significant
official elected on
basis, the nominal leader of

a

vast national bureaucracy, etc.

source
is

a

a

national

political party, the nominal head of a

Nonetheless, the chief immediate re-

President has to attempt coordination of policy
and expenditure

his actual control of that part of the
bureaucracy most Involved in

preparing the federal budget proposal, that is, the
Executive Office of
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the President, especially
the White House staff
and the Office of Management and Budget.

While the budget passed by
Congress

is

certainly not
the one submitted by the
President and 0MB. the
reality is
does not have the political
cohesion to do .ore than
amend
dential proposal. ^6
.^^^^^^^^
^^^^^.^^^

identical to

that Congress
the presi-

.^^^ ^^.^^
tripartite bargaining were usually
able to skew the budget in
their
favor. When congressional
cormittees, executive branch
agencies, and
interest groups acted in concert
they usually held the
upper hand. The
point of the 1980 election was
that this situation was
changed. While
the election results could be
viewed as an i»ediate cause
of change in
policy and institutional practice,
it is of course the growing
disjunction between particularistic
patterns of action and benefit that
is at

the root of the matter.

Any president elected in 1980,
or thereafter

for the foreseeable future, will
need to respond (if perhaps in
some

cases by non-action) to the tensions
created by the relative decline of
the United States economy and the
gradual exacerbation of the fiscal

crisis.
In a certain sense these problems
are old ones.

In the

twentieth

century claims for government resources have
been continuously greater
than available resources.

All

presidents from Franklin Roosevelt onward

have attempted to use budget preparation to
coordinate policy to some
degree.

For the most part their efforts were neither
extensive nor par-

ticularly effective.

It was President Nixon who made the first

substantial efforts to gain
effective presidential
control of the
federal budget.
It was no coincidence
that the Nixon
niAuri efforts
tn control
mn+v, i
eTTorts to

government
expenditures occurred at the ti.e
when intractable economic
problems
arose for the first ti.e since
the Great Depression.
While there were
frequent changes in the Nixon
administration's substantive
economic
policies, and Nixon was willing
to incur huge deficits
for electoral
purposes, in terms of its procedural
initiatives the administration
was
highly consistent. Their
principal method of increasing
policy coordination was to increase their
control over budgetary matters.
The Nixon
approach, which was to come to full
flower after the 1972 election,
had
three main elements:
(1) increased fonral and informal
guidance of
agency decision making by the White
House or by super councils headed
by
a senior White House official
or a politically loyal Cabinet
member,
(2)

an increased role for OHB in the
evaluation of agency requests and

in the actual

disbursement of money to the agencies
based upon political

rather than technical criteria, and
(3) unprecedented use of executive
"powers" of impoundment and transfer.

The bulk of evidence supports the

view that the Nixon administration was
achieving an unheard of degree of
central control."^

However, the Watergate scandal and the
subsequent

weakening of the administration returned the
situation to the preNixonian status quo.

Not only were the Ford and Carter administrations

forced to retrench in this area, but Congress passed
the 1974 Budget Act
to limit the use of impoundment and to at least
formally strengthen its

role in the budgetary process.
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The Reagan administration
also has attempted to
obtain greater
budgetary control and
coordination through the
Presidency,
indeed, in
the Simplistic sense of
having Congress abide by
the administration's
basic priorities, the Reagan
people were highly successful
in their
first two years. As noted in
Chapter V, many of the
administration's
tactics are similar in general
outline, if not in specifics,
to those
used by the Nixon administration.
For example, the Reagan
administration replaced the legally
questionable Nixonian use of
impoundment and
reprogramming of funds with the
extensive use of the deferral
and recission processes established in
the 1974 Budget Act.
Some Reagan opponents claimed that the President
was trying to make de facto
budget cuts
by submitting so many deferral
requests that Congress would not
have
time to evaluate them.^^ Reagan
also made use of the other two compo-

nents of the Nixon approach, although
in

a

less

imperious or conspira-

torial fashion.

However, there are important differences
between Reagan's efforts
and those of the Nixon administration in
terms of method and of the external

situation to which those efforts were applied.

The shortcomings

of past operating procedures in dealing
with economic and related problems is much more obvious to powerholders
today than in the early 1970s.

Secondly, Reagan was perceived to have coattails.

For the first time in

many years at least some members of Congress saw
their fortunes as tied
to those of the administration.

The impact of this perception was

directly reflected in the behavior of those members.

At least in the

97th Congress, many Republicans gave Reagan some
credit for either their
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own election or for the
newly obtained majority
status of their party in
the senate.
Further, many Reagan
opponents conceded the
President s
popularity and the initial
widespread public
approval of Reagan's general approach on salient
public policy issues.^
Finally, the Republican senate victory and the
defeat of key members
of the Democratic House
delegation resulted in changes
in committee chairs
and partisan composition that somewhat disrupted
existing patterns of
accommodation.^

A key additional feature
of the Reagan strategy
was to use party
affiliation as an important element
in coordinating budget
policy and
adoption. That is, the
administration encouraged
Republican members of
Congress to feel a deep
identification with the administration's
program, thereby Implicating them
in the success or failure
of the economic
recovery program.^l
This course was not open
to Nixon, who saw the congressional Republican party as much
as an impediment as a
resource.
It
1s notable that Nixon divorced
his 1972 reelection campaign
from that of

the party he supposedly headed.

Given the minority status of the
Repub-

lican party and the continuing trend
toward electoral and party disag-

gregation this was probably

a useful

strategy to maximize his own vote.

However, the 1972 Nixon landslide, which
on its surface was much more

impressive than Reagan's 1980 victory, did
not have any material impact
on the balance of political forces
in Congress.

Still, even if Nixon

had attempted to mobilize electoral strength
on the basis of party it

would have availed him little.

The gradual

increase in levels of elec-

toral instability, for offices other than
the Presidency, was still

the future.

Perhaps one of the most important effects of the
1980

in
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election

win

be the growth of a
perception a.ong elites and
.ayPe a.ong

the wider citizenry that
officials cannot govern In
isolation of each
other.
The simple principle of
punishing the Incumbent once
again Increases the value of party
cohesion to office-holders
both as a risk
management device and as a way of
seeking a return to electoral
stability on favorable terms.
Thus if the Reagan administration's
economic recovery program

proves ineffective, the developing
economic situation and its
attendant
political instability will encourage
future attempts toward resolving
underlying economic and social problems.
While in the short run it is
not impossible that

a

particular administration or Congress
might try to

return to the pre-1980 status quo,
the inevitable deterioration of
economic conditions under those political
circumstances will result in public officials again turning to more
innovative, less incremental, ways

of dealing with the nation's problems.

Those who innovate will need to

set priorities and to coordinate the
adoption and execution of those

choices.

They will need to use some combination
of presidential power

and party mobilization to seek to obtain
their chosen needs.

CHAPTER

VII

DEBATES, REALIGNMENTS,
AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE:

A SUMMARY

One goal of this dissertation
is to der^onstrate and
explore the

relationship between critical
realignments and subsequent changes
in
governmental structure and process.
A second goal is to explicate
the
ideas of governmental institution
and
institutional change.

are closely related.

These goals

While most Americans develop
clear ideas of the

differences between governmental
institutions and other kinds of institutions, it is very difficult to
articulate those differences in a way
that allows the construction of an
ostensive definition of the concept
of a governmental

institution.

As a result,

it is difficult to identify

what really counts as significant institutional
change.

Exploring the

impact of realignments on governmental
institutions requires clarification of these questions.

Indeed, these conceptual

questions are impor-

tant to any study of governmental institutions
and how they change.
In

Chapter

I,

I

noted there

is

little work that explores the rela-

tionship between realignment and institutional change.

Yet many re-

searchers imply that realignments encourage institutional
change.
part their expectations rest on historical evidence.

Institutional

structure and process do seem to change after realignments.

Despite the

fact that the grand structures of the United States government
have
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essentially remained constant
since the 1970s, the
forms or styles of
governance have changed several
times.

Nonetheless, the study of the
connection between realignments
and
institutional change has been a minor
concern to students of electoral
phenomena. Most researchers devoted
their main attention to studying
the dynamics of realignments.
Research has centered on the
role of
social and economic tensions, as
mediated by the actions of political
elites and insurgents, in encouraging
the formation of persistent new
voting patterns, political coalitions,
and issue agendas.
Yet researchers have generally felt that
realignments matter, in fact matter
very
much.

In

within

a

brief, realignments are viewed as

major form of adjustment

relatively stable political system to new
conditions and poli-

tical forces.

Indeed, a system of party/electoral
competition can be

understood as an institutional form itself.
a

a

Partisan alignments embody

set of purposes which have crystallized into
rules and rule governed

social practices that are widely recognized as
one process the society

uses to make binding, i.e., governmental
ly enforced, decisions.

Although realignments can be understood as
tutional change,
a

I

a

major form of insti-

examined realignments and similar electoral events
as

"cause" of change in either other governmental

relations among institutions.

institutions or the

This argument, which has its roots in

Schattschneider's work, is that governmental structures and processes
tend to embody the purposes of the interests or social groupings that

designed, altered, and/or maintained those institutional arrangements.
If an emerging class or set of interests requires the occurrence of

a
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-alignment
then

n

to gain control of
the state and of the
political

agenda

is reasonable to
expect that newly dominant
political

forces
Will want to change the
structures and processes
of government in ways
that help them to obtain
their policy goals.
While some changes in

substantive policies can result
from simply the turnover
in government
officialdom, the complete
maintenance of pre-existing
institutional
arrangements will bias the
government in the direction
of replicating
the public policies favored
by previously dominant
political forces.
The case studies examined
in this dissertation,
the establishment

of the Executive Office of
the President, the evolution
of the pre-NLRA
labor boards, and the development
of congressional and executive
practice under the 1974 Budget Act,
were selected to illustrate
the process
of institutional change following
important electoral events.
In the
strict sense it has not been proven
that institutional change is
more

common following realigning or
comparable elections than at other
times.
However one cannot count the incidence
of significant institutional

change as conveniently as one can
count indicators of policy change,
such as Acts passed by Congress.^

Laws are discrete phenomena.

In

contrast, institutional change, excepting
formal alterations of structure, process, and authority, does not
exhibit clear transitions from
the previous state of affairs.

change is in part

a

The identification of institutional

matter of judgement.

One implication of the case studies is that
formal

institutional

change is the least common and important type
of institutional change in
the United States political

system.

Formal

institutional change usually
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follows Change in
institutional practices.

When formal

institutional
changes are instituted without
previous changes in institutional
practice, as in the case of
establishing the labor boards
or the inclusion
of the reconciliation option
in the 1974 Budget
Act, the formal changes
remain ineffectual or dormant
until appropriate practices
and understandings develop.
Changes in institutional functions
and power relations also seem to be more closely
associated to changes in institutional practice than to changes
in formal structure and
process.
Thus,

while it may be possible and ultimately
desirable to construct

a

method

to count the incidence of institutional
change, that method would neces-

sarily prejudge the question of what
constitutes significant institutional change.

That standard would almost certainly
be the same one

that informed the selection of the case
studies in this dissertation.
An institutional change is significant
insofar as it has

a

major impact

on what interests and issues receive
governmental attention and on what

public policies are adopted and implemented.
The institutional changes described in the EOP
and labor board

case studies have in fact had an enormous influence
over what the United

States government did following the institutionalization
of those
changes.

Before the formation of the EOP, the federal government
lacked

the institutional capacity to administratively manage
the relations be-

tween the state and the larger society on

a

sustained basis.

While the

value and effectiveness of that capacity are often questioned, the
fact
that such coordinative capacity exists represents

a

constitutive differ-

ence between the United States political system since the 1930s and
the
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one that previously existed.

Effects of comparable
importance followed

the development of labor
law and administrative
practice.

These case

studies Of institutional change
in the 1930s represent
major components
of the governmental transformations
that Dahl calls historical
corr^iit-

ments and Lowi regime changes.

^

The relationship between these
institu-

tional changes and the concurrent
period of electoral

recoalescence is not coincidental.
tal

instability and

Although the questions of governmen-

coordination and the status of organized
labor were not major

partisan issues in 1932, these matters
were continuous themes in the

ongoing debate and conflict of the
era following the 1896 realignment.
It is

premature to make

a

similar historical judgement about the

long run impact of the changes in the
budget process that have occurred

since 1980.

However the potential impacts of an omnibus
budgeting pro-

cess upon both the character of politics and
the distribution of public

resources are comparable to those resulting from
the major institutional

changes of the New Deal.

In

particular, changes in the budgetary pro-

cess imply important changes in the power
relationships among those seg-

ments of American society currently active in distributive
politics.

Since the 1930s, public power has been expanded chiefly
under the control and to the benefit of narrowly based coalitions.

The current

transformation of the budget process, though far from complete,
portends
a

greater degree of central coordination of public policy

in the

inter-

ests of broader, though not necessarily more pluralistic, coalitions.

Despite some of the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, the continuation of the positive state is not at issue.

What is at stake is the
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fo™

the positive state

potential results
cal

commitment or

,„a.
a

win

well

be

take and the Interests
1t

histoH-

practice under the 1974
Budget Act
a

governmental response to the

instability arising from
prolonged shortcomings

States economic performance.
a

a

The

regime change.

constitute, as explained in
Chapter VI,

called

serve

important enough to classify
as

The changes in institutional

political

win

in

United

Although the 1980 election
cannot now be

realigning election, as Burnham
notes, there

is

an unusual

de-

gree of similarity between the
period following the 1980
election and
the periods following realigning
elections in terms of changes in
the

political agenda, public policy, etc.^

mdeed, given the improbability

of a classic realignment occurring
under the conditions of the late
20th
century, 1980 may turn out to represent
a new kind of election
that does
not fit the standard classification
used by political scientists
since
the 1950s.
Elections like 1980 may provide the
closest functional

approximation to realigning elections
Earlier in this dissertation
cant institutional change.
rrew

I

in

the future.^

listed five indicators of signifi-

These indicators were (1) the appearance
of

institutional forms, (2) the creation of new
institutional func-

tions, (3) changes in the relationships
among institutions, (4) the ini-

tiation of new governmental functions, and
(5) changes in institutional
process related to the dominance of new constituencies.
all

To some extent

three case studies illustrate all of the indicators
of institutional

change.

Yet, the appearance of distinctive new institutional
forms

very minor theme.

is

Even in the most pronounced example of this
type of

a
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change, the ad hoc labor boards,
the boards borrowed their
organization
and routines from models provided
by other governmental and
private
institutions.
The appearance of new institutional
forms is the most distinct and
visible type of formal institutional
change.
Its relative absence in

these case studies suggests that formal
change in institutional struc-

ture and process is

United States.

a

Formal

secondary form of institutional adaptation
in the
institutional change is not

a

crucial element in

any of the three case studies, although
formal change is more signifi-

cant in the EOP and labor board cases.

For the most part, formal

change

is concentrated at either the beginning
or end of the process of insti-

tutional change.

The role of formal change is mainly either
to provide

an opportunity for the development of informal
practices and understand-

ings or to legitimize that development after the
fact.
is

This observation

not surprising; it conforms with commonplace
expectations about large

organizations.

Much formal organizational change

is

little more than

alterations in personnel titles and organization charts.
of the three case studies,
tional change is

a

I

On the basis

tentatively conclude that formal institu-

relatively unimportant indicator of electoral effects

on the form or style of governance in the United States.

Changes in the functions performed by governmental

institutions,

the kinds of functions performed, and in the relationships among insti-

tutions are, on the basis of these case studies, far more important indicators of institutional change.

For example, the EOP represents an

increase in presidential power relative to Congress and to the executive
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bureaucracy.

The EOP case also
demonstrates an institutionalization
of

the new function of overall
coordination (however limited),
particular, the Budget Bureau
facilitated this process by
adopting new functions in a changing and initially
hostile political environment.
Com-

m

parable summaries can be written
for the other case studies.

If re-

alignments should be understood as
the institutionalization of
the
political ends of newly dominant
political coalitions, then institutional change that follows realignments,
or comparable electoral

tions, should reflect these changes
in purpose.
al

1

situa-

This is clearly true in

three case studies.
The final indicator of institutional
change, changes in institu-

tional

process related to the goals of new
constituencies, appears to be

the most important one.

As

noted earlier, most of this form of
change

takes place as changes in institutional
practices and participant under-

standings rather than as changes

course informal change

codified institutional rules.

in

is a formal

Of

rather than substantive category.

Informal change can occur that has no relation
to the demands of

dominant political coalition or to the imperatives
of

a

a

newly

transformed

political environment.
However, in the three case studies, changes in practices
and

understandings are

a

far more important part of the process of institu-

tional change than changes in formal
As

institutional

rules and structure.

noted formal change is usually anticipated or routinized by
informal

change.

Codification generally followed institutionalization rather

than preceding it.

The pre-NLRA labor boards created

a

labor law and

a
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legalistic tradition of
board procedure through
the creative extension
of .nfornal practice to
new situations. The
BOB entered the areas of
legislative clearance and the
enrollment process mainly by
creative extensions of old practice.
The congressional Budget
committees enforced
the reconciliation process
mainly by creative extensions
of past practice.

However, these extensions of
institutional practice are not
merely
products of some exercise of
"institutional will." These
extensions
occur in situations where previous
understandings of the politically
possible have been expanded.
In part this expansion
is related to the

existence of deep economic and social
tensions, in part to the long term
social discourse about those
tensions, and
in part to the political

certainty reflected in electoral
instability.

un-

In turn, this expansion

of the possible is augmented through
the extension of institutional

practice into new areas of policy and/or
process.

While the case

studies verify the actuality of disjunctive
change in institutional
process and thereby policy, the dynamic
of that change

incremental in character.

is

unexpectedly

Realignments and similar electoral events

seem to multiply the rate of incremental
change and to channel that

change in

a

consistent direction.

Alterations in practices and under-

standings rather than formal changes in
institutional rules

is

the

central feature of this process.

This tendency of institutional change to be rooted
mainly in in-

stitutional practices and understandings may be
particularly strong in
the United States.

Certainly this interpretation

is

consistent with the
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liberal

preconception to avoid the
appearance of the exercise of
govern-

ment power.
exhibits

a

In this,

the phenomenon of informal

institutional change

family resemblance to aspects
of American political
practice

such as the tendencies to settle
political conflicts through
judicial
action and to use interest group
based "triangles" as the
operational
basis of the United States positive
state.
The dominance of informal

modes of institutional change

in the

United States has implications for

how one should study institutional
change.

The crucial

element of gov-

ernmental institutions is how political
purposes are translated into

participants'

practices and understandings.

The crucial element of in-

stitutional change is how new purposes,
whether external or internal to
the institution, transform institutional

life.

To understand how pur-

poses crystallize into what are called institutions
requires the exami-

nation of how participants willingly or not
convert those purposes into
institutional practices.

Realignments as Debates

If realignments encourage institutional change, there
must be some

link between electoral events and the transformation of
institutional

rules and practices.
that linkage:

Realignment theory provides one understanding of

institutional change results rather directly from the

demands of an electoral majority.

However this understanding is insuf-

ficient; it places an insupportable emphasis on the ready translation of

voter preferences into state action.

I

suggest that it

is

better to
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think Of the linkage between
realigning and comparable
elections and
institutional change as stages in
an ongoing "social
debate."

Realignment theorists share

a

common understanding or
characteris-

tic "story" of how realignments
encourage policy and institutional

changes.

there is

Realignment theorists begin with
the contention that normally
a

relatively stable structure of
linkages between the citizens

and the state; in Schattschnei
der'

of bias.

s

terms,

a

characteristic mobilization

Generally, the most important form
of linkage is the party

system, including voting patterns,
interest group coalitions, and issue
agendas.

Realignments are the transformations
of relatively stable

mobilizations of bias to new ones.

Old party systems, and structures
of

political conflict, break apart under the
pressure of social or economic
crisis.

Ultimately new party systems which are
organized around new

electoral majorities come to power.

Elected and appointed officials

belonging to the new majorities then seek to
resolve the realignment
crises on terms favorable to their period's
majority.

If perceived to

be successful, they will solidify their
party's political

thereby the new structure of political conflict.

base and

In short,

are stories of crisis and decline followed by renewal.

realignments

In this story

the critical election (or elections) is the key
event that initiates
renewal and the subsequent restoration of political

stability.

Realignment theory and research not only furnishes

a

story about

political change in the United States of wide historical applicability,^
the literature also offers a near universal explanation for the
policy,

coalitional, and elite shifts that follow realignment.

The very

309

structure of this for. of
explanation .ests upon the
existence of a .e.
explanatory .etaphor. An
election o. sen'es of
elections, usually presidential, is viewed as the
key «,t1ve force In
the post-real 1gn.ent
period. Although the critical
election cannot happen
without an underlying soc1al/econo.1c crisis,
response to the crisis
can occur only In
the wake of an election
that seriously disrupts
the operation of polltics and government as
practiced
In the previous
political

era.

Similarly, the actuality of the
new political era can
only be confirmed by
the results of subsequent
elections.
Thus, the central metaphor
of the
realignment process Is the exercise
of popular sovereignty
through the
mechanism of presidential elections.
The following statement by
Trilling and Campbell provides an
excellent summary of this
metaphor-

Nonetheless, while the principal
metaphor offered in the realign-

ment literature is the existence of
popular sovereignty in the United
States, there is
ture.

As

a

second theme incorporated into the
explanatory struc-

the authors of the previous quotation
observe the exercise of

popular sovereignty

an uncommon phenomenon.

is

Major adjustments in the

operation of government and politics generally
occur only after major
crises, and often with enormous tension and
difficulty.

contention represents

a

sovereignty, not simply

However, this

contradiction to the major theme of popular
a

limiting factor upon its exercise.

Most political scientists and historians agree that
Americans,
both now and in the past, have generally preferred
incremental political
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change.

Paradoxically, the realignment
.etaphor proposes that it is
easier to achieve relatively
disjunctive change through
realignment than
incremental change on major
problems at other times.
Realignment theorists could reply, and to some
extent have, that political
alignments
produce and then are maintained by
a variety of political,
ideological,
and institutional constraints.
Some realignment theorists
might add
that other factors can mitigate
the will of a popular majority.
The

existence of
formal

a

dominant economic class or the
extreme fragmentation of

governmental authority can serve as
examples.

rists admit that the period of
political

election is often long.
difficult to "induce"

a

Realignment theo-

instability prior to

Usually political

a

critical

insurgents find it extremely

realignment, however much they desire
one.''

As

such it is singularly inappropriate to
believe that all these con-

straints are simply absent at the point of
realignment.

Indeed, as

a

number of researchers have confirmed, echoes
of old political alignments
can be discerned in the voting behavior
and forms of political organiza-

tion found in many localities and even regions.

The metaphor of popular

sovereignty cannot render fully intelligible what
researchers have discovered about realignments.

While the metaphor of an electorate's exercise of popular
sovereignty had unacceptable flaws as an explanation of how
realignments (or

similar events) influence later policy and institutional changes,
the

metaphor may be appropriate under special conditions.
the problem of constructing

a

One approach to

more suitable metaphor for understanding

the effects of realignments is to examine the conditions
assumed in the
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prevailing explanation.

I

a. not claiming that any
realignment theorist

believes that any or all of the
following conditions are
.et or approached in United States national
politics.
Rather. I want to show how
the current metaphor underlying
the idea of realignment
can distort the
understanding of policy and
institutional change following
realigning
and other comparable elections.
The metaphor of popular sovereignty
suggests that realignments are

situations reminiscent of direct
democracy.

The metaphor suggests

images of New England town meetings,
ancient Athens, or Rousseau's

republic.

I

have already discussed one respect
in which this under-

standing is misleading.

It neglects the impact of
numerous forms of

institutionalized constraints.

However, the metaphor is misleading in

a

second way, which unlike the issue of
constraint has been generally

unrecognized by students of realignment.

Given the pluralist viewpoint,

and therefore liberal-individualist
orientation, of almost all political

scientists interested in the question of
realignment; little attention
is

given to the question of the relationship
between the understandings

that people have of their needs and interests
and the articulation and

aggregation of such into political issues.^

It is now widely admitted

that any number of institutionalized constraints,
especially the coalitional makeup of a party system, can prevent or delay
the consideration

of certain kinds of political issues.

Still, realignment theorists seem

to assume that individuals easily reconceptual

concerns into political issues.

i

ze relevant personal
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Yet there is as much reason
to believe that individuals
do not
commonly transform their personal
troubles into public issues.
As
C. Wright Mills points
out, most individuals have
direct experience of
and the ability to directly
act in a relatively limited
social milieu.
Political conflict and action take
place largely in settings and
forms
of discourse somewhat removed
from most individuals'

everyday life.

The

private trouble must be translated
into the language of public
values
and in that translation the formerly
private, though often widely
shared, concern can lose the concreteness
and be divorced from its
original context.
This debate (on the now public issue)
is often without focus if nnlv
because it is the very nature of the
issue, unl ike even w dL
'''''' '''' ''''
terms Sf
'''''''
e ^^:'
dL°tP .'nn'p''
'I
diate
and everyday
environments of ordinary men.

LS^

The empirical existence of political
quiescence
well established.

""^

in

the United States is

Any satisfactory understanding of the
realignment

process must come to grips with the fact that
the translation of

troubles into issues is anything but automatic.

Indeed the near hege-

mony of implicit liberal-individualist beliefs among
Americans exacerbates this tendency insofar as those beliefs establish

a

rather rigid

cognitive separation of private and public life.
Thus

I

find that popular sovereignty is

image of the realignment process.

realignments would need to describe

a

singularly inappropriate

An appropriate way of understanding
a

plausible connection between the

realigning election and subsequent institutional change.
vious analysis demonstrates that there cannot be

a

While the pre-

simple connection

•
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between the voting results
of realigning elections
and subsequent governmental change; 1n past
realignments major change has
followed shifts
in voting patterns.

Further, periods of substantial
change in govern-

ment policy and process have
not usually happened without

election first J

^

a

critical

The original understanding,
based on the exercise of

popular sovereignty, seems fruitful
to the extent that the critical
election is a crucial linkage in
the realignment process, but
this

understanding is clearly wrong insofar
as it connotes that the election
performs a directly constituent function.
The central explanation of
the realignment story must encompass
both aspects of the phenomenon's

appearance.

Most realignment theorists claim that
between the social or economic crisis that sets the realignment
process in motion and the re-

alignment itself is

a

period of progressively focused political
debate

and the increased pol i ticization of the
citizenry.
is

While this process

never completely linear, it is definitely
cumulative.

In Mills'

terms, one can say that social troubles are
translated increasingly

often and accurately into an issue or cohesive set
of issues.

Yet

strangely, most of the elections associated with
realignments have not
been as intensely contested as one might have expected
given the preceding periods of increasing pol iticization.
In 1932 Franklin Roosevelt generally sought to give the impression

of favoring modest governmental

innovation to relieve the collective

burdens of the Depression and to promote economic recovery.

Still, he

emphasized his symbolic approval of several contemporary political
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icons, such as the balanced
budget, that allowed hi.
to consolidate

conservative supportJ^

m

contrast, the 1928 presidential
election be-

tween Hoover and Smith had
witnessed more intense
invective and debate
on matters that in retrospect
seem almost trivial.
The level of discourse in
the 1896 election, coming
after years of
increasing polarization, was
remarkably mild. This was
despite the fact
that many opinion leaders saw
the election as a turning
point in United

States history.
issue.

It is true that campaign
rhetoric was

But it was

a

intense on one

narrow one, the comparative
virtue of the silver

versus gold backed currency.

Otherwise the McKinley campaign was

a

muted one based on generalized claims
that the Republicans would restore
economic prosperity. While more
aggressive in style, the Bryan campaign

essentially purged any reference to the
institutional and structural
reforms that had formed the basis of the
populist program.^^

Earlier realigning elections were fought
on

a

more localized basis

than those of the 1890s and 1930s,
reflecting the limitations of trans-

portation and communication

in those times.

Still, with the exception

of the 1800 election, the campaign discourse
of realigning elections is

always mild compared to what it was reasonable
to expect given the

increased level of political conflict prior to those
elections.

In con-

trast, elections which were in no sense realigning
were often carried on

with extreme intensity by the rival candidates and parties.

contemporary examples, the elections

in 1964 and 1968 were

To give

accompanied

by intense campaign rhetoric far exceeding in power the
rhetoric of the

1932 election or the important, but unclassified, 1980 election.
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It is well

known that American candidates
and parties tend to

moderate their appeals to build
the broadest possible
electoral support.
That candidates and parties would
still tend to do so in
realigning
elections also seems reasonable for
the same reasons that inform
the
general

rule; for example, institutional
arrangements, the rather atten-

uated distribution of political
outlooks in the United States, or
the
vested interests of officials in
maintaining old issues and forms of
political discourse.

Nonetheless, it

still

is

remarkable that the

intensity and the range of alternatives
presented in directly electoral

discourse is not appreciably greater in
realigning elections than in

other elections.

If realigning elections are in fact
exercises in

popular sovereignty, then the electorate needs
some set of cues, however
subtle, to tell them that the election

of

a

is

really crucial.

The existence

crisis is not enough; the crisis can continue for
many years before

there is

a

realignment.

in major parties

without prompting

is
a

The growth of third parties or of insurgencies

not enough; insurgencies can occur for many years

realignment.

One thing that does happen following realigning elections

is

that

many incumbent officials are turned out of office and are replaced
by
new ones of usually

a

different party affiliation.

Further, while some

of these changes occur in marginal constituencies, some occur because
of

unexpected voting shifts within
tional

a

constituency.

A particular occupa-

group or ethnic group in an electoral district may now distribute

its vote for candidates and parties in

ship to its past behavior.

a

pattern that has no relation-

This kind of change implies

a

shift or the
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potential for

shift in the coalitional
makeup of political parties
Certainly, one would expect
this kind of phenomenon
in a realignment by
definition.
Yet this very effect will
be seen in some
electoral districts in any election,
especially in deviating
elections.
While bei nq
a rarity, the degree
of electoral instability
in a deviating electi
on
can exceed that of a realigning
election.
Of course in this case voting
patterns will largely return those
expected in a given political
era, at
least on a national basis, in
the next election.
Still, the fact that
voting patterns return toward
the period's norm does not
by itself
explain a certain problem.
If changes in the party
affiliation of
office holders can be as large in
deviating elections as realigning
a

elections, why is the degree of
observed policy and institutional innovation much more significant following
realigning elections?^^
One plausible answer is the perceived
permanence of the new voting

and coalitional patterns.

This answer is largely wrong.

The greatest

periods of policy (and institutional)
innovation have occurred in the

first presidential term following realignment.

For example, most of the

New Deal was put into operation in Franklin
Roosevelt's first four
years.

Another possible answer

is

that governments elected in deviating

elections either do not attempt large scale policy
innovation or if they
do the reinstatement of the dominant party
results in the repeal of

those innovations.

There may be some truth to this construct, but it too has
severe
problems.

Occasionally, presidents and congressional majorities elected

against the grain of

a

political era will adopt significant new
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policies.

The Wilson administration
provides a ,ood example
of this
sort.
Yet despite the return
of overwhelming
Republican dominance in
the 1920s, most of the
Wilsonian initiatives were
preserved.
How then
can one Identify, except
in retrospect, the
livelihood that an election,
particularly one that occurs
in a period of social
or economic crisis,
and following a period of
intensifying politicization,
is a realigning
el ection?

Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan
.ake

applied to this problem.

a

useful

suggestion that can be

They contend that during
the period of politi-

cization before the realignment,
there

straining the issue agendaJS

is

a

process of narrowing or con-

However, before the realignment
the new

agenda does not fully penetrate
those areas of political and
covernmental activity dominated by the
political elites of the dying
electoral
era.

This is especially true for the
electoral arena where the old

elites have an immediate interest
in maintaining old forms of
conflict
and cohesion.
Despite the attempt to ignore or
suppress the emerging

agenda, the increasing need to respond
to that agenda, at least before
some other party does, encourages some
political actors to make use of
the new issues.

agenda is made in

In the case of major party members,
a

somewhat cryptic fashion.

the use of the new

That is, political actors

invent symbolic patterns which as Burnham et
al. contend act as shorthand explanations of the crisis and as suggestions
of the general direction of ameliorative policy.

Burnham et

al

.

then claim that these

symbolic patterns become central to the political
discourse in the years

following realignment.

It is

the institutionalization of the new
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political agenda, through what
others might call

"condensation symbols,"
that allows political parties
to serve as the principal
agency of what
Burnham et al. call a reintegration
of the political systemJ^
Thus the
realigning election is not so much
the ending of a debate over
how to
respond to a social or economic
crisis by the national electorate,
but
an event that transforms the
structure of officially organized
political
debate to coincide with the real
political agenda and that aives one
political coalition an opportunity
to act decisively to meet that
agenda.
I

think this idea of the transformation
of officially organized

political debates is

a

useful place to begin

a

reconstruction of the

central metaphor for the realignment
scenario.

Yet the idea seems

vague, without any obvious reference to
everyday life.

In contrast,

popular sovereignty, despite its ambiguities in
application,
iar idea in American culture.

is

a

famil-

The idea of popular sovereignty makes

intuitive sense because it is closely related
to
liberal cultures, i.e., individual choice.

preeminent value of

a

The understanding of the

idea of individual choice seems intuitive because
it resonates with most

Americans' experience of economic and social action in
their society.
One chooses his or her spouse, friends, occupation, place of
residency,

and purchases of goods and services.

Popular sovereignty

ciple of individual choicemaking transformed into

a

is

set of rules and

practices applicable for conscious collective choicemaking.
find

a

this prin-

Can one

similar set of everyday experiences that will allow one to make

sense of the notion of alteration of debate on the official level?
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Many common situations
involving interpersonal
conflict have elements of precisely this
sort.
Imagine a conflict between
a husband and
wife over whether the wife
should seek a job.
Let us make the increasingly dubious assumption that
the earnings of the husband
are sufficient
to purchase those goods and
services the family needs and
wants.
Given
this, the husband says he cannot
understand why the wife wants a
job,

especially given the things of value
the wife and/or family will
need to
give up. As long as the husband
understands paid work as simply a way
to earn money, it will be difficult
for him to understand why his wife
wants to enter the labor market, or
will see it as resulting from

a

greater, and perhaps illegitimate, desire
for more goods and services.
Perhaps the wife has completely different
reasons for wanting
job:

a

desires for self-development, new social
relationships, community

recognition and so on.

If she can articulate these reasons
and make

them comprehensible to her husband, she will
thereby change the nature
of the debate and by that the terms of the conflict.

Indeed, to the

extent that her arguments reinforce either the husband's
previously un-

articulated experience (e.g., that his job has many values not
connected
to compensation) or the arguments he has heard in his
social

milieu or

through the media, her arguments are likely to be recognized as making
sense.

While the husband may still object, in many cases the resolution

of the conflict will be different than if one or both of the parties

maintained their original understandings.

This same sort of analysis,

including the analysis of cases where no transformation of the terms of

debate took place, can be
applied to .est forns of
interpersonal conflict familiar to Americans.
This notion of the transformation
of debates is in many ways congruent with Schattschneider's view
that the results of political
conflicts are greatly influenced by
their scope, that is by the number
and

resources of the combatants.
in a conflict is

Expansion or contraction of participation

likely to have asymmetrical

each side to win.^^

impacts on the ability of

Similarly, changing the language of
political dis-

course, by changing the sense of the
conflict, allows the mobilization
of participants and resources on new
terms.

While, in principle, it is

easy to determine the scope of conflict
by counting the bodies on each
side; the measurement of change in
political debate is trickier.

example,

I

For

said, extending the insights of Burnham,
Clubb, and Flanigan,

that critical elections seem to only exhibit
hints of the emerging discourse.

Yet it is clear that the discourse

before the realigning election,
cal

as

is

already widely understood

much or more by officials and politi-

activists than by the general public.

After all, realignments are

preceded by periods of increasingly intense debate and pol
i tici zation,
implying that the real change in debate among members of actual
or
potential

political elites occurs before realignment.

to deal with this terminological

Alain Touraine provides

a

overcome some of this confusion.

Is

there any way

confusion?
useful

vocabulary through which to

Touraine uses three terms to talk

about differences in the character of various aspects of what

I

have

called social debate or discourse, clumsily distinguishing between
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official and underlying debates.

Touraine's most general term,
"de-

bates," refers to any public
expression of the tensions among
various
aspects of a social system. While
debates require public expression,
it
need not be in the form of
articulated discourse.
It is the situation,
not the discourse, that matters.
For example, debates could be
carried
on in forms as diverse as changes
in the divorce rate, labor
absenteeism, or the average actual

driving speeds on interstate highways.

Touraine uses the terms "discussions" and
"deliberations" to denote

progressively more articulated but also more
institutionally constrained
forms of discourse.

Discussions require organization as well as
articu-

lation, with conflicting parties at least
tacitly recognizing each

other's existence.

Deliberations involve

a

fuller institutionalization

of debate, including the specification of roles,
rules of procedure, and
a

common language of discourse.

discussions, in deliberations it

Unlike debates, and to
is

a

lesser extent

no longer possible for the parties

to completely talk past one another.

There are three points of contact between this material and the

realignment literature.

First the debate

is

the public expression of

the tensions generated or exacerbated by the social or
economic crisis.

Second, the term "discussion" seems to fit the activities carried on in
the time of pol

i

ti ci

zati on occurring before the realigning election.

Finally, Touraine's concept of "deliberations" seems congruent

,wi

th the

period following realignment, when the newly dominant political forces
are able to take action on the basis of the political discourse devel-

oped before the realignment.
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The main value of conceptualizing
the realignment process as
a debate rather than as an exercise
of popular sovereignty is
that the first
understanding provides more insight
into how post-realignment change
occurs.
The metaphor of popular sovereignty,
which informs almost all

realignment studies, proves unfortunately
limited as

a

basis from which

to generate plausible explanations
for how either institutional

policy change takes place.

or

Because this understanding of political

change emphasizes the role of the
electorate in demanding and legitimating government action, the process
of change is understood almost

entirely in terms of the electorate's beliefs
and actions.
Realignment theorists offer two major variables
to explain the
process of post-realignment change.

One variable focuses on the state

of the electorate, its "motivation" in changing
its longstanding voting
patterns.

Some observers think that during realignment many
voters are

actively seeking changes in public policy.
19
or prospective voting.'^

This is called anticipatory

Another group of observers hold that the elec-

torate approves post-realignment change retrospectively,
i.e., in later
elections.

The initial change in voting patterns is interpreted as

a

massive vote of no confidence in the dominant political party of the
fading political alignment.

The new voting patterns become permanent

only if there is "majority" support for the actions of the administration formed by the newly dominant party/coalition.^^

constructed syntheses of the two views.

Some analysts have
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Technically, policy and institutional
change

mented by government officials.
change?

In

is

adopted and imple-

But why do officials undertake
such

addition to electoral pressure,
realignment theorists hold

that there are always groups or
constituencies that actively seek policy
and by implication institutional
change during realignments.
Once again
there are two basic views as to who
are the primary agents of change.
The first view implies

a

combination of wisdom and democratic respon-

siveness on the part of holders of institutional
power, public and
private, in the realigning period.

The second view credits non-elite

insurgents with forcing elite concessions.

Often these concessions are

forced through "extra-political" actions as well
as electoral instability.

23

Once again, some observers have attempted to combine
elements of

the two approaches.
On the basis of the case study material

I

examined,

I

conclude

that the occurrence of prospective and retrospective
electoral judge-

ments in realignments (or other electoral situations)
tional.

It

is

difficult to make

a

is

largely situa-

strong case that the electorate

demonstrated either prospective or retrospective judgement in regard to
the EOP, the pre-NLRA labor boards, or recent changes in the budget

process.

Even if data about voters' issue positions was available for

these cases, it would be hard to confirm the effect of those issue

positions on actual voting behavior.

Further, even when policy issues

related to later institutional changes were campaign issues, e.g., the
role of labor in 1936 and budget deficits in 1980, the institutional
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implications of candidate and
party issue positions were
rarely, if
ever, publicly mentioned.

Materials that can be used to
support judgements about the relative influence of elites and
non-elite insurgents in the process
of

institutional change is more readily
available.

On the basis of the

case studies, the relative influence
of elites and non-elites
fic to the historical

situation.

speci-

is

Mass insurgency played an important

perhaps critical role in both the adoption
of

a

national

the 1930s and in the development of
institutional

labor policy in

practice in that area.

Yet even in this case elite action also
had an important impact on that

development. 2^

In contrast,

it is difficult to find any insurgent
acti-

vity, let along influence, in the formation
of the EOP.

The 1980-82

changes in the budget process represent an
intermediate case, although

case much closer to the elite agency model.

a

Actions by ordinary citi-

zens, such as non-payment or underpayment of taxes
and the passage of
tax or expenditure limitation referenda, appear to have
created

a

con-

text that encouraged institutional powerholders to alter the
budget
process
An advantage of viewing realignments and post-realignment change
as elements in a long term social

debate is that it allows the observer

to systematically cope with these variations in the realignment process.

Debates can be followed through their increasing levels of clarity and

institutionalization.

This dissertation looked mainly at the final

stage in that progression, the period of "deliberations."

During such

periods institutional practice and rules are changed to more closely
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fulfill the purposes of newly
dominant political coalitions.

However,
this kind of institutional
development is possible only because
the

earlier stages of debate have
occurred.

Indeed, the stage of "discus-

sions," preceding the significant
electoral event, establishes the preconditions for institutional (or
policy) change.
New forms of institutional

action rest upon the extension of
the realm of the politically

possi ble.^^

Throughout this dissertation

I

forms of crystallized social action.

have argued that institutions are

While this crystallization is to

some extent codified by formal rules, it
always exists in

deeper and

a

more extensive form in the practices and
understandings of active institutional

participants.

In

particular, prior to codification, practices

and their related understandings always permit
in their application.

a

measure of flexibility

Yet the extent of this flexibility

is

not

a

given; it is revealed and articulated through institutional
action.

Brigham contends that

".

.

understanding an institution implies aware-

.

ness of the dynamics between possibilities and action. "^^

made in the context of what

a

social

she understands an institution.

This claim is

scientist understands when he or

By implication,

something parallel

happens when an institutional participant acts in new ways within the
institution.

The participant must first be aware of the possibility of

greater flexibility

in action.

However, each extension or transforma-

tion of practice implies new possibilities and thus

way of knowing the institution.

a

somewhat different
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Nonetheless, this process of
extension

is

anythinc, but rando.n.

Institutions are always constrained
environments.

There are potential

rewards and penalties for each
change of institutional practice.
It is
here that the stage of "discussions,"
i.e., poli ticization (and by
extension electoral instability), is
so important.
As the social debate
becomes more explicit and focused
the possibilities for changes
in

institutional practice grow, but only
in ways related to the progress
of
the debate.
Similarly, pol i tici zati on and electoral
instability provide
cues to the likely rewards and penalties
that will be associated with
potential changes in practice and public
policy.
Thus, the stage of "discussions" or poli
tici zation provides the

cues for the development and crystallization
of the new social knowledge
into rule governed institutional

fied rules.

practice and in some cases into codi-

This social process is the institutional component
of what

has been variously called "the public
philosophy" or "political

style."

27

Although the emphasis here has been on this process as
an

aspect of institutional change following realignments and
other significant electoral events, the approach can be applied to any
study of governmental

institutions or institutional change to the extent that insti-

tutions are forms of social action.
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;e :oreTkel1;':
^. r^'"'°^'
attain
major
leadership positions p<;npri;^nu
4.u L
'^"^f^

48

Walter Dean Burnham, "Party Systems
and the Political

PrnrP<;<;

-

49

Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Electiona
and the Mainsorinas
nf
^
American Politics, (New York: "WTWT Norton,
_

1970), pp

lu^^s

50
"^^"^^^ Systems,"
Of course Burnham does
p. 289.
not mP.n^Lt'I^h^"''
mean that there were no political issues
in the 1896-1932 period
Nor would Burnham contend that the
party coalitions of the posri896
period had no basis in the interests of their
members.
By "issueless
politics Burnham seems to mean that there
was little open conflict
between the major parties on the basis of the
interests of the coalitional partners.
Rather, such potential conflicts were largely
suppressed.
The Republicans did not challenge white
supremacy in the
South, nor did the Democrats challenge the methods
of industrialization
carried out by Northern capital, largely associated
with the Republican
Party.
Also see cf. Schattschneider, pp. 78-85.
51

Cf.

Burnham, "Critical Elections," pp. 185-8.

^^Ibid.,
53
54

57

68.

Cf.

Burnham,

Cf.

Burnham, "Critical Elections,"

^^Ibid.,
56

p.

p.

"Party Systems,"

p.

289.
p.

181.

27.

Cf.

Sundquist,

Cf.

Burnham, "Critical Elections," pp. 27-30.

^^Ibid.,

p.

p.

176.

^^Ibid., pp. 91-92.
Ibid.,

p.

133.

27.
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^^Ladd, pp. 189-90.
^^Cf. Jahnige, p. 470,
65

and RecruUmenVto^thiT."
Trillina np. 1^7
Trilling,
157.

^^Ibid.,

p.

^^'"5' "P°^^'tical Realignments
^'''^''io?A
Congress
1870-1970," in cf. Campbell and

171.

67,

^^Ibid., pp. 186-7,
69
f^^l^
^'P'""^'
Critical Elections,"
in rf
cf. r^'mnhfi?'^'"'5"^-i!'^^
Campbell and Trilling, pp. 229-59, in particular
see p. 257.

^^Cf. Lewi,

"End of Liberalism," p. 272

^^Ibid.,

273.

p.

Ibi d.

^^Ibid., pp. 38-39.
'^'^Ibid,

,

p.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

xii

274 and 277.

^^Ibid., pp. 22-6.
''^Ibid.,

p.

49.

^^Ibid., pp. 42-3.
79

80

Ibid., pp. 31-2.

Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York
Vintage Books, 1 970), pp. 338-41.
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82

Press, 1957)!

tin's

Pp'Tll."

I!=^*de™ireside^

liliymrTprzW^^^

(New York:

^-^^

St.

.

p.

ments ^M^''^']^^?
(New York:
4-

n

•

Umver-

^^a&Jh^

yor^'^^l^
^^Ibid.,

Mar-

St.

84m
Murray Edelman, The Sym bolic Uses
Pontics niv^h=n.
^^-^^^ of Pnlitirc;
(Urbana:
sity of Illinois, 1967),
2-1
pp
(New

Martin's

40.

Richard A. Cloward, Poor Keopie
People'ss NoveMnveVintage Books, 1979), p. 16.

^^Ibid., pp. 11-12.
89

Cf. Piyen and Cloward, Regulating the
Po or, p. 111.
However the
authors are quite clear in sayin that
g
symbolicall y progre si ve programs
(e.g.
Social Security, the Wagner Act) were
constructed in a way con
gruent or even supportive of the general interests
of capital
Thev
also see policy innovation of this sort as
intended to reinstitute
social routine and thereby lessen social disruption.

90

Edward S. Greenberg, Understanding Modern Government
(New York
~
John Wiley and Sons, 1979), pp. 87^^88^
91

For two discussions on the ability of corporate based
elites to
influence and/or make public policy see Charles E. Lindblom,
The Policy
Making Process 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall,
1980), pp. 71-82 and Ralph Mi li band, The State in Capitalist Soc iety
(New York:
Basic Books, 1969), in particular see Chapter 6, "Imperfect
Competition," pp. 146-78.
Despite the fact that the first account is
written by a "mainstream" United States political scientist and the
second by a Marxist, both discussions agree on most major points.
_

,

92

James 0 Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York:
Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 1-10.

Chapter

St.

II

See C. B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 38-44. Macpherson 's main point here
is that in liberal societies, and by implication in other modern
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societies, government sanctions
and supports the nnpr^^tinn

^-f

regara to tne

actual primacy of state power.
2

I
have examined a number of textbooks
readily available to me for
the nature and extent of their treatment
of institution' material
T
was especially interested to see if
the authors expl c t y de?^nei"or
explained what an institution (government
or poli tical )wL and where in
relation to other material such explanations
were placed
I
3o not
claim that this sample is random, but I believe
the texts I examined
were reasonably representative of what is
currently available
Most of
pluralist
perspective
on
United
1.^''^^'!^^
States
'
LHonaTnnliH
P°l^t^cs, although there are several so-called "radical"
texts
nH^i
ncluded
The texts also vary substantially in length.
Some are clearly intended to provide only the most "basic"
information on the subject
others are more "encyclopedic" in character.
The texts examined were:
James MacGregor Burns, J. W. Peltason, and Thomas
E. Cronin, Government
by the People (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1975); Milton C
Cummings Jr. and David Wise, Democracy Under Pressure
(New YorkHarcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1981); Kenneth M. Dolbeare and
Murray J
Edelman, American Politics (Lexington, Mass.:
D.C. Heath, 1981);
David V. Edwards, The American Political Experience (Englewood
Cliffs
N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1982); Peter K. Eisinger et al , American P oli-'
ticsj
The People and the Polity (Boston:
Little Brown, 1 978); Edward
S. Greenberg, The American Political System:
A Radical Appro ach (Cambridge, Mass.:
Winthrop, 1977); Barbara Hinckley, Outl i ne of Am'er ican Government (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall
1981 ); Ira
Katznelson and Mark Kesselman, The Politics of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Robert L. Lineberry, Government in America (Boston:
Little Brown, 1980); Theodore J. Lowi , Incomplete Con quest:
Governing America (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981);
Michael Parenti
Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1980); Samuel C. Patterson, Roger H. Davidson, and Randall B. Ripley,
A More Perfect Union (Homewood, 111.:
Dorsey Press, 1982); Harrell R.
Rodgers Jr. and Michael Harrington, Unfinished Democracy (Glenview,
111.:
Scott Foresman, 1981); Robert S. Ross, American National Govern ment (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1981); Max J. Skidmore and Marshall
Carter Wanke, American Government (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981);
Grover Starling, Understanding American Politics (Homewood, 111.:
Dorsey Press, 1982]^

f

w

'

.

,

,

3

4

See footnote

2

above.

For good examples see cf.

Lineberry and cf. Starling.

Cf. Katznelson and Kesselman, pp. 12-18.
This view seems implicit in at least some of the other "radical texts."
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a

good example of this "failure"
to pynlin-+iu

a^^

Connolly, The Terms of Political
DiscoursP
^l^^ ^V^^^^ ^'
(Lexington,
Mass.:
^l^^-OMIse
D.C. Heath
19741
nn
' discussion of
"essentially contested concepts."
•

^'

g

Fred M.

Frohock,

calScience Review

"The Structure of 'Politics
Ameriran Pniit-i
3 (September 1978),
863.
p

No.

72,

Books,^^959KV'3^'""'
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

4-5.

^hbid.,

pp.

19-20.

^^Ibid.,

p.

^-^^^^-^^^^^^^^^

(New York:

Vintage

155.

1

extreme example of

this phenomenon was President
Rp.n.n'c^^^?^"^
Keagan s failure to recognize his own
Secretary of Housing and Urban
^""^

Development, Samuel Pierce.
Reagan mistook Pierce as the mayor of a
medium size midwestern city! See Newsweek
99, No. 4 (1/25/82), p. 25.
,

14

See footnote

2

above for the texts

I

examined.

1

^^^^"^^

pp.

nf^^^l^'^
93-94
and 101-2.
1

"Federalism," in cf. Greenstein and Polsby,

g

See cf. Lowi, "End of Liberalism," and Grant McConnell,
Private
Power and American Democracy (New York: Vintage Books,
1970).
^'^For a good example of this sort of work, see
Randall B. Ripley
and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy a nd Public
Policy
( Homewood
111.:
Dorsey Press, 1980).
,

1

g

Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizatio ns (Englewood Cliffs, N.J
Prentice-Hall, 1964), p.T:

•

"

1

~

Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York:
Press, 1969), pp. 127-8.
20

Free

William H. Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of
Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political S cience
Review 74, No. 2 (June 1980), p. 443.
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^^^'"'"^ ^'

^P^^"^'

25.

22

Mltical_Chai^

(London:

Frank Cass, 1973), p.

Ibid., p. 8.

FrnP.t^L^!^^!— /°^c^^
1960K P 169.'
'

.Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau as
quoted in
^^'^
University Press,

24
a

J"^^^

UnZr,

9660rpp.';§r8

1

paraphrase of Marx's conception of his-

^^^^^^^7^^

^'^^ ''''''

^^Bernard N. Meltzner, John W. Petras, and Larry T.
Reynolds,
Symbolic Interacti omsm:
Genesis, Varieties, and Criticism (London:
"
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 1.
26
.

,^P?'^9e Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed.

Morns (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press,

1

962),

pp.

Charles W
68-75.

^^Ibid., pp. 173-8.
^^Ibid.,

p.

261.

29

Peter M. Hall, "A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics,"
Sociological Inquiry 42, No. 3-4 (1972), p. 43.
_

,

"^^Ibid., pp. 43-8.
31

Erving Goffman, Asylums (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1961).
See entire book, but particularly 304-20 for an explanation of the idea
of "secondary adjustment"; that is, of a negotiated order within structural or institutional or institutional constraints.
^^Cf. Meltzner et al

.

,

pp.

96-100.

33

Tom Bottomore, "Structure and History," in Approaches to the
Study of Social Structure ed. Peter M. Blau (New York:
Free Press,
1975), p. 160.
,

"^^Cf.

Mead, pp. 71-2.

^^Ibid., pp. 153-4.

^^Ibid.,

p.

155.

37
^John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.:

versity Press, 1971),
38

Ibid., pp.

p.

55-6.

55.

Harvard Uni-
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39

pp.

"^Ibid.,

30-1.

31.

p.

Ibid.

42

43

Ibid., p. 32.
Ibid., pp. 64-5.

44

45
46

Ibid., p. 81.

Ibid., pp. 11-12.

47

R.HnV.i

(Joreen), "The Tyranny of Structurelessness

r°

,

"

in

48
^^^^

Macmillan!^%24)'T^140^lf'^^^^^
Ibid.,

6.

p.

50

Frank
Little Brown,

J.

.

1

~

Sorauf, Party Politics in A merica, 3rd ed. (Boston-

976), pp.

9^T2\

"

51

^^^^ ^^^^

ary nnoo^^^^
1982.
I
don

t

°^ ^ conversation with John Brigham in Februremember if it was his idea or mine.

52

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressman in Committees (Boston:
Little Brown, 1973), p. 5.
"

53

Ibid., pp. 39-40.

54
""^Ibid., pp.

57-64.

55,

Ibid.

,

p.

56
"""Ibid., pp.

63.

285-87.

^^Ibid., pp. 278-79.
^^Ibid., pp. 94-97.
^^Ibid., pp. 101-102.
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^°Cf. Brigham, "The Supreme Court
P

.

o

...

as Conventional

Practice,"
'

.

hor a discussion of some of the issues involved
here see cf
Connolly, pp. 22-35.
^^Cf. Frohock, pp. 865-87.

63

—

E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisove reign People
(Hinsdale,
~~
Dryden Press, 1960), p. 72.
>

111

•

64

Charles G. Benda, "State Organization and Policy Formation:
1970 Reorganization of the Post Office Department," Politics and
Society 9, No. 2 (1979), p. 125.

The

65

Alain Touraine, The Self-Production of Society, trans. Derek
Coltman (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 178.
^^Ibid.,

p.

179.

^^Ibid.,

p.

217.

68

Ibid., p. 460.
The term system means a social order or social
system. The term system of historical action refers to a system of
class relations in a given social order.
However some debates have the
potential to spread beyond the constraints of a given system and thereby
to become a force for transforming that system.
See Touraine, pp. 72
and 75.

^^Ibid., pp. 178-79.
^^H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed. and trans., From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 7778.

^^Cf. Touraine, p. 188.
72

Nico Poulantas, State, Power, Socialism
(London:
New Left Books, 1978), p. 58.
'''^Cf.

,

trans.

Patrick Camiller

Macpherson, pp. 39-44.

^^Robert Grafstein, "The Legitimacy of Political Institutions,"
find Grafstein's position fruitI
Polity 14, No. 1 (Fall 1981), p. 58.
ful because it focuses on legitimacy as a result/aspect of a social process rather than as an individual attitude.
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Chapter III
1

Ih e_End of Liberalism 2nd ed. (New York^"'"^ McC^T^^^^vrrTO^^iB-T^ and American
Democ;ar: (New
(M
l^'^'l
York: ^^l^^'
Vintage Books, 1970); iHOiW^^TTTT
ariel
The
of American Pluralism, (Stanford, Cal
Stanford Univers tTTTilf^
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No

?Q^Sr

.
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^
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^Lowi

p.
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43
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msrPP^^lTr^^

Univeriuf Sr^ss;
4

See Thomas

P

^'^^^^'"^^^^

Jahmge, "Critical Elections and Social Change, To-

^"^^'^"^^ PartyCompetition
o'P,'"'^^?"
^tl^L'n
States, r?^!'
Polity 3, No. 4 (Summer

in the United
1971), p. 480 and Everett Carll Ladd
Jr., American Political Parties, Social Change
and Political Respons e
(New York:
W.W. Norton, 1970), pp. 57-58.
5

Cf.

Crenson,

p.

46.

^Ibid., pp. 3-4.
^Ibid.

,

p.

161

^Ibid., pp. 171-72.
9

Kenneth Finegold, "From Agrarianism to Adjustment: The Political
Origins of New Deal Agricultural Policy," Politics and Society 11, No.
^
1
(1982), pp. 1-27.
""^James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 335.

^^Cf. Crenson (entire); i.e., this is a major point of the book,
although Crenson does not use the term "realignment."
1

Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of
American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), pp. 73-82 and 101-4.
13

Richard Polenburg, Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government 1936-39
(Cambridge, Mass.
Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 6.
:

14

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Coming of the New Deal
Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp. 2-3.

Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston:
Mifflin,

1

925), p.

266.

(Boston:

Houghton
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I^lg-Plg^Mat_gff1ce and Powers, 1787-19.^7
dth
"""^"^//m^^T".'
4th ed. revised
(New York:Ti^n^?rDB^^iFiit^^
^^For a fuller discussion of "state capacity"
see Theda sknmni
and Kenneth Finegold, "State Capacity
and Economic I
erve
c
n't e
Science_auarter1i97, No. 2 (Summer 198 2)
'
PP

2s"
1

g

Cf.

Wilson, pp. 148-49.

^^Ibid.,
20

Ibid.,

p.

106.

p.

135.

Note:

my parentheses on "congressional."

21

The Developm ent of the American Constitu tion
1Q77
ioi^^I^m" ^, ^f**^'
1877-1917
(New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 29-30.
'

22
n

1

^6^1

^t^"^-^. ^^^H
(Cambridge,
Mass.:

fr

23

24

Cf. Wilson, pp.
Cf.

Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New
Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 33.
xx-xxi.

Polenburg, pp. 3-4.

25

Cf. Karl, p. 167.
Of course the meaning of "efficiency" is subject to contention.
It can mean management control or the ability to
respond to substantive problems.
These two values are to some extent
always in contradiction.

26

York:

Harold Seidmann, Politics, Position, and Power, 3rd ed. (New
Oxford University Press, 1980) p. 86.
,

^'^Cf.

Beth, p. 25.

28

Larry Berman, The 0MB and the Presidency 1921-79 (Princeton,
N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 4.
The bill actually
passed Congress, but Wilson vetoed it over a dispute over whether the
President could remove the Comptroller General and other GAO officers.
29
30

Cf.

Seidmann,

Cf.

Berman, pp. 4-5.

^hbid.,
32
33

pp.

p.

5-7.

Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid.

,

pp.

"^^Ibid., pp.

ix-x.
7-8.

102.
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36
PP: 78-79 and Allen Schick, "The Budget Bureau
Th.t II
c^%^^'
^r'^"^^""'
That
Was:
Thoughts
on the Rise, Decline, and Future
of a Presidential
Agency," Law_and Contejnporar^JPro^
35, No. 3 (Summer 1970r pp
5] 9-

37

Cf.

Neustadt,

p.

643.

oo

Ibid., pp. 644-45.

^^Ibid., p. 646.
40

~

Stephen J. Wayne, The Legislative Presiden cy (New York:
~
and Row, 1978), p. 96.
n

Harper

^^Cf. Skocpol and Finegold, pp. 262-63.
42

Jordan A. Schwartz, The Interregnum of Despa ir (Urbana,
University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 4-5.
43

Cf.

111

•

Wayne, p. 16.

44

Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics, 3rd ed. revised
(New York:
Harper Colophon Books, 1965), pp. 48-49 and 166-67.

45

John M. Allswang, The New Deal and Amrican Politics (New York:
~~
John Wiley, 1978), p. 12.
46

^°Ibid.,

p.

13.

^^Cf. Schwartz, p. 237.
48

William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin
Harper and Row, 1963), p. 27.

D.

Roosevelt and the New Deal

(New York:
49

The 1 932 election was an unusual realigning or pre-real igning
election in that there was no significant third party vote. See
Leuchtenburg, p. 27.
^°Cf. Ladd, p. 5.
51

Cf.

Leuchtenburg,

p.

17.

52

York:

Phillip H. Burch Jr., Elites in American History, Vol. Ill (New
Holmes and Meier, 1980), p. 51.

^^Cf.

Schlesinger, "The Coming of the New Deal,"

p.

549.
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54
55

Cf.

Leuchtenburg,

p.

Ct.

Polenburg,

22.

p.

63.

^^Ibid., pp. 5-6.
57

Cf.

Neustadt,

p.

647.

^^Cf. Berman, pp. 8-9.
59

Cf.

Neustadt,

p.

648.

60

yo\icy.

^Gerhard Colm, "The Executive Office and Fiscal and
Economic
Law and Contemporary Problems 21 (Autumn
1956),
710.
p.

61

Lester G. Seligman and Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., eds.. New
Deal
Mosaic, Roosevelt Confers with his National Emergency
Co uncil. 1933-1 936
(Eugene, OreTi
University of Oregon Books, 1965), pp. xiii-xxix.
62

63
64

Cf.

Schlesinger, "The Coming of the New Deal,"

Cf.

Seligman and Cornwell,

Cf.

Neustadt,

p.

p.

p.

547.

79.

649.

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid.,

p.

650.

^^Ibid., p. 652.
^^Ibid., pp. 651-62.
^^Cf.

Karl

,

pp.

76-78.'

^^Donald K. Price, "Staffing the Presidency," American
Science Review 40, No. 6 (December 1946), pp. 1161-62.

Pol itical

^^Cf. Lubell, p. 35.
72

Lubell, essentially the entire book is a description of how the
characteristic post-1932 Democratic and Republican coalitions came into
being.
73

Nancy H, Zingale, "Third Party Alignments in a Two Party System:
The Case of Minnesota," in The History of American Electoral Behavior
eds. Joel H. Silbey, Allan G. Bogue, and William H. Flanigan (Princeton,
N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 109-10.
,

74
Cf.

Leuchtenburg,

p.

84.
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Cf.

Schlesinger, "The Coming of the
New Deal," pp. 472-73.

HouJolTf7^'n: 196Jr'p'V7:-' '-^^^-^^^t^^^
''^Ibid., p.

(Boston

603.

Mentor, 1960)!^^°! 22!'''

I^-"^^^^^^" Presidency. revi.pH (New York:

^^Cf. Karl, p. 247.

80

Lester G. Seligman and Michael R. King,
"Political Realiqnments
and Recruitment to the U.S. Congress 1870-1970 "
in Realignme nt in AmerTcarLPo nics, eds. Bruce A. Campbell and Richard
"
J.
n ing iHusnn.
(Austin
University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 171.
I

81

Cf.

I

l

Polenburg, pp. 51, 146-51.

^^Ibid.,

p.

148.

^^Cf. Karl, p. 249.
84

Cf.

Polenburg,

p.

79.

^^Ibid., pp. 28-40.
^^Ibid., pp. 181-88.
87
Cf.

Berman, pp. 13-14.

Cf.

Neustadt, pp. 654-55.

00

^^Ibid., pp. 654-57.

Chapter IV

These amendments include a number of major pieces of legislation
including the Taft-Hartley Act the the Landrum-Griffith Act.
2

Karl E. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and
the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41," Minnesota Law
Review 62, No. 3 (March 1978), p. 291.
3

Frank W. McCulloch and Tim Bornstein, The National Labor Relations Board (New York:
Praeger, 1974), p. 23.
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^^^^^
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McCulloch and Bornstein, pp. viii-ix.

Iberkeley, Cal

.
:

University of Cal i fornfi^Press

^Ibid.,

p.

2.

^Ibid.,

p.

145.

,

1950),

ppTT^

9
''ox P^'ven and Richard A. Cloward,
Poor People's "ovements
""r^^^f,^
Movements
'0
(New VYork:
Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 115-19 and I4y-b3.

10

•cf. McCulloch and Bornstein,
pp. 8-9.
controversy
)ve
on this last point.

n Cf.

Piven and Cloward, pp. 96-97.

There is of course some

Also see all of Chapter 3.

1

James Wright points out that the worker insurgency model ".
requires an active, indeed, militant, constituency 'out there' in
the
body politic."
I agree with
this comment.
But given the way American
elections and major political parties are organized, the electoral
impact of this constituency is indirect or contextual. Government officials, professional politicians, etc. have to infer the meaning of
electoral results.
See cf. Pivan and Cloward, pp. 27-32.
1

Cf.

McCulloch and Bornstein,

p.

9.

14

Ironically, Robert F. Wagner may have been the first judge in
the United States, state or national, to issue a "pro-labor" injunction
in a labor dispute.
Cf. Bernstein, p. 28.
1

Cf.
1

g

Piven and Cloward, pp. 102-4.

Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The President, Congress and Legislation
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29-46.
^

pp.

26

Theodore J. Lowi , The End of Liberalism 2nd ed. (New
YorkNorton, 1 979); Grant McConnell, Private Power an d American
Democracy (New York:
Vintage Books, 1970), and Lester C Thurow, The Zero
Sum
~
Society (New York:
Penguin Books, 1981).
,

W.W

.

27

See James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New YorkMartins Press, 1973); Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets
(New
York:
Basic Books, 1977); and Ian Gough, "State Expenditure in
Advanced
Capitalism," New Left Review 92, No. 1 (July-August, 1975),
pp. 53-92.
St.

,

28

Charles

E.

Lindblom, The Policy Making Process

,

2nd ed.

woof Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980), pp. 71-77; also see
blom, "Politics," Ch. 12.
29

Cf.

0 Connor, pp.

"^^Ibid., p.
31

(EngleLind-

cf.

6-7.

7.

Ibid., pp. 64-91; also see cf. Lindblom, "Policy Making," pp.

74-76.
32

See cf

.

Lowi

,

pp.

15-21

33

For a full discussion of these issues see Louis Hartz, The
Liberal Tradition in America (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, and World,
1955).
34

See Kenneth M. Dolbeave, Political Change in the United States
(New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1974), pp. 91-112.
35

There is general agreement about the development of American
capitalism among observers of varying ideological perspectives. For
example see John Kenneth Galbraith, the New Industrial State (Bergenfield, N.J.:
New American Library, 1967); Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capi tal ism, Socialism and Democracy
3rd ed. (New York:
Harper and Row,
1950); and Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969).
,

^^Cf.

O'Connor, pp. 23-25.

^^Cf. Lowi, pp. 289-92.
Cf.

O'Connor, pp. 72-79.
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39

Walter Dean Burnham, "The Eclipse of the Democratic
Partv
Democracy 2, No. 3 (July 1982), p. 8.

"

,

40

While I am following Lowi's terminology, Lowi himself believes
that tripartite bargaining did not become the characteristic
form of
institutional action until the 1960s.
However Lowi does concede that
this development rests on choices made in the New Deal period
See rf
Lowi, pp. 273-88.
41

The House Education and Labor Committee is a good example of
this sort of committee.
See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressman in
Commi ttees (Boston:
Little Brown, 1973), pp. 226-42';^
'

42

For the purposes of simplification I am ignoring backdoor spending through the authorization process and the initial application of the
1974 Budget Act.
I
am also choosing to ignore the role of Appropriations committees, especially in the House as "guardians of the treasury"
for the time being. While these factors mitigate the effect I am describing, they do not come near to eliminating it.
Instead, while the
Appropriations committees may look with suspicion on the work of authorization committees, they respected the autonomy of their own subcommittees.
Members of these subcommittees often had strong ties to organized
constituencies.
See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary
Process (Boston:
Little Brown, 1964), pp. 47-56.

43

Some observers think the social programs of the 1960s resulted
in the greater incorporation of relatively disadvantaged groups into the
post-1932 system of governance, thereby providing these groups and their
allies with some ability to protect their gains.
See Frances Fox Piven
and Richard A. Cloward, The New Class War (New York:
Pantheon Books,
1982), pp. 118-24.
^^Cf. McConnell

,

pp.

51-90.

45

See Thomas E. Cronin, The State of the Presidency 2nd ed.
(Boston:
Little Brown, 1980), pp. 148-150; and Alan Wolfe, "Presidential Power and the Crisis of Modernization in Rethinking the Presidency
ed. Thomas E. Cronin (Boston:
Little Brown, 1982), pp. 139-52.
,

,

Of course the President, like Congress, is constrained by past
budget decisions.
^'^For an overview of different aspects of these changes see
Harper and Row,
J. Wayne, The Legislative Presidency (New York:

Stephen

1978), pp. 45-51, 83-91, 114-19, and 184-87.
^^

13, No. 19 (May 9, 1981),
National Journal
Journal, 13, No. 47 (November 21, 1981), p. 2090.
,

p.

846 and National
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I

and #20.

have argued this point earlier in this chapter, see notes
#19

50

This was particularly true in the Senate because of the rapid
expansion of the Republican delegation and of the pronounced difference
in the political views and allies of many of the new committee
chairmen
from those of their Democratic predecessors.
The replacement of Kennedy
by Thurmond as the chair of the Judiciary Committee represents an
extreme case of this phenomenon.
51

In two analyses of the Reagan 1981 budget victory that differ on
number of points, both authors agree that passage would have been impossible without the extraordinary solidarity of Republican members on
budget and tax issues.
See cf. Le Loup, and Allen Schick, How the Budget Was Won and Lost for AEI Conference on Presi dential -Congressional
Relations (January 7, 1982).
Differences between the authors' analyses
focus on the relative importance of the "Boll Weevils" and the "Gypsy
Moths."
a

,

Chapter VII

Most claims that policy change is strongly associated with realignments are based on historical judgement. Some efforts have been
made to quantitatively establish this relationship, mainly by testing
the significance of the correlations among the passage of varying types
of legislation, party platforms, and election results.
Examples of this
approach include David Brady and Joseph Stewart Jr., "Congressional
Party Realignment and the Transformation of Public Policy in Three
Realignment Eras," American Journal of Political Science 26, No. 2 (May
1982), pp. 333-60 and Benjamin Ginsberg, "Elections and Public Policy,"
American Political Science Review 70, No. 1 (March 1976), pp. 41-49. A
second, more indirect, approach to this problem is to check the association between election results and subsequent changes in inter-party and
For an example see Barbara
intra-party voting coalitions in Congress.
Transformation of the
the
and
Realignment
Deckard Sinclair, "Party
Review 71, No. 3 (SeptemPolitical
Science
Political Agenda," American
inability to directly
this
approach's
Despite
ber 1977), pp. 940-53.
it
has the advantage of
correlate policy change to election results,
focusing on qualitative differences in issue importance--a failing of
the Brady-Ginsberg approach which treats all congressional actions as
equally significant.
,

,

,

"On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy
^Robert A. Dahl
the United States," Dissent 25, No. 3 (Summer 1978), pp. 310-12 and
Theodore J. Lowi The End of Liberalism 2nd ed. (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1979), pp. 271-72.
,

,

,

,

in
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3

Walter Dean Burnham, "The Eclipse of the Democratic Party
Democracy 2, No. 3 (July 1982), pp. 7-10.

"

,

4

Ibid., pp. 7-17; Samuel P. Hays, "Politics and Society: Beyond
the Political Party," in The Evolution of American Electoral Systems
eds. Paul Kleppner et al
(Westport, Conn.
Greenwood Press, 1981), 'pp.
243-67; William Schneider, "Realignment:
The Eternal Question," P S
15, No. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 449-57.
,

.

:

5

I
am referring to the historical periods around 1800, 1828-32,
1860, 1896, and 1932-36.
It may be possible to apply the concept of
realignment in a lesser degree to other times, including the present
(1980) period.

Richard J. Trilling and Bruce A. Campbell, "Toward a Theory of
Realignment," in Realignment in American Politics eds. Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1980^,
,

p.

4.

^Cf. Brady and Stewart, pp. 335-36.
Also see James L. Sundquist,
Dynamics of the Party System (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1973),
p. 37 for a possible explanation for this difficulty.
g

Burnham seems to be an exception to this contention. He sometimes notes the constraining force of the dominance of liberal ideology
upon the development of political movements/opposition in the United
States.
For example, cf. Burnham, "Eclipse," pp. 7-17.
In this article
he also talks about the constraint of policy change, in this case the
policies of the Reagan administration, in creating a new political
environment.
Oxford
^C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York:
For a discussion of the issue of the
University Press, 1967), pp. 8-9.
translation of personal troubles into public or political issues see pp.
3-13.
For a related but distinct analysis see Richard F. Hamilton,
John Wiley, 1972),
Class and Politics in the United States (New York:
process is diffitranslation
the
83-85.
that
authors
agree
Both
pp.
However, Mills seems to think that individuals' abilities to
cult.
perceive situations as troubles can be constrained by the language/
Hamilton seems to discount this
concepts available to the individual.
possi bili ty

^Powerful documentation of this is found in John Gaventa, Power
University of Illinois Press, 1980).
and Powerlessness (Urbana, 111.:
are able to easily articulate
individuals
In this particular case study,
their personal troubles.
^

The
^^This generalization may be less useful than in the past.
yet
elections,
1964 and 1980 elections do not appear to be realigning
from
both resulted in policy change comparable to that expected
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realignments. This suggests the decline of realignment as the
most
important agency of major political adjustment in the United States.
See Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of
American Politics (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1970), pp. 170-74.
1

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 413-39.
1

Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment (New York:
versity Press, 1978), pp. 270-86.

Oxford Uni-

14

The 1896 election is an exception.
But in this case the leading
coalitional partners wanted to maintain the form of state it had helped
create in the period following the Civil War.
1

Walter Dean Burnham, Jerome M. Clubb, and William H. Flanigan,
"Partisan Realignment: A Systemic Perspective," in The History of
American Electoral Behavior eds. Joel H. Si 1 bey, Allan G. Bogue, and
William H. Flanigan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1978), p. 71.
,

1

g

Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan, pp. 70-72.
In the case of the New
Deal, the authors note that significant symbols of both cognitive and
emotive importance formed around terms such as "Herbert Hoover," "Depression," "FDR," and "New Deal." These symbols informed voter choice
in the following political era.
^^E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi soverei gn People (Hinsdale, 111.:
Dryden Press, 1960), pp. 1-5.
1

o

Alain Touraine, The Self-Production of Society trans. Derek
University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 72-75.
Coltman (Chicago:
,

1

Q

Cf. Sundquist, pp. 275-81 and Gerald M. Pomper with Susan S.
Longman Press,
Lederman, Elections in America 2nd ed. (New York:
recognize retrogenerally
approach
this
of
Proponents
105.
1980), p.
spective elements of realignments as well as anticipatory ones.
,

^^This has been the dominant view in the realignment literature.
The classic statement of this view is found in V. 0. Key with Milton C.
Vintage Books, 1966).
Cummings, The Responsible Electorate (New York:
Zingale, "Third Party Alignments in
in The History of American
Minnesota,"
of
The Case
a Two Party System:
(Princeton, N.J.:
al
et
Silbey
Electoral Behavior , eds. Joel H.
106-33.
Princeton University Press, 1978), pp.
^""For an example see Nancy H.

.

^^Virtually all formal realignment theorists hold this view,
voting during
although those who see major prospective elements to
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realignments seem to hold this view less stronqly.
285-98.

See cf

Sundauist
lUMuibt,

pp.

23

See Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor
Movements (New York:
Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 14-32.

P eople's

24

See Piven and Cloward, pp. 32-36, and Karl E. Klare, "Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941," Minnesota La w Review, 62, No. 3 (March 1978)
pp. 265-339.
25

Of course this expansion is not absolute.
The expansion of possibilities in terms of the interests of a new dominant political coalition always means the contraction of other possibilities.
See, E. E.
Schattschneider, The Semisoverei gn People (Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden
Press, 1960, pp. 70-71.
26

al

John Brigham, "The Supreme Court:
An Institution
Practice," mimeographed (Amherst, Mass., 1981), p. 8.
27

as

Convention-

Cf. Lowi
pp. 4-6, and Everett Carll Ladd Jr., American PolitiParties, Social Change and Political Response (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1970), p. 54.
,
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